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Abstract 
 
The European Union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy, 
the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty 
on the European Union. Whereas future Member States are vetted for their 
compliance with these values before they accede to the Union, no similar 
method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles after 
accession. EU history proved that this ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ was far from 
theoretical. EU Member State governments’ adherence to foundational EU 
values cannot be taken for granted. Violations may happen in individual 
cases, or in a systemic way, which may go as far as overthrowing the rule of 
law. Against this background the European Parliament initiated a Legislative 
Own-Initiative Report on the establishment of an EU mechanism on 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and proposed among 
others a Scoreboard on the basis of common and objective indicators by which 
foundational values can be measured. This Research Paper assesses the need 
and possibilities for the establishment of an EU Scoreboard, as well as its 
related social, economic, legal and political ‘costs and benefits’. 
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Executive summary 
 
The European Union (EU)  received its core values at its inception: achieving peace and 
prosperity, the immediate goals of integration still with us since the times of the Schuman 
declaration, had a strong implied liberty component. Dictatorships and any countries 
which were not ‘free’ were not welcome to join the Union. Notwithstanding the fact that 
democracy and the rule of law were not part of the black letter law of the Communities 
for a long time, both have clearly been regarded as important unwritten principles, which 
became codified thanks to the pre-accession strategy in the context of the preparation of 
the ‘big-bang’ enlargement to the east of the continent. Currently there is Treaty basis 
behind EU values, such as democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, which are 
entrenched in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Future Member 
States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to the Union. 
The so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ ensure that all new EU Member States are in line 
with the Union’s common principles before joining the EU. That notwithstanding, no 
similar method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles after 
accession. This has been referred to as the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’. 
 
Borrowing from James Madison, “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary.” History has shown that EU 
governments are no exceptions: they do violate foundational EU values in multiple ways. 
It happens in individual cases, or in a systemic manner that might result in a serious and 
persistent breach of EU values, which may go as far as overthrowing a system based on 
the rule of law.  
 
Beyond harming nationals of a Member State, all Union citizens in that State will also be 
detrimentally affected. Lack of limits to illiberal practices may encourage other Member 
States’ governments to follow, and subject other countries’ citizens to abuse. In other 
words, rule of law violations – if no consequences occur – may become contagious. 
Moreover, all EU citizens beyond the borders of the Member States concerned will to 
some extent suffer due to the given State’s participation in the EU’s decision-making 
mechanism, or to say the least, the legitimacy of Union decision-making will be 
jeopardised. Therefore, a state’s departure from the rule of law standards and the 
European consensus will ultimately hamper the exercise of rights of individuals EU-
wide. As a further consequence of no consequent and uniform enforcement of 
fundamental rights throughout the Union, and regular health check of judicial 
independence of Member States for granted, mutual trust- and mutual recognition-based 
instruments are jeopardised. The CJEU has accepted that the presumption of EU Member 
States’ compliance with fundamental rights may be rebuttable – but if EU Member States 
cannot properly ensure an efficient, human rights-compliant and independent judiciary 
to carry out that test, how possibly could the principle of mutual recognition stand in EU 
JHA law? Beyond the political and social costs of the democracy, rule of law and 
fundamental rights deficit exposed in the non-compliant Member States, economic costs 
should also be mentioned. Rational law presents a necessary condition for economic 
transactions, and its application creates a sense of foreseeability and predictability on the 
part of economic agents. The latter is a necessary condition in order for rational economic 
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actions to occur. Control of private capture and corruption, institutional checks on 
government, protection of property rights and mitigation of violence are all in close 
correlation with economic performance. Especially in times of financial and economic 
crises solid State institutions based on commonly shared values play a key role in 
creating or restoring confidence and fostering growth. 
 
In a democracy based on the rule of law, built-in correction mechanisms and sites of 
resistance compensate for the deficiencies of a majoritarian government, such as the 
concept of separation of powers, checks and balances, emphasis on independent judicial 
control, media freedom, etc. In a country where domestic checks fails, solely the control 
mechanism of international law including supranational courts protecting the rule of law 
is left. Accordingly, international and EU norms and enforcement mechanisms shall be 
regarded as external tools of militant democracy whereby the people are granted 
protection against their substandard representatives, when all domestic channels of 
criticism have been effectively silenced and all domestic safeguards of democracy 
become inoperational – in short, when the rule of law has been efficiently deconstructed 
in a state of constitutional capture. 
 
Currently, the EU possesses of one sole supervisory mechanism to uphold its values, in 
the form of Article 7 TEU. The Article 7 TEU procedure has not been used ever since its 
introduction in the Treaties – not because there were no situations that would have 
justified its use, but for lack of political will. In response to this deficiency, both scholars 
and European institutions have called for reforms; the latter’s group of proposals most 
importantly include the Commission’s New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, commonly referred to as pre-Article 7 procedure, currently being tested with regard 
to Poland.  
 
The formulation of a pre-Article 7 procedure is a milestone in a worrying trend of non-
enforcement of European values to be witnessed for almost two decades. The Amsterdam 
Treaty introduced the Article 7 sanction mechanism in 1999, and soon the Nice Treaty 
added a preventive arm to it. Whereas there were good reasons for instigating the 
mechanism in the recent history of integration, instead of making use of the already 
diluted procedure of Article 7(1), the Commission decided to water down the process 
even further by inserting a preventive-preventive process. Moreover is used selectively, 
thereby questioning the objectivity of the process and the equal treatment of Member 
States. Despite its weaknesses, the creation of the Commission’s new EU Rule of Law 
Framework can be seen as an acknowledgment of the rule of law problem, and as a step 
in the right direction to overcome it. On a positive note, the ongoing rule of law debate 
shifted its focus from an Article 7 TEU emergency-led context toward a discussion on 
shared European values and legal principles. Beyond supervision, EU values shall be 
promoted actively. Still, previous mechanisms and the EU Rule of Law Framework are 
crisis-driven and do not constitute a permanent and periodic monitoring and evaluation 
process of EU Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU legal principles. Neither do 
they go far enough in ensuring objective, independent and regular scrutiny of EU 
Member States’ rule of law obligations.  
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The present Research Paper was written with the establishment of such a mechanism in 
mind, responding to a call by Resolution of 10 June 2015 the European Parliament to 
create an annual monitoring of compliance with democracy, the rule of law and the 
situation of fundamental rights in all Member States through a Scoreboard, to be 
established on the basis of common and objective indicators.  
 
The first part of the Research Paper – accompanied by three Annexes – provides a map of 
the state of the art; existing instruments in the EU, Council of Europe and United Nations 
settings to assess various aspects related to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
human rights; summaries of scholarly and institutional approaches to overcoming the 
Copenhagen dilemma; and finally, by way of currently ongoing procedures, an 
illustration of deep-seated tensions within the Union’s architecture to tackle rule of law 
backsliding and constitutional capture. The second and third parts highlight general and 
EU-specific methodological issues and challenges to be tackled. On the basis of our 
findings the fourth part incorporates an enumeration of substantive and procedural 
factors to be taken into account when considering the establishment of an EU Scoreboard. 
Annex 4 summarised the impact of the rule of law on economic performance and 
introduces factors to consider when assessing the costs of an EU Scoreboard.  
 
The Research Paper formulated the following recommendations with regard to the 
establishment of an EU Scoreboard on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights. 
 
1. The Research Paper understands the Scoreboard as a combination of ‘discussion and 
dialogue’, ‘monitoring’, ‘measuring/evaluating and benchmarking’ and ‘supervision’, 
with various actors and methods channelled into one EU-specific system. In this sense a 
Scoreboard could be described as a ‘process’ encompassing a multi-actor and multi-
method cycle.  
 
2. The Research Paper argues with respect to the principle of conferral that the EU can 
intervene to protect its constitutional core, but what is more, the EU is also unequivocally 
obliged by the Treaties to act. Member Sates are interdependent in multiple areas, and 
depreciation of EU values will have EU-wide effects in all possible ways. In order to 
ensure that the principle of subsidiarity and, by consequence, the sovereignty of the 
Member States are respected, it is indispensable for the Union to create reliable 
instruments of data collection and exchange, to enable it to be always on top of the 
situation on the ground in all the Member States. A Scoreboard instrument in this sense is 
not in contravention of the subsidiarity principle but, quite to the contrary, would 
contribute to making it operational.  
 
3. In order to prevent hypocrisy and enhance credibility in and outside the EU, preferably 
both the supranational entity – in the case at hand, the EU – and its constitutive elements, 
i.e. the Member States, shall be scrutinised via a Scoreboard, even if certain remedies are 
by nature exclusively applicable to the EU’s constitutive elements. 
 
4. Possibilities and limits of borrowing from existing monitoring and evaluation 
instruments in other international or regional fora shall be acknowledged. As has been 
PE 579.328  11 
shown in this Research Paper, making use of international mechanisms is already 
happening, with the EU Justice Scoreboard relying among others on the CoE CEPEJ 
model of evaluation/benchmarking, and the EU Anti-Corruption Report making use of 
the GRECO model. Borrowing may take place with regard to information, data, 
standards, structures and mechanisms. One option is to bring together all existing data 
and analyses from the international scene under one umbrella, in a ‘one-stop shop’, like 
the European Fundamental Rights Information System within the frame of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency. Already existing data and analyses on various ‘rule of law-
related dimensions’ at the CoE and the UN should be taken in consideration during the 
EU Rule of Law Scoreboard.  
 
At the same time, bringing together data and analysing synergies, or even making 
comparisons as suggested in the literature, is an exercise that is close to impossible and 
more akin to ‘alchemy’. Standards, sources, data, data-handling methods and the 
interpretations of each of the various sets of tools are so different in nature and 
fundamentals, they necessitate a very tedious methodological exercise for making 
international mechanisms comparable and conclusions and findings meaningful.  
 
While relying on external sources and mechanisms, the EU element or specificity of the 
process shall always be kept. In other words, a rule of law mechanism shall never be 
‘contracted out’ entirely to third parties, since non-EU actors fail to take due account of 
their relevance or links with existing European law and policies as well as general 
principles of European law, such as that of mutual recognition of judicial/administrative 
decisions. The EU shall be allowed to set higher standards than other international 
mechanisms.  
 
The EU Rule of Law Scoreboard could fit into the timetable of the European Semester and 
could be linked to the Cycle of Economic Governance. Beyond necessary overlaps in data 
collection however the EU Scoreboard shall be detached from other existing mechanism, 
with special regard to the latter’s weaknesses with regard to enforcement. EU values 
beyond monitoring.  
 
5. A case-by-case approach would be needed, where assessment through numerical 
indicators could be an element, but it should not constitute the core of the new 
Scoreboard. Instead, emphasis shall be placed on a contextual, qualitative assessment of 
data and a country-specific list of key issues, in order to grasp interrelations between data 
and the causalities behind them.  
 
Limits of the Scoreboard should also be acknowledged: it would not be suitable to predict 
or prevent future trends; rank Member States according to who is performing ‘better’ or 
‘worse’; or conduct simplistic cross-country comparative analyses.  
 
Fundamental rights to a lesser extent, but democracy and even more the rule of law are 
fluid concepts and phenomena, and there is no single ideal formula to achieve them. Rule 
of law is a contested concept, and even the most detailed definition, to be true to the idea 
of the rule of law, has to contain a share of vagueness in order to accommodate rule of 
law’s very nature. This requirement of vagueness plays strongly against any Quichotean 
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attempts to turn the rule of law into a shopping list of elements, even if some examples of 
relatively good lists are known. Eliminating vagueness entirely, on such a reading, 
profoundly undermines the usefulness of the concept itself. Therefore the Research Paper 
argues against designing the standards along indicators – a rather dubious exercise that 
can easily be attacked as politically or ideologically biased. It is suggested to carefully 
consider whether needed and sparingly use benchmarking methods and indicators.  
 
Lack of agreement on standards and a context-sensitive analysis is not only benefiting 
states, but at the same time it does not allow rule of law backsliders to hide their efforts 
by referencing other states and claiming that there was nothing unorthodox about their 
structures. Whereas it may be true that formally a state borrowed the existing legal 
solutions, institutions and practices from various other jurisdictions, it might well be a 
selection of ‘worst practices’ and taken as a whole, in violation of EU values. 
 
6. The Research Paper systemized possible stages of respect for European values and 
identified three scenarios. In the first scenario, the boundaries of democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights are correctly set by national constitutional law and domestic 
bills of rights, whereas the enforcement of the values is first and foremost the task of the 
domestic courts, but other checks and balances are also operating well and fulfil their 
function. In this scenario an external mechanism is not vital but can have an added value. 
In a second scenario a Member State still adhering to democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights might be in violation of individual rights, due to individual mistakes 
or structural and recurrent problems. In such cases, as a general rule, if domestic 
mechanisms (such as a constitutional court, civil society or media pressure) are incapable 
of solving the problem, the national law will be overwritten by international law and 
deficiencies in application of the law will be remedied to some extent by international 
apex courts. In other cases chronically lacking capacity to solve systemic problems such 
as corruption, international norms and fora cannot remedy the problems but can point to 
them and contribute to domestic efforts to tackle them. The third scenario is qualitatively 
different from the previous two. Without going into the details, this is the state of a 
constitutional capture with a systemic breach of separation of powers, constitutional 
adjudication, failure of the ordinary judiciary and the ombudsman system, civil society or 
the media. Before reaching that stage, the country on its way towards the third scenario, 
in a state of so-called rule of law backsliding shall be warned and a constitutional capture 
be prevented. 
 
7. The institutional framework behind the Scoreboard shall reflect objectivity. The 
proposal to establish a ‘EU Rule of Law Commission’ as an independent body of scholars 
should be seriously considered. The EU Rule of Law Commission could be placed at the 
centre of the EU Rule of Law Scoreboard. The selection and organizational model could 
follow the one currently utilized in actors like the Venice Commission and the CEPEJ. Yet 
particular attention should be paid to the academic and independent nature of the 
members.  
 
The EU Rule of Law Commission shall make a context-specific assessment in light of data 
available or call for the need to gather extra information on EU issue-specific questions. 
The possibility to conduct country visits (following the UN Special Rapporteurs model) 
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could also be envisaged. The UN model of well-established working relationships/close 
partnerships with national Human Rights Authorities and civil society organisations 
should be pursued.  
 
An EU Rule of Law Commission could draw up Annual (Country Specific) Reports on 
the basis of available and additional materials. The annual report shall point to the 
strengths and weaknesses, and suggest specific ways to overcome the latter.   
 
8. Tools and institutional design shall be adjusted to the needs, and accordingly the 
Scoreboard shall establish a two-prong mechanism for Member States ‘on track’ and ‘off 
the track’ of the rule of law.  
 
In both the first and second scenarios described above, i.e. when international 
mechanisms are used for upholding and promoting European values, remedying some 
breaches of single elements of European values or reversing the trends in the 
deterioration of some sub-elements of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights, the Scoreboard mechanism may follow a “‘sunshine policy’, which engages and 
involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, and where value-control “is owned equally 
by all actors”. 
 
In the second scenario, it may be useful to disentangle the interrelated values of 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Maintaining the distinction is 
particularly useful at this point, since infringement in this second scenario typically 
affects fundamental rights, whereas a number of mechanisms exist in Europe to tackle 
fundamental rights problems.  
 
The third scenario – which is the trigger for the attempts to tackle the Copenhagen 
dilemma and also for the present Research Paper – is fundamentally different from the 
first two, and therefore the methodology of the Scoreboard shall introduce a second 
prong accordingly. When a State systematically undermines democracy, deconstructs the 
rule of law and engages in massive human right violations, there is no reason to presume 
the good intentions of those in power to engage in a sunshine approach involving a 
dialogue and soft measures in order to make the entity return to the concept of limited 
government – a notion that those in power wished to abandon in the first place.  
 
A challenge lies in identifying the point when a Member State enters or is on the path 
towards the third phase, and to remedy the situation. It is under this Scenario that the 
systemic infringement proceedings, the EU Rule of Law Mechanism or Article 7 TEU 
would come in. All these procedures have – and we assume all future mechanisms will 
have – a discussion phase, where the Member State in question can present its views on 
its laws, policies and their realisation in practice. The Scoreboard could guide the 
discussion and make the process foreseeable and transparent. The discussion could still 
be led by an inter-institutional arrangement/agreement, with the FRA and/or the 
Commission taking the lead.  
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Graph 1: The three rule of law scenarios and responding mechanisms  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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9. the procedural matters are in close correlation with the key challenge of any 
Scoreboard method, namely their ‘politicisation’ versus retaining their legitimacy when 
governments and the various EU institutions will accuse them of being ‘political’ and 
‘non-neutral’. The main challenges identified with regard to ensuring and enhancing 
legitimacy were the need for objective standards, equal treatment of Member States, a 
prompt response to rule of law backsliders, respect for the principles of conferral and 
subsidiarity, potentially reversing the burden of proof of compliance with European 
values and shifting it from European institutions to the Member States, the need for 
follow-up mechanisms and the introduction of efficient, dissuasive and proportionate 
sanctions.   
 
10. Follow-up mechanism and efficient sanctions  
There was a general agreement between interviewees that a follow-up mechanism was 
needed, such as the Committee of Ministers in the framework of the Council of Europe 
overseeing Strasbourg judgments. After problems – whether individual or systemic – 
have been identified, there shall be regular assessment and a special procedure on 
compliance and follow-up with recommendations. The supervisory prong of the 
Scoreboard would however need to go beyond that. As is apparent from the state of the 
art and the depreciation of rule of law values, enforcement is the weak side of the existing 
legal framework overseeing European values – including the Article 7 mechanism or 
general infringement procedures according to Articles 258-260 TFEU. Enforcement with 
effective sanctions is also the weak side of suggestions by EU institutions and academic 
proposals. 
 
The highly probable failure of both naming and shaming, and also of a more positive 
discursive approach, shall be acknowledged: an illiberal State is unlikely to be persuaded 
to return to EU values by way of diplomatic attacks, political criticism, discussions and 
dialogue. Proposals “adding bite to the bark” therefore typically point to the power of the 
purse, i.e. operate with quasi-economic sanctions, such as the suspension, withholding or 
deduction of EU funds, or pecuniary sanctions. Whereas pecuniary sanctions may be 
effective with regard to all Member States, for the time being the power of the purse 
could be particularly strong, as paradoxically the main rule of law backsliders are 
countries which are net beneficiaries of European integration. Freezing EU funds in their 
case would also put an end to the paradox of using EU money to build authoritarian 
regimes in denial of EU values. 
 
11. Concerning the legal basis dilemma, we have several options under the current Treaty 
framework to set up an EU Rule of Law Commission as a consultative body. 
 
The option of an inter-institutional agreement without any further legal basis shall be 
considered. 
 
Also, Article 352 TFEU constitutes the foundations for Regulation 168/2007 establishing 
the FRA. There is therefore a precedent in its use. The FRA's organisational structure also 
includes a Scientific Committee composed of eleven independent persons, highly 
qualified, whose terms of office is not renewable. The Scientific Committee thus is a 
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candidate for fulfilling the role of the EU Rule of Law Commission. However, there are 
strong reasons against entrusting the FRA or the FRA Scientific Committee with such a 
mandate. First,  autonomy and legitimacy of the entity can only be preserved, if  
governments and the various EU institutions cannot accuse it of being ‘political’ and 
‘non-neutral’, and therefore any such body shall be detached from EU institutions and 
bodies. Second, whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are closely 
interrelated, they cannot be used as synonyms, and there are strong benefits in keeping 
these apart. 
 
Alternatively, or in parallel, the implementation of Article 70 TFEU could also be used. 
This article would give a sound entry point in an area, which is specific to EU law, 
namely mutual recognition.  
 
Preferably the Court of Justice could get involved, in particularly at times of determining 
what is a systematic rule of law deficiencies. If the EU Rule of Law Commission 
determines that there are systematic deficiencies, one could consider to call the Court to 
intervene and have a substantial assessment even before the context of Article 7 TEU, 
particularly when the deficiencies affect mutual recognition based EU policies and 
aspects where fundamental rights of people are at stake, for example in cases of 
detention. An option is to make use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure laid 
down in CJEU Rules of Procedure. 
 
Finally, the EU Rule of Law Commission could follow a similar format than the Venice 
Commission. An open question is who should appoint its members. In the Venice 
Commission it is the Member States. For the EU, prospective potential members should 
pass the test of the European Parliament before nomination, and they could be chosen 
from candidates proposed by Council and the Commission. 
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1. Democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights 
mechanisms: Moving beyond the state of the art  
1.1. State of the art, research questions and methodology 
The current situation as regards democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the 
EU is faced with substantial challenges and uncertainties. The UK referendum on the EU 
is only one of the obstacles to better governance of the EU and one which presents a 
particularly problematic challenge as the threat is to remove a Member State from the 
rule of law framework altogether. The use of the threat of a referendum as a mechanism 
to drive negotiations with the EU institutions as the UK has approached the issue, has 
already encouraged copy cat referenda – notably now in Hungary over the refugee crisis. 
The present Research Paper is written against the background of ruptures in the fabric of 
the complex web of interconnectedness within the European Union. 
 
The European Union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, and fundamental rights. This has been enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) which lists “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities” as the shared values in which the Union is rooted. With the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU became officially equipped with its own bill 
of rights in the form of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Moreover, national 
constitutional traditions of EU Member States, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, ECHR), and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court are also 
constitutive elements of EU law. 
 
Member States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to the 
Union (Article 49 (1) EU). The so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ established in 1993 are 
meant to ensure that all new EU Member States are in line with the Union’s common 
principles before joining the EU.1 Also, the Union is obliged by law to export these 
values, which underlie the Union’s international relations (Articles 21, 3 (5) and 8 TEU).2 
That notwithstanding, no similar method or ‘mechanism’ exists to supervise and 
regularly monitor adherence to these foundational legal principles after accession. A gap 
emerged between the proclamation of fundamental rights and foundational values and 
                                                          
1 The criteria read as follows: “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union”. Cf.: C. Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and Their 
Progeny’ in: C. Hillion, EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, Oxford: Hart, 2004, 1–23; D. Kochenov, 
‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Criterion of 
Democracy and the Rule of Law’, 8 European Integration online Papers 10 (2004). 
2 Cf. L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’, in: D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The 
European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013, 108–129; M. Cremona, ‘Values in EU Foreign Policy’, in: M. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds.), 
Beyond the Established Legal Orders: Policy Interconnections between the EU and the Rest of the World, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, 275–315. 
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principles, and their actual enforcement. Whereas before accession the most severe 
sanctions could be imposed on a prospective member country – namely disregard of EU 
values could result in the suspension of membership negotiations and any financial 
assistance from the EU3 – there is no counterpart to such scrutiny after accession. In 
theory – and there is convincing evidence that also in reality – Member States may abuse 
the fact that EU membership is a one-way-street, and might jeopardise EU values to an 
extent that they would not be permitted to accede, had they not been already member 
countries. This has been referred to by Vice-President of the European Commission 
Viviane Reding as the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’.4  
 
Against this background former Commissioner Reding’s call in 2013 to stop applying 
double-standards in and outside the EU when it comes to respect for the rule of law shall 
be seen as an important initiative. “Whereas it is the duty of domestic legal systems to 
uphold the Treaties, including EU objectives, rule of law matters are no longer a ‘domain 
reservé’ for each Member State, but are of common European interest.”5  
 
The lack of monitoring, evaluating and supervisory mechanisms for the EU’s legal 
founding principles would not constitute a problem if Member States adhered to these 
principles after accession. This, however, is a very unlikely hypothetical scenario. As 
James Madison put it, “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.”6 The whole idea of the rule of law implies 
that law is an effective check on the exercise of political power.7 However, governments 
of human beings, including Member State governments, may – and do – violate 
foundational principles,8 and they do so in at least two ways.  
 
First, concepts such as fundamental rights are fluid ones. Member States may violate 
them by sticking to their old black letter law or jurisprudence instead of responding to 
the changed social circumstances (criminalisation of homosexuality, non-criminalisation 
of domestic violence, or lack of reasonable accommodation are just illustrative and 
obvious examples).  
 
Second, a country may straightforwardly turn against its own previously respected 
principles of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. This latter scenario may 
                                                          
3 C. Hillion, ‘Enlargement of the European Union: A Legal Analysis’, in: A. Arnull and D. Wincott 
(eds.), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
401–418. 
4 “Once this Member State has joined the European Union, we appear not to have any instrument 
to see whether the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary still command respect”. 
European Parliament (2012), Plenary debate on the political situation in Romania, statement by V. 
Reding, 12 September 2012. See also V. Reding, “The EU and the Rule of Law: What Next?”, speech 
delivered at CEPS, 4 September 2013. 
5 V. Reding, “The EU and the Rule of Law: What Next?”, speech delivered at CEPS, 4 September 
2013. 
6 J. Madison, The Federalist No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper 
Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments, Independent Journal, 6 February 1788. 
7 G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds.), Relocating the Rule of Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009; G. 
Palombella, È possibile la legalità globale? Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012. 
8 On the relationship between democracy and the rule of law, see, e.g. L Morlino and G. Palombella 
(eds.), Rule of Law and Democracy: Inquiries into Internal and External Issues Leiden: Brill, 2010. 
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happen in a narrow field, but in a gravely injurious manner, which is typically the case 
with regard to fundamental rights. Cases in point include the Roma crises in France in 
2010-13, the Italian Ponticelli incident, and the mass surveillance programmes of EU 
citizens by the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) intelligence 
service and other EU Member States in collaboration with the United States NSA. 
Alternatively, a country may make a U-turn on the path of the rule of law, systematically 
eliminating – at least in the domestic setting – the channels for any kind of internal 
dissent, i.e. diminishing the potentialities of criticism by the voters (by media dominance, 
gerrymandering, etc.), civil society (by cutting funds and systematically harassing NGO 
representatives), and the state institutions (by weakening the powers of the constitutional 
court, influencing the judiciary, eliminating ombudsman’s offices, etc.), thereby 
deconstructing effective checks and balances. Hungary and more recently Poland are 
illustrative examples in this regard, and are yet not exceptions across the Union.  
 
Typically, depreciation of one foundational ‘value’ triggers depreciation of others. Take 
the discrimination against the Roma, which goes hand in hand with arbitrary 
determinations of a state of emergency. Also, unlimited electronic surveillance was 
possible due to lack of transparency and democratic and judicial accountability of 
intelligence communities’ practices. A systematic deconstruction of the rule of law results 
in fundamental rights violations in all possible ways. Since democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental rights are co-constitutive, throughout the present Research Paper they 
will be discussed together, with due regard to their triangular relationship.9 
 
Against this background the present Research Paper examines the viability and added 
value (costs and benefits) of the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights, making use of an EU Scoreboard assessing EU 
Member States’ compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. 
 
The methodology used in the elaboration of this Research Paper has included both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of data when assessing the various options and 
research questions, as well as their related social, economic, and political costs and 
benefits. The Research Paper is based on the information already gathered from publicly 
available sources of information and data (both primary and secondary sources), as well 
as own field research. The desk research was complemented with a set of semi-structured 
                                                          
9 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available 
at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf; the 
original study done for the Directorate General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament, PE 
493.031, 2013, is available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2013)493031_EN.pdf; S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, ‘Rule of law or rule of thumb, 
A new Copenhagen mechanism for the EU’, CEPS policy brief, 2013, available at 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%20303%20Copenhagen%20Mechanism%20for%20Fundam
ental%20Rights_0.pdf. Cf. Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), Report of the Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights: The Principle of the Rule of Law, Doc. No. 11343, 6 July 2007, 
para. 5. One should not forget that the substance of EU values received a synergetic treatment also 
in the pre-accession context leading to the ‘big-bang’ enlargement: D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the 
Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Criterion of Democracy and 
the Rule of Law’, 8 European Integration online Papers 10 (2004). 
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(face-to-face) interviews with relevant EU policy-makers, representatives from other 
relevant supranational organisations and in the broader context, with individuals 
shaping the European understanding of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights.  
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Chapter 1 provides an synthesised overview of existing EU instruments that assess EU 
Member States’ compliance with democratic, rule of law and fundamental rights legal 
principles ‘outside the scope of EU law’. At the same time, Council of Europe and UN 
instruments will be presented, which might well serve as inspirations or sources for an 
EU Scoreboard, as well as at times of reflecting on ways to avoid unnecessary 
duplications and take into account ‘lessons learned’ from these already existing 
instruments when (and if) developing a Scoreboard instrument specific to the EU. 
Scholarly and institutional approaches tackling the Copenhagen dilemma will be 
summarised and, finally, ongoing rule of law scrutiny against two Member States will be 
described as illustrations of institutional, procedural and political obstacles to conducting 
a meaningful supervision of EU legal principles.  
 
Chapter 2 highlights the general methodological challenges to be addressed by any 
Scoreboard measuring complex social phenomena and ‘rule of law in the EU legal 
system’ more generally. The focus of Chapter 3 is narrowed to the EU jurisdiction and the 
possible objections against a supervisory mechanism established at the EU level. 
Drawing on the considerations, challenges, obstacles, advantages and dangers identified 
in the previous parts of the Research Paper, Chapter 4 provides ‘policy options’ and 
suggestions with regard to the value added and specficities of an EU Scoreboard 
designed to monitor and assess democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the 
EU legal system. 
1.2. A Typology of existing EU instruments  
What are the existing instruments that assess EU Member States’ compliance with rule of 
law-related or relevant aspects? This Section provides a synthesised overview of existing 
EU rule of law instruments that fall outside the formal institutional and procedural 
arrangements foreseen by the Treaties for the enforcement of EU, and of EU Member 
States’ practices that fall outside the scope of EU law.10 A detailed overview and typology 
of EU rule of law instruments has already been provided in a previous 2013 European 
Parliament study.11 Table 1 below provides an updated snapshot of the set of most 
relevant and recent instruments, as well as a picture of the wider policy landscape of 
diversified methods and EU actors involved.  
                                                          
10 For a detailed account of compliance and enforcement of EU law refer to M. Cremona (ed.), 
Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012; A. Jakab and 
D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, 
forthcoming. 
11 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available 
at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf, 4–15, and Annex 1 of the study.  
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Table 1: Landscape of combined EU rule of law methods and actors 
Supervision Evaluation Benchmarking Monitoring 
Discussion/ 
Dialogue 
Article 7 TEU 
EU Justice  
Scoreboard 
EU Justice  
Scoreboard 
EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule 
of Law  
Council  
Rule of Law  
Dialogue 
 
EU Anti-Corruption  
report 
EU Anti-Corruption 
report 
  
 
Cooperation and 
Verification  
Mechanism  
(CVM) 
   
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
This overview shows that the EU already counts on an increasing framework of tools and 
processes that engage in different ways in various kinds of assessments and monitoring 
procedures focused on EU Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU-relevant legal 
principles under the current Treaties’ configurations, including the legally binding EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. These instruments can be grouped into various 
categories depending on their actual scope, normative nature and degree of 
enforcement/follow-up as follows: supervision (Section 1.2.1.); 
Evaluation/Benchmarking (Section 1.2.2); Monitoring (Section 1.2.3); and 
Discussion/Dialogue (Section 1.2.4). 
1.2.1. Supervision 
Supervision instruments usually comprise monitoring and a detailed qualitative 
assessment/evaluation in cases where there are risks of a serious breach, or actual and 
persistent breaches, by an EU Member State of Article 2 TEU legal principles. In this way, 
this supervisory instrument has a preventive and a coercive arm. Supervising compliance 
is grounded on the Treaties or in an express provision envisaged in European law. There 
is also an enforcement or coercive arm in cases where EU Member States do not comply 
with their obligations. Article 7 TEU is the instrument serving such a function. 
 
Although the values laid down in Article 2 TEU, including, most importantly, democracy 
and the rule of law, do not lie, strictly speaking, within the scope of ordinary acquis of the 
Union in the sense that the Union cannot legislate based on this provision alone, their 
inclusion within the broader ambit of EU law cannot be disputed, as underlined by 
scholars on numerous occasions.12 In other words, it would be difficult to persuasively 
argue that the EU does not already possess a very clear and strong constitutional 
mandate to ensure that its foundational values are observed in each of its Member States. 
As a matter of law, EU Member States are in fact under a legal duty to cooperate in this 
endeavour and assist the EU in promoting its values both within and beyond the EU. 
 
The special nature of Article 2 TEU is demonstrated by the existence of Article 7 TEU, 
which offers a specific enforcement mechanism in two situations:  
                                                          
12 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the 
Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming; C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper (2014); J.-C. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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1. Where there is a clear risk of a serious breach of Article 2 values in a Member 
State (a four-fifths majority of the Member States in Council is required, not 
counting the Member State subjected to the procedure). No sanctions can be 
adopted under this procedure. The ‘best’ outcome could be the adoption of 
recommendations provided that the European Parliament assents and a four-
fifths majority is reached in the Council, conditions which do not seem 
unattainable if there is a political will to act. 
2. Where a serious and persistent breach of the same values has been established 
(unanimity of the Member States required, not counting the one subjected to the 
procedure). Once a breach is demonstrated under this procedure of Article 7, 
sanctioning of the troubled Member State is possible with the view of bringing it 
back to compliance with Article 2 TEU.  
 
That being said, Article 2 values unquestionably form part of the ‘Treaty’, which the 
Commission is also empowered to protect on a case-by-case basis via the ordinary 
infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, notwithstanding the fact that the 
institution opted to interpret this power conservatively and has not deployed Article 258 
TFEU procedure in this vein. 
 
A point of debate has been the actual material scope of Article 7 TEU. The Commission 
Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – Respect for and 
promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final – underlined 
that: 
The fact that Article 7 of the Union Treaty is horizontal and general in scope is quite 
understandable in the case of an article that seeks to secure respect for the conditions of 
Union membership. There would be something paradoxical about confining the Union’s 
possibilities of action to the areas covered by Union law and asking it to ignore serious 
breaches in areas of national jurisdiction. If a Member State breaches the fundamental 
values in a manner sufficiently serious to be caught by Article 7, this is likely to undermine 
the very foundations of the Union and the trust between its members, whatever the field in 
which the breach occurs.13 
 
Table 1: Effects and remedies of infringing national law, EU law and EU values 
 Breach of national law Breach of EU law 
Breach of EU values in the 
national setting 
 Effect Remedy Effect Remedy Effect Remedy 
MS level       
EU level       
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
                                                          
13 Commission Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - Respect for and 
promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, 15 October 2003, page 
5.  
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Article 7 TEU allows for EU intervention even if the threats or breaches of EU values 
concern issues lying outside of the EU scope of competence.14 It is however politically 
perceived as a remedy of last resort to use only in the most extreme circumstances, hence 
the ‘nuclear option’ label. Procedurally speaking, this provision is subject to relatively 
high decision-making thresholds. The presence of two countries in the EU in serious and 
persistent breach of EU values makes the deployment of the ‘biting’ clauses in the 
provision difficult, unless both problematic countries are tackled simultaneously. The 
Court of Justice can only review the legality of the procedure and not the decision 
establishing whether there is a risk or a persistent and serious threat to EU values.15 
 
Neither of the two Article 7 TEU procedures has been used even once in practice since 
this provision’s introduction into the Treaties. The provision does not provide any clear 
indication or way in which the determination and assessment of the rule of law threat is 
to be determined and by whom. The activation is also in hands of the various EU 
institutional actors, and is therefore subject to political manoeuvring or diplomatic will. 
The Council has been endowed with ample discretion when activating Article 7 
procedure and in applying sanctions. The European Commission has recognised, “The 
thresholds for activating both mechanisms of Article 7 TEU are very high and underline 
the nature of these mechanisms as a last resort.”16 All these legal and political barriers 
have left a considerable gap that limits its effective operability and undermines legal 
certainty. 
 
1.2.2. Evaluation and benchmarking 
Evaluation instruments entail a qualitative and quantitative assessment of a specific 
subject or area of intervention following well-established social-sciences standards. It 
often involves scientifically-based design, collection and analysis of data. They are non-
legally binding tools aimed at fostering change in Member States’ arenas through soft 
methods of steering, coordination or non-coercive (guiding) tools. They are usually 
Member State or theme-specific or provide a qualitative comparison between EU 
Member States.  
 
Evaluation instruments usually present conclusions drawn from the analysis and provide 
non-binding suggestions or recommendations to Member States for addressing deficits or 
obstacles. There is a lack of a coercive arm. They are aimed at incentivising States to 
comply or align with international and European standards, yet they usually present 
legally weak (if any) ‘follow-up’ procedures of conclusions reached and for ensuring 
effective implementation of recommendations. 
 
                                                          
14 C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the 
Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 
forthcoming; L. F. M. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 and the Rule of Law 
Initiatives’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (ed.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: Methods 
against Defiance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
15 Refer to Article 269 TFEU. 
16 European Commission, Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014)158, 11.3.2014, page 6. 
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A specific category of evaluation instruments are those covering ‘benchmarking’ 
methods, which utilise indicators and identify ‘best practices’ when comparing EU 
Member States’ performance. Benchmarking is not the same as evaluation, but entails a 
rather specific methodology based on complex indexing methodologies (calculation of 
averages), the identification of common principles and standards and the selection of 
good/bad practices (corresponding to the highest/lowest standard). The outputs are 
represented in complex, yet highly visually attractive, graphs and quantitative methods. 
There are several examples of EU evaluation instruments comprising a ‘benchmarking’ 
approach which are of relevance for the purposes of this Research Paper. These include, 
for example, the EU Justice Scoreboard (1.2.2.1) and the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
(1.2.2.2).17 
 
1.2.2.1. The EU Justice Scoreboard  
Since 2012 the quality, independence and efficiency of justice and national judicial 
regimes constitute one of the priorities in the EU yearly cycle of economic policy 
coordination, or ‘European semester’, to foster structural reforms at national levels.18 This 
has taken the form of the so-called ‘EU Justice Scoreboard’.19 The last edition was 
published in 2015.20  
 
The material scope of the EU Justice Scoreboard is rather limited. It only includes data 
that deals with civil, commercial and administrative justice. Criminal justice and other 
justice-relevant fundamental rights aspects fall outside the scope of evaluation. The 
driving approach pays particular attention to a set of ‘parameters’ which would enable 
any justice system to facilitate the improvement of business and investment. According 
to the Commission the main objective of the EU Justice Scoreboard is: 
to assist the EU and the Member States to achieve more effective justice by providing 
objective, reliable and comparable data on the functioning of the justice systems of all 
Member States. Quality, independence and efficiency are the key components of an 
‘effective justice system’. Providing information on these components in all Member States 
contributes to identifying potential shortcomings and good examples and supports the 
development of justice policies at national and at EU level.21 
 
The EU Justice Scoreboard uses a number of indicators which broadly relate to the 
efficiency of the justice systems (length of proceedings, clearance rates, pending cases, 
etc.), quality of justice systems (monitoring, evaluation and survey tools, information and 
communication technology systems, courts’ communication policies, alternative dispute 
resolution methods, promoting judge training resources and equal share of female 
                                                          
17 Other examples include the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for Bulgaria and 
Romania. For the latest CVM see http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm. 
18 See Communication from the Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2015, COM (2014) 902 final. 
For a study of the European semester method refer to 2013 CEPS Study. 
19 The EU Justice Scoreboard: Towards more effective justice systems in the EU, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/effective-justice/news/150309_en.htm. 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/justice_Scoreboard_2015_en.pdf. The first 
edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard was published in 2013 by the previous European Commission. 
See European Commission (2013), The EU Justice Scoreboard – A tool to promote effective justice 
and growth, COM(2013) 160 final, Brussels, 27 March. 
21 Page 3 of the Communication. 
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judges) and the independence of the judiciary (perceived and structural).22 The source 
from which the data comes is mainly the Council of Europe’s Commission for the 
Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (refer to Section 1.3 below for a detailed overview 
of CEPEJ), on the basis of a study commissioned by the European Commission to this 
body,23 as well as two field studies commissioned to two external contractors.24 The 
financial costs granted to the CoE to deliver this work was approximately €800,000.25  
 
The results of the Scoreboard have reportedly received mixed reactions from EU Member 
States.26 Most important, the Scoreboard is incapable of catching the most atrocious 
violations: it does not sufficiently detect internal linkages, thus it examines individual 
elements but fails to supply a qualitative assessment of the whole.27 The Scoreboard does 
not foresee any coercive action or sanctions/penalties in a situation where an EU 
Member State may be seen as performing poorly on the above-mentioned indicators. A 
key incentive supporting EU Member States’ implementation of the proposed reforms is 
through various sources of EU funding,28 including European structural and social funds 
and economic adjustment programmes.29 
                                                          
22 The 2015 edition states, “The 2015 Scoreboard has evolved: this third edition of the Scoreboard seeks to 
identify possible trends whilst taking a cautious and nuanced approach as the situation varies significantly, 
depending on each Member State and indicator. The 2015 Scoreboard also contains new indicators and more 
fine-tuned data based on new sources of information, for example, on the efficiency of courts in the areas of 
public procurement and intellectual property rights, the use and the promotion of alternative dispute 
resolution methods (hereafter ADR), the use of Information and Communication Technology (hereafter ICT) 
for small claim proceedings, courts’ communications policies, composition and powers of Councils for the 
judiciary. It also contains, for the first time, data on the share of female professional judges, as more gender 
diversity can contribute to a better quality of justice systems”, page 6. Moreover, the Scoreboard states, 
“Pursuing efforts to promote the exchange of best practices is key for supporting the quality of justice reforms 
in Member States.” 
23 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/cepj_study_Scoreboard_2015_en.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2015-
005198+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN and Nielsen, N., Hungary in surprise ranking on EU justice 
scoreboard, 27 March 201, https://euobserver.com/justice/119597. 
24 European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, Case 
study on the functioning of enforcement proceedings relating to judicial decisions in Member 
States, Final Report, February, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/enforcement_proceedings_final_report_en.pdf. See also Europe economics and Milieu 
(2015), Economic efficiency and legal effectiveness of review and remedies procedures for public 
contracts Final Study Report MARKT/2013/072/C. 
25 See http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:263765-2013:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0 and 
http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:25222-2014:TEXT:EN:HTML&src=0. 
26 Nikolaj Nielsen, EU justice Scoreboard upsets some Member States, 17 March 2014, 
https://euobserver.com/justice/123507. 
27 K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not 
Work’, 26 Governance 4, 559–562 (2013). 
28 According to the 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, “The European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI 
Funds)9 provide support to Member States’ efforts to improve the functioning of their justice systems. At the 
start of the new programming period 2014-2020, the Commission engaged in an intensive dialogue with 
Member States on establishing the strategic funding priorities of the ESI Funds in order to encourage a close 
link between policy and funding. Based on the draft partnership agreements, the total budget allocated to 
investments in institutional capacity of public administration amounts to almost 5 billion euros for the next 
programming period. Out of the twelve Member States that received a country-specific-recommendation in 
the area of justice in 2014, eleven identified justice as a priority area of support for the ESI Funds. Justice is 
also a priority in the Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece and Cyprus which will use ESI Funds in 
this area. The country-specific-recommendations, the country specific assessment and the data provided in the 
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1.2.2.2. The EU Anti-Corruption Report  
The European Commission adopted in 2011 the Decision C(20011) 3673 Establishing an 
EU Anti-corruption reporting mechanism for periodic assessment (‘EU Anti-corruption 
Report’).30 The EU Anti-Corruption Report is a ‘reporting mechanism’ for the periodic 
assessment of anti-corruption efforts in the Union in order to facilitate and support the 
implementation of a comprehensive anti-corruption policy in the Union. According to 
Article 2 of this Decision the Report has the following objectives: “(a) to periodically assess 
the situation in the Union regarding the fight against corruption; (b) to identify trends and best 
practices; (c) to make general recommendations for adjusting EU policy on preventing and 
fighting corruption; (d) to make tailor-made recommendations; (e) to help Member States, civil 
society or other stakeholders identify shortcomings, raise awareness and provide training on anti-
corruption”. 
 
The first issue of the EU Anti-Corruption Report was published in 2014,31 and new 
editions are scheduled to appear every two years. According to the Report, it focuses on  
…selected key issues of particular relevance to each Member State. It describes good 
practices as well as weaknesses, and identifies steps which will allow Member States to 
address corruption more effectively. The Commission recognises that some of these issues 
are solely national competence. It is, however, in the Union’s common interest to ensure 
that all Member States have efficient anti-corruption policies and that the EU supports the 
Member States in pursuing this work. The report therefore seeks to promote high 
anticorruption standards across the EU. By highlighting problems – as well as good 
practices – found inside the EU, the report also lends credibility to the EU’s efforts to 
promote anticorruption standards elsewhere.32 
 
The assessment has been based on a wide range of sources. These include existing 
evaluation mechanisms in other supranational fora, notably the Council of Europe’s 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the OECD. This constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                                               
Scoreboard are key elements for Member States when setting out their funding priorities. Member States 
which identified justice systems as a priority area intend to use ESI Funds mostly for improving the 
efficiency of the judiciary. Although concrete activities will depend on the particular needs of each Member 
State concerned, some types of activities are emerging as being common to more Member States, such as the 
introduction of case management systems, the use of ICT in courts, the monitoring and evaluation tools, and 
training schemes for judges. The extent of this support varies between the Member States: while some 
Member States intend to support a broad section of their justice systems, others will concentrate on only a 
few courts which are facing particular challenges or are selected for pilot purposes. The Commission 
emphasised the importance of robust indicators for monitoring effectiveness of the support and issued 
guidance documents on monitoring indicators in line with those used in the Scoreboard. They will ensure the 
regular reporting of the Member States to the Commission on achieved results. These data will help the 
evaluation of EU support in rendering Member States’ justice systems more effective”, page 4. 
29 For a detailed overview of the corrective and preventive arm of the European semester refer to 
2013 CEPS study. 
30 European Commission Decision establishing an EU Anti-corruption reporting mechanism for 
periodic assessment (‘EU Anti-corruption Report’), 6 June 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/com_decision_2011_3673_final_en.pdf. 
31 European Commission Report From the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, EU Anti-Corruption Report, COM(2014) 38 final, 3 February 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-
human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf. 
32 Page 2 of the Report.  
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commonality with the above-mentioned EU Justice Scoreboard, which relies heavily on 
non-EU specific monitoring bodies and tools. It also benefited from a group of experts on 
corruption and a network of research correspondents. The Report is not based on 
detailed questionnaires or expert country visits.33 The assessment methodology also 
makes use of ‘indicators’, and is based on ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’ 
assessment.34  
 
The Report was originally intended to give special emphasis to indicators including 
“perceptions, along with facts, trends, challenges and developments relevant to corruption and 
anti-corruption measures.” That notwithstanding, the actual assessment qualifies more as a 
proper country-by-country report/evaluation, still using indicators as reference points 
while acknowledging their profound methodological limitations. Indeed, the Annex on 
Methodology states  
During preparation of the list (of indicators), the Commission became aware that there 
might be a fundamental difficulty in relying primarily on indicators and statistical data for 
getting to the core of corruption problems, and most importantly for building actionable, 
tailor-made policy recommendations. Still, already established indicators directly relevant 
to the anti-corruption efforts supported by robust data were collected in order to examine 
the situation in Member States and identify areas for closer analysis in the country-specific 
research.35 
 
The EU Anti-Corruption Report covers all EU Member States and is structured as 
follows: introduction (presenting the policy setting and background, the results of 
Eurobarometer surveys on perceptions and experience on corruption, a chapter 
describing corruption-related trends across the EU; a thematic chapter focusing on a 
cross-cutting issue of particular relevance at EU level, which in the 2014 edition focused 
on ‘public procurement’; an Annex on Methodology and Country Chapters, which 
focuses on a ‘list of key issues’.36 The country reports end with a ‘future steps’ section 
                                                          
33 Moreover, “Studies and surveys were specifically commissioned for the purpose of further extending the 
knowledge base in areas relevant to the report. An extensive study on corruption in public procurement 
involving EU funds, launched at the initiative of the European Parliament, was commissioned by OLAF”, 
page 37 of the Report.  
34 According to the Report, “Quantitative approaches play a lesser role, mostly because it is difficult to put 
a figure on how much of a problem corruption is, and even more difficult to rank the countries by results. The 
obstacle to using a quantitative approach is related to the fact that well-known surveys tend to compose their 
indexes using others’ data. This creates a cascade effect: composite indexes building on this approach may 
reflect data gathered one or two years before their publication. Surveys tend to use for instance the 
Eurobarometer results; however, by the time the composite index is published, another more recent 
Eurobarometer survey may be available.” Id. at 39. 
35 Page 40 of the Report. It continues by saying, “These data (1) were used for scene setting (i.e. an 
introduction to the country chapters), and (2) serve as a starting/complementary point for further research on 
particular matters/sectors at country or EU level pointing to identification of problem and assessment of 
response; (3) ultimately, they also helped identify flows or lack of coherence in the different sources”. 
36 According to the Report, “While the emphasis is on vulnerabilities and areas for improvement, the 
analysis is forward-looking and points to plans and measures going in the right direction, and identifies 
issues that require further attention. Good practices which might be an inspiration for others are highlighted. 
Some country chapters do, however, include a specific analysis of public procurement; this is the case for 
countries where substantial problems with public procurement have been identified”. Id. at 4. 
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which highlights points where further attention/action is required by the national 
government.37 
 
1.2.3. Monitoring  
Sine 2014, the EU has counts on an EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law,38 which 
was adopted in the form of a Commission Communication COM(2014)158.39 The EU 
Framework can be seen as a ‘monitoring’ instrument focused on the Commission’s 
assessment of specific national developments posing ‘systematic threats to the rule of 
law’. The Framework is founded on the Commission’s role in Article 7 TEU but does not 
provide for legally-binding outcomes, as it cannot alter the procedures described in that 
provision. The softness of the Framework, as well as its potentially disruptive legal 
effects (as the Framework had come to be perceived as a stage in the Article 7 TEU 
procedures, consequently making speedy deployment of that provision difficult) was 
criticised.40 It constitutes an even ‘softer’ instrument than those falling under scope of 
‘evaluation/benchmarking’, and the monitoring of a specific threat to the rule of law is 
framed and followed by a predominantly political or dialogue-driven nature between the 
Commission and the Member State concerned.  
 
In the Annexes accompanying the Communication, the Commission underlined a 
number of important definitional or conceptual clarifications when it comes to the notion 
of rule of law in the EU legal system. Here, the Commission made express reference to 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which over the various 
decades of European integration has developed a body of legal principles comprising the 
flesh and bones of the EU legal system and its foundations.41  
 
The Communication underlines that “the Court indicates that the rule of law is the source of 
fully justiciable principles applicable within the EU legal system”, and by doing so ascribes to 
this notion an ‘EU-specific meaning’. The Commission highlighted the following legal 
principles as being particularly important in this context:  
 the principle of legality; 
 legal certainty; 
 prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; 
 independent and effective judicial review, including respect for fundamental 
rights; 
                                                          
37 See for instance http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-
and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_austria_chapter_en.pdf  
38 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/rule-of-law/index_en.htm. 
39 European Commission, Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014)158, 11.3.2014. 
40 For an overview of key arguments, see D. Kochenov, L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Ni panacée, ni 
gadget: Le ‘nouveau cadre de l’Union européenne pour renforcer l’Etat de droit’, Revue trimestrielle 
de droit européen (2015), forthcoming. 
41 L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 04/09 (2009); M.L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European 
Constitution, The Hague: Kluwer, 1999. 
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 an operational separation of powers implying an independent and effective 
judicial review; 
 equality before the law. 
 
Moreover, the Commission underlined, “Mutual trust among EU Member States and their 
respective legal systems is the foundation of the Union. The way the rule of law is implemented at 
national level plays a key role in this respect”.42 The Communication also recalls the 
competence of the European Commission as ‘guardian of the Treaties’ to ensure the 
respect of the values on which the EU is founded and of protecting the general interest of 
the Union. The EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law aims at guaranteeing “an 
effective and coherent protection of the rule of law in all Member States”.43 It is a crisis-driven 
framework of operation, “to address and resolve a situation where there is a systemic threat to 
the rule of law”.44 
 
The objective is to prevent situations in EU Member States from reaching the level or 
scope of application envisaged in the previously mentioned Article 7 TEU. It is seen to 
complement and precede this Treaty provision. The Communication reminds the reader,  
Its scope (Article 7 TEU) is not confined to areas covered by EU law, but empowers the EU 
to intervene with the purpose of protecting the rule of law also in areas where Member 
States act autonomously. As explained in the Commission’s Communication on Article 7 
TEU, this is justified by the fact that if a Member State breaches the fundamental values in 
a manner sufficiently serious to be caught by Article 7, this is likely to undermine the very 
foundation of the EU and the trust between its members, whatever the field in which the 
breach occurs.45 
 
When justifying the need for an EU Framework safeguarding the rule of law, the 
Commission Communication states that recent developments in EU Member States show 
that existing instruments are not “always appropriate to quickly respond to threats to the rule 
of law in a Member State. There are therefore situations where threats relating to the rule of law 
cannot be effectively addressed by existing instruments”.46  
 
How does the EU Framework work in practice?47 The Framework would be activated in 
those cases where EU Member States are about to adopt laws/policies or tolerate 
practices which can be expected to systematically and adversely affect or constitute a 
threat to the integrity, stability and proper functioning of their institutions in securing the 
rule of law. This would cover challenges to constitutional structures and the principle of 
the separation of powers; or cover questions related to the independence of the judiciary, 
including judicial review of government actions. The Framework therefore does not 
                                                          
42 See page 2 of the Communication. 
43 Id. at 3.  
44 Id. 
45 Reference is here made to the above mentioned Commission Communication COM(2003) 606 
final. 
46 Id. at 6. 
47 For a detailed criticism, see, D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule 
of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
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constitute a comparative and regular/periodic country to country assessment on the state 
of rule of law in the Union.48 
 
Graph 1 below provides a visual representation of the various phases comprising the 
Commission’s framework. It is composed of three main phases: 
1. The first step is the Commission assessment leading to a ‘rule of law opinion’ 
where the concerns are developed, and granting the concerned Member State 
the possibility to answer. 
2. If the controversy is not resolved, the Commission would issue a ‘rule of law 
recommendation’ providing a time limit for providing an answer to the 
concerns and ways to address them. 
3. The final step would be a follow-up or monitoring of the rule of law 
recommendation, which if not complied with could activate Article 7 TEU. 
 
On which basis does the Commission assess the rule of law threat? The Communication 
vaguely states that it will seek ‘external expertise’ and  
…will collect and examine all the relevant information and assess whether there are clear 
indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law as described above. This assessment can 
be based on the indications received from available sources and recognized institutions, 
including notably the bodies of the Council of Europe and the European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights.49 
 
Concerning inter-institutional relations and roles, the EU Framework only envisages that 
the Commission will keep the European Parliament and the Council “regularly and closely 
informed of progress made in each of the stages.”50 
                                                          
48 For an analysis see S. Carrera and E. Guild, Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: Improving the 
Functioning of the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, Study done for the European Parliament AFCO 
Committee, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519225/IPOL_STU(2015)519225_
EN.pdf. 
49 Page 7. Page 9 reads, “Depending on the situation, the Commission may decide to seek advice and 
assistance from members of the judicial networks in the EU, such as the networks of the Presidents of 
Supreme Courts of the EU23, the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative 
Jurisdictions of the EU24 or the Judicial Councils25. The Commission will examine, together with these 
networks, how such assistance could be provided swiftly where appropriate, and whether particular 
arrangements are necessary to that end. The Commission will, as a rule and in appropriate cases, seek the 
advice of the Council of Europe and/or its Venice Commission, and will coordinate its analysis with them in 
all cases where the matter is also under their consideration and analysis”.  
50 See page 8 of the Communication. 
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Graph 2: The EU Rule of Law Framework in practice 
 
Source: Annex 2, Commission Communication, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of 
Law COM(2014) 158 final, 11.3.2014, at 4. 
 
The first case in which the EU Framework was used in practice was against Poland.51 
During his intervention before the European Parliament’s Plenary Session in Strasbourg 
on 19 January 2016, Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans laid 
down the reasons why the Commission had decided to assess the recent developments in 
Poland from a rule of law perspective:  
                                                          
51 Rule of law in Poland: Commission starts dialogue, 13 January 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/01/20160113_en.htm, which states, “The College agreed to come 
back to the matter by mid-March, in close cooperation with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. 
Echoing what President Juncker said last week, First Vice-President Timmermans underlined after the 
College meeting that this is not about accusations and polemics, but about finding solutions in a spirit of 
dialogue. He underlined his readiness to go to Warsaw in this context.” See also European Commission – 
Fact Sheet, College Orientation Debate on recent developments in Poland and the Rule of Law 
Framework: Questions & Answers, Brussels, 13 January 2016 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm. 
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I would like to stress firstly that we are at the beginning of the process under the 
framework. The framework has a preventive nature, and the start of a detailed, factual 
and legal assessment in no way implies any automatic move to decisions at later stages. 
That will depend purely on the facts – and answering us so quickly will help to stimulate 
that dialogue and to have a constructive dialogue with the Polish government. We will 
engage in the dialogue in an impartial, evidence-based and cooperative way. It goes 
without saying that the Commission fully respects the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Poland, and carries out its duties in an objective and non-partisan manner, as for any 
other Member State in line with the duties imposed on the Commission by treaties that 
were signed and ratified by sovereign states – the members of the European Union. 
Finally, we will conduct our assessment in close cooperation with the Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe.52 
 
It is most regrettable that the Commission did not conduct serious analysis of the 
likely effects of the deployment of the Framework in the context of the subsequent 
invocability of Article 7 TEU. Invoking the Framework against one of the two 
Member States obviously allows the second to sabotage the deployment of Article 7 
TEU sanctions, which indirectly require unanimity in the Council, since Article 7(2) 
TEU procedure is a necessary prerequisite for their activation. In such a context, 
leaving one of the problematic Member States outside the ambit of the Rule of Law 
Framework effectively switches off Article 7 TEU, leaving the EU absolutely 
powerless, as far as enforcement goes, in the face of the challenges to the rule of law 
and other values.53 
 
1.2.4. Discussion/Dialogue  
The General Affairs Council of 16 December 2014 formally adopted Conclusions on 
ensuring respect for the rule of law and established a Rule of Law Dialogue between EU 
Member States. The idea was to set up “a political dialogue among Member States to promote 
and safeguard the rule of law within the EU.” Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions stated,  
 
[K]ey challenges that require particular and urgent attention include, in particular, judicial 
reform, the fight against organised crime and corruption, the freedom of expression and 
the media, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, the non-discriminatory treatment 
of national minorities, as well as tackling discrimination of vulnerable groups such as the 
Roma, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. Further work 
is also required to promote gender equality and the rights of women. The Council looks 
forward to the completion of preparations aimed at candidate countries’ participation as 
observers in the work of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency. The rule of law is also 
crucial for economic development and creating a favourable business environment and 
investment climate. 
 
                                                          
52 Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Commissioner Günther Oettinger – EP 
Plenary Session – Situation in Poland, Strasbourg, 19 January 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-114_en.htm. 
53 D. Kochenov, ‘The Commission vs. Poland: The Sovereign State is Winning 1-0’, 25 January 2016, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-vs-poland-the-sovereign-state-is-winning-1-0/. 
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It is important to underline that the Conclusions were jointly adopted by the Council and 
the Member States meeting in the Council. They call for the Dialogue to be driven by “the 
principles of objectivity, non discrimination and equal treatment of all Member States…(and to 
be) conducted on a non partisan and evidence-based approach”.54 The Dialogue is organised by 
each of the relevant Presidencies once a year in the context of the General Affairs 
configurations, not those under Justice and Home Affairs. The Presidency prepares a 
concept note.55 The Dialogue is then organised by the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER) and it is of a purely intergovernmental nature. There is no 
formal role envisaged for the European Commission or the European Parliament in the 
session. The Commission is invited. The discussion takes place on ‘thematic subject 
matters’ and is closed-doors.  
 
The first Dialogue took place under the Luxembourg Presidency in the second half of 
2015.56 The Discussion Papers which provided the background for the Dialogue of 17 
November 2015 at the General Affairs Council focused on a presentation by the European 
Commission of the outcomes of its annual colloquium on fundamental rights “Tolerance 
and respect: preventing and combating anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe” 
on 1-2 October 2015. Member States were then asked to “to share one example of a best 
practice and one example of a challenge encountered at national level in relation to the respect for 
the rule of law, as well as the approach to respond to that challenge.” Moreover, the 
Luxembourg Presidency distributed a discussion paper on “the rule of law in the age of 
digitalization” which aimed at combining “the two themes in an attempt to identify areas in 
the digital environment where the rule of law could be strengthened in a useful and sustainable 
way.” The following specific themes were examined: freedom of expression, internet 
governance, data protection and cybersecurity. One can only add that the choice of the 
topics for the ‘Dialogue’, made in the context of overwhelmingly serious backsliding and 
constitutional capture in at least two Member States, already provides a serious 
indication of the likely workability of this instrument for the promotion of the Rule of 
Law and other Article 2 TEU values.  
 
                                                          
54 Refer to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Conclusions. 
55 Council of the European Union, Ensuring respect for the rule of law in the European Union, 
Brussels, 15206/14 FREMP 198 JAI 846 COHOM 152 POLGEN 156, 14 November 2014 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015206%202014%20INIT. See the first 
substantive Presidency Discussion Papers which provided the basis for the first Dialogue: 13744/15 
KR/tt 1 DGD 2C EN, Council of the European Union, Ensuring the respect for the rule of law – 
Dialogue and exchange of views, 9 November 2015 13744/15 JAI 821 FREMP 243, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13744-2015-INIT/en/pdf. 
56 General Affairs Council, Meeting n°3427, 17-18 November 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2015/11/17/, which states, “Ministers held 
their first annual rule of law dialogue which was established in December 2014. They exchanged views on 
their experiences of challenges in this area and of how best to respond. Ministers also specifically addressed 
the issue of the rule of law in the digital era. “The launch of the political dialogue on the rule of law was one 
of the priorities of the Luxembourg presidency”, said Jean Asselborn, adding: “I’m glad that the incoming 
Netherlands presidency is committed to follow up these efforts and to build on the exchange of views held 
today.” 
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The Dutch Presidency is currently preparing the ground for the second Dialogue. A 
preparatory seminar was organised on 2 February 2016 in Strasbourg on migration and 
rule of law which aimed at fueling the next Dialogue.57 
1.3. An overview of UN and Council of Europe instruments  
This Section provides a synthesised overview of the detailed mapping contained in 
Annexes 1 and 3 of this Research Paper. The overview of relevant rule of law 
institutional structures, actors and mechanisms focuses on the following questions: Who? 
(Section 1.3.1.) What? (Section 1.3.2.) and How? (Section 1.3.3.) 
 
1.3.1. Who?  
The composition of the non-judicial monitoring UN and CoE bodies can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
First, national experts ensure impartiality and independence from the State party or 
government, and have specific expertise on the issue/theme being monitored, usually 
in a Member State party to the relevant system.  
 
In the context of the CoE, the Venice Commission is an independent consultative body 
composed of independent experts, serving in their individual capacity, and having 
achieved ‘eminence’ through their experience in democratic institutions or scholarship. 
Venice Commission experts “shall serve in their individual capacity and not receive or 
accept any instructions”. The members of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) are required to have high moral authority and recognised expertise in 
dealing with issues related to racism, discrimination, etc. Similar qualities of impartiality 
and independence are required of ECRI members.  
 
Similar features apply to members of the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). Its members come 
from different backgrounds, a number equal to that of the parties, and shall be chosen on 
the basis of their high moral character, competence in human rights and professional 
experience in prison and police matters covered by the Convention. The composition of 
the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice relies on experts who can best 
contribute to its aims and functions and have in-depth knowledge of the administration, 
functioning and efficiency of justice. Each member of the CoE shall appoint an expert to 
the CEPEJ. 
 
                                                          
57 The Dutch Presidency Priorities state, “The Netherlands Presidency will work to ensure an open 
dialogue on the rule of law that helps foster a new culture which allows improvements to be made in this area 
in the member states. The second dialogue on the rule of law will take place in the Council during the 
Netherlands Presidency, following a seminar in Strasbourg in February on the rule of law and current 
political issues. An essential element of ensuring respect for the rule of law is the protection of fundamental 
rights as laid down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Netherlands will devote specific attention 
to this during its Presidency by holding a seminar on the Charter’s application in member states’ legislative 
and policy processes”, 13. 
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Similar qualities are required of members of the UN Treaty Bodies (see Annex 3 for a 
detailed overview), which by and large need to ensure their independence, 
acknowledged impartiality and specific expertise in the subjects covered by the relevant 
UN Convention or Covenant, and more generally human rights. As Table 2 below shows, 
UN Treaty bodies’ composition varies from 10 to 20 members. 
Table 2: Composition of UN Treaty Bodies 
Committee Membership Current number of State 
parties 
CERD 18 175 
Human Rights Committee 18 167 
CESCR 18 160 
CEDAW 23 187 
CAT 10 153 
CRC 18 193 
CMW 14 46 
SPT 25 67 
CRPD 18 129 
CED 10 37 
Source: UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty 
body system and working methods related to the review of State parties, 12 April 2013. 
 
Second, some monitoring actors are directly elected by the institutions composing the 
supranational actor. In the CoE context, the Commissioner for Human Rights is elected 
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE, on the basis of candidates submitted by State 
parties. Similarly to the qualifications and qualities of national experts participating in 
other supranational monitoring bodies, the Commissioners are “eminent personalities of 
high moral character having recognized expertise in the field of human rights, a public 
record of attachment to the values of CoE and personal authority”.  
 
The members of the CPT are elected by the Committee of Ministers, from a list of names 
drawn up by the Consultative Assembly of the CoE. Each national delegation of State 
parties puts forward three names.  
 
Third, nomination by State parties. There are other instances where the members are 
nominated directly by State governments. The members of the European Committee for 
Social Cohesion, Human Dignity and Equality (CDDECS) are representatives of CoE 
States. The governments designate one representative “of the highest possible rank and 
expertise in the relevant fields”. In the UN context, members of the UN Treaty Bodies are 
usually nominated by State parties, yet they serve in their personal capacities.  
 
Fourth, Member States’ representatives are appointed to monitoring bodies following 
mutual evaluation or peer review assessments. This is the case of the CoE Group of 
States against Corruption. Each State party nominates a delegation of two representatives 
who will participate in evaluation teams. 
 
Fifth, individual or working group model. Both in the context of the UN and the CoE, 
the model can be based on an individual or a team of experts or working group. Instances 
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of individual models include the above-mentioned Commissioner for Human Rights. In 
the framework of the UN there are further examples, such as the Special Rapporteur or 
‘Individual Expert’ model in the so-called Human Rights Council (Special Procedures). 
Special Rapporteurs are appointed by the Human Rights Council, in their personal 
capacities and have shown a special competence and expertise on specific themes that 
they cover. They have thematic or country-based mandates.58 
1.3.2. What? 
Both in the UN and CoE contexts, the monitoring systems focus generally on ensuring 
that State parties comply with their statuses, conventions/covenants and treaties and 
legal standards. When it comes to the ‘what’ question, human rights constitutes a central 
common dimension in the work that both supranational organisations carry out.  
 
This is the case for instance when it comes to the CoE Parliamentary Assembly 
Monitoring Committee. Similarly, the UN Universal Period Review, and the Special 
Procedures, focuses on the extent to which States respect their human rights obligations 
provided by the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human 
rights instruments to which the State is party. The monitoring results, conclusions and 
recommendations resulting from UN Special Procedures and Treaty bodies feed into the 
work of the Universal Period Review (UPR). 
 
Sometimes, there are Committees dedicated to monitoring aspects of work that cover 
specific fields of action, such as the CoE Committee for Social Cohesion, Human Dignity 
and Equality (CDDECS), which focuses on CoE work in these domains. This sectoral 
approach becomes more important in the scope of the Treaty bodies system in the UN, 
which plays a key role in the wider UN institutional setting outlined in Table 3 below. 
(Annex 3 shows in detail UN human rights treaty bodies that focus on monitoring the 
application of specific conventions and covenants.) 
Table 3: UN institutional landscape 
Charter Bodies Treaty Bodies 
Human Rights Council Human Rights Committee 
Universal Periodic Review Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
Human Rights Council (HRC) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
Special Procedures of the HRC Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
HRC Complaint Procedure Committee against Torture 
 Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture  
 Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 Committee on Migrant Workers 
 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
                                                          
58 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx
?Type=TM (Thematic Mandates); 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx 
(Country Mandates). 
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Table 4: UN Treaty Bodies and Relevant Convention/Covenant Monitored 
Treaty Bodies 
Conventions/Covenants  
Human Rights Committee International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights  
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR)  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 
International Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
Committee against Torture (CAT) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment  
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture 
(SPT) 
Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture (OPCAT) 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
Optional Protocols 
Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (ICRMW) 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
(CED) 
International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(ICPPED) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
In the context of the CoE, the angle of ‘democratic rule of law’ comes into the picture as a 
way to ensure human rights protection, i.e. effective implementation and delivery of 
human rights.  
 
The Venice Commission focuses on “the guarantees offered by the law in the service of 
democracy” and the promotion of ‘rule of law’ and ‘democracy’ (see Table 5 below). The 
Venice Commission pays particular attention to the health check of the constitutional, 
legislative and administrative principles and practices. Efficiency of democratic and 
judicial institutions constitute a core dimension of work. The Venice Commission also 
pays attention to citizens’ fundamental rights and freedoms when it comes to their 
participation in public life. ‘Democracy’ is here a key additional angle that falls under the 
material scope of its mandate, which includes actions in the electoral field.  
 
Some monitoring actors focus on specific themes, which have direct and indirect 
ramifications for rule of law related aspects. CEPEJ focuses on the efficiency, fairness and 
practical implementation/functioning of the judicial system of Member States, for the 
purpose of ensuring that every person can enforce their legal rights effectively. It also 
covers facilitating a better implementation of CoE legal instruments and standards. This 
aims at fostering citizens’ trust in the justice systems. 
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Also in the CoE, bodies like GRECO primarily focus on a specific field, i.e. corruption. 
Yet, they have the mandate to tackle the subject from a rule of law perspective. This is the 
case in its fourth evaluation round which deals with “the prevention of corruption in 
respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors”. (See Annex 1 for a detailed 
overview of GRECO.) GRECO aims at improving State parties’ capacity to fight 
corruption. It pays special attention to the implementation of the Guiding Principles for 
the Fight against Corruption adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 1997, and 
the implementation of international legal instruments. 
Table 5: CoE actors  
Institutions 
(including relevant 
Committees) 
Partial Agreements 
(not including all 
Member States) 
Theme Specific 
Body 
European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) 
European Commission for 
Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission) 
European Commission 
against Racism and 
Xenophobia (ECRI) 
Parliamentary Assembly 
(Monitoring Committee) 
Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO) 
 
Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
The European Commission for 
the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) 
 
European Committee for Social 
Cohesion, Human Dignity and 
Equality (CDDECS) 
  
European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
1.3.3. How? 
Each of the actors or bodies involved in monitoring systems and instruments in the 
context of the UN and CoE present their own specificities as regards the procedures and 
methods deployed when conducting the States parties’ assessment and evaluation. The 
following procedures can be broadly distinguished: 
 
1.3.3.1. State parties reporting 
A specific featuring component of the UN Treaty body system is that it is based on the 
reporting by the member countries to the relevant Committees. State parties are under 
the obligation to submit regular reports to the Committees on which rights under the 
relevant legal instrument are being implemented (with the exception of SPT, which does 
not require this task). This procedure and method of assessment shifts the burden of 
proof to the States and not the monitoring body.  
 
The reporting systems by States are usually organised around a list of issues (LOI) which 
are key themes of principal concern prepared by the respective Treaty bodies’ structures. 
The LOI is intended to give the government a preliminary indication of the issues that the 
Committee considers to be priorities for discussion. The LOI may take an article by article 
approach (CED and CEDAW), or be shaped around specific thematic priorities (Human 
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Rights Committee). The LOI is not self-exclusionary as regards the material scope of the 
country assessment, as it does not generally restrict the dialogue with the State concerned 
as regards the issues to be tackled or monitored. 
 
The kind of replies which are required from State parties vary from body to body. Some 
oblige them to reply in written form to the specific LOI (e.g. CEDAW, CESCR, CMW, 
CRC, CRPD and the Human Rights Committee), while others do not emphasise or 
envisage that duty (e.g. CAT, CED and CERD). In order to facilitate the reporting 
process, a majority of Treaty bodies have delivered reporting guidelines (common core 
document) which States are invited to use when submitting reports. 
 
The usual procedure foresees the presence of representatives or a delegation of State 
parties. The procedures in UN Treaty bodies are in general open to the public and ensure 
a high degree of public accountability (open to media as well). The country reports are 
discussed and examined in public hearings. The number and kind of sessions vary from 
body to body.59 The following procedures are shared by all the Treaty bodies in the 
framework of the so-called ‘constructive dialogue’ with State parties: 
(a) The State party is invited to send a delegation to attend the meetings at which the 
committee will consider the State party’s report; 
(b) The head of the delegation is invited to introduce the report and provide 
information on developments since its submission in a brief opening statement. 
Some committees, such as the Human Rights Committee, request the delegation 
to provide an oral summary of the State party’s written replies to the lists of 
issues; 
(c) Members of the committee, usually led by the country rapporteur(s) or country 
report task force members, raise questions on specific aspects of the report that 
are of particular concern and/or in relation to the oral summary of the written 
replies to the list of issues.60 
 
Sometimes this is preceded by a pre-sessional working group or system, which convenes 
some time before the formal meeting of the relevant Committee, and which identifies in 
advance the relevant questions and draft list of ‘key issues’ which will constitute the 
principal focus of the dialogue. The pre-sessional working group usually leads to the 
adoption and enactment of the LOI (e.g. CRC, Human Rights Committee, CESCR). The 
                                                          
59 According to UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty 
body system and working methods related to the review of State parties, 12 April 2013, “The 
number of sessions that each committee holds annually varies. Moreover, some committees have 
been given additional sessions or meeting time to address the backlog of reports and individual 
communications awaiting consideration. For example, CESCR will have one four-week session in 
2013-2014, following the endorsements and approvals in General Assembly resolution 67/246. The 
General Assembly has also authorized CAT to hold two four-week sessions per year in 2011-2012 
(resolution 65/204); CERD to convene two four-week sessions from August 2009 until 2011 
(resolution 63/243); CEDAW to hold three three-week annual sessions and a one-week pre-
sessional working group meeting for each session, for an interim period effective from January 
2010, pending the entry into force of the amendment to article 20, paragraph 1, of the Convention 
(resolution 62/218); CRPD to hold two sessions per year, consisting of one one-week session and 
one two-week session (resolution 66/229). Since November 2012, CED convenes two two-week 
sessions per year.” 
60 Quoted from UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty 
body system and working methods related to the review of States parties, 12 April 2013. 
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UN Treaty body committees usually appoint a country rapporteur who is responsible for 
steering the implementation of the various phases of the monitoring procedure. 
 
During the phases preceding the preparation of reports by State parties, the Committees 
often consult with national human rights associations (NHRAs) and civil society 
organisations (CSOs), which provide additional information in the work of the 
Committee (e.g. CAT). 
 
The majority of Treaty bodies have the mandate to assess the reports submitted initially 
and periodically by State parties. The specific ‘periodicity’ in the reporting procedures 
varies from Treaty body and instrument, as outlined in Table 6 below. Usually, there is 
an initial reporting shortly after accession and this is followed by periodical reporting 
procedures. Three of the UN treaty bodies have adopted so-called ‘simplified reporting 
procedures’61: “All committees, except CMW, have adopted the practice of proceeding with the 
examination of the situation regarding the implementation of the relevant treaty by a State party 
even when no report has been received”.62  
Table 6: Reporting periodicity under the treaties 
Treaty Body 
Initial reports 
(years) Periodicity of reports 
ICERD 1 2 
ICCPR 1 3, 4, 5 or 6 
ICESCR 2 5 
CEDAW 1 4 
CAT 1 4 
CRC 2 5 
CRC-OPAC 2 Integrated into next CRC report, 
every five years; every five years for 
States not party to the CRC 
CRC-OPSC 2 Integrated into next CRC report, 
every five years; every five years for 
States not party to the CRC 
ICRMW 1 5 
CRPD 2 4 
CED 2 -- 
Source: UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty 
body system and working methods related to the review of State parties, 12 April 2013. 
 
The dialogue with State delegations broadly takes place in the scope of thematic debates 
or days of general discussion. As regards the considerations of State parties’ reports, the 
UN publication states,  
All the treaty bodies have adopted broadly the same approach towards the consideration 
of States parties’ reports, the main features of which are the constructive dialogue, in 
                                                          
61 “In May 2007, CAT adopted a new, simplified and optional reporting procedure which consists 
in the preparation of a List of issues prior to reporting (LOIPR) to be transmitted to States parties 
prior to the submission of their respective periodic report (see A/62/44, paras 23-24). In October 
2009 and in April 2011 respectively, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Migrant 
Workers also adopted this optional procedure”, 6, paragraph 17. 
62 Id. at 15. 
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which the respective committee engages with a delegation from the State party whose 
report is under consideration, and the adoption of concluding observations, which 
acknowledge progress made and indicate to the State party where further action is 
required. However, there is still considerable variation in how the treaty bodies consider 
their States parties’ reports. 
 
The phase of ‘constructive dialogue’ with State parties leads to the drafting by the 
relevant Committee of so-called ‘concluding observations’, i.e. “all treaty bodies have 
adopted the practice established by CESCR in 1990 of formulating concluding observations or 
comments following the consideration of a State party’s report.”63 These include “introduction; 
positive aspects; principal subjects of concern; suggestions and recommendations.” State parties 
may submit comments on the concluding observations.  
 
Moreover, all Treaty bodies lay down their views on the actual content of the obligations 
taken by State parties in the shape of so-called ‘general comments’, which are based on 
Treaties concerned and their rules of procedure, which often relate to a specific article, 
provision or theme.64 The concluding observations usually follow and are presented in a 
similar thematic structure. They include positive aspects (areas where progress has been 
achieved), factors and difficulties/challenges impeding the implementation, main issues 
of concern and suggestions and recommendations.  
 
1.3.3.2. Expert groups 
The CoE Venice Commission uses a monitoring method which is based on an expert 
group/commission model. The experts carry out legal analysis or research on the 
compliance of State parties’ draft pieces of legislation or laws already in force which are 
brought to its consideration. The group is assisted by a secretariat in the preparation of 
draft opinions and studies, which are then discussed and adopted at the Committee’s 
plenary sessions. Several actors can request an Opinion to the Venice Commission: 
Member States, Council of Europe (Secretary General, Committee of Ministers, 
Parliamentary Assembly and Congress of Local and Regional Authorities), international 
organisations, which include the EU and OSCE. 
 
The result of the assessment will result in an Opinion. Annex 3 outlines the specific 
phases comprising the procedure for the elaboration and adoption of an Opinion by the 
Venice Commission. The Opinion issued by the Venice Commission is usually structured 
around the following sections: preliminary remarks, analysis (general and specific 
remarks) and conclusions, which include outstanding issues, concerns and 
recommendations to the State party. Interestingly, in light of the current rule of law 
controversy with Poland, the Venice Commission has recently received a request by 
Poland on the constitutional issues addressed in the amendments to the Act on the 
Constitutional Court of 25 June 2015.65 
 
                                                          
63 Id. at 14. 
64 See for instance CESCR outline for drafting general comments (E/2000/22, annex IX). 
65
 European Commission for Democracy through Law, (Venice Commission), Draft Opinion on 
Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland, Opinion No. 
833/2015, Cdl(2016)003, 26 February 2016 
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1.3.3.3. Evaluation: indicators and benchmarking  
CEPEJ provides an example of a monitoring system based on benchmarking 
methodology. The assessment of State parties’ judicial systems is based on a set of 
‘common principles’, and comprises common statistical criteria and ‘other means of 
evaluation’. CEPEJ has developed a biennial evaluation using a “Scheme for evaluating 
judicial systems”. The evaluation scheme, which aims at identifying ‘areas of possible 
improvement’ and ‘problems’, is supplied with data by CEPEJ’s members/national 
correspondents (which by and large correspond with national Ministries of Justice). Their 
responses are analysed and processed by the CEPEJ Secretariat.  
 
The scheme is composed by six general indicators: demographic and economic data 
(number of inhabitants, GDP, budget allocated to courts, etc.); legal aid (access to justice, 
including number of legal aid cases), organisation of the court system and the public 
prosecution (including number of judges and prosecutors, level of computer facilities); 
the performance and workload of courts and the public prosecution (including number 
of cases related to Article 6 ECHR, number of civil and administrative law cases, number 
of cases received and treated by the public prosecutor, number of criminal cases); 
execution of court decisions and legal and judicial reform. On the basis of this method 
CEPEJ analyses quantitative and qualitative data and produces reports, statistics, ‘best 
practices’, guidelines, action plans, opinions and general comments.  
 
CEPEJ data feeds into the so-called ‘EU Justice Scoreboard’, which among its various data 
sources uses information provided by EU Member States using the CEPEJ 
methodology.66 The 2015 edition of the EU Justice Scoreboard states,  
Most of the quantitative data are currently provided by the Council of Europe 
Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with which the 
Commission has concluded a contract in order to carry out a specific annual study. These 
data are from 2013 and have been provided by Member States according to the CEPEJ 
methodology. This year the data have been collected by CEPEJ specifically for EU Member 
States. The study also provides country fiches which give more context and should be 
read together with the figures.67 
 
                                                          
66 The 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard, retrievable from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/justice_Scoreboard_2015_en.pdf. 
67 Id. at 5. For the information used by the Commission in conducting the Scoreboard it is stated 
that “[w]hen preparing the EU Justice Scoreboard for 2015, the European Commission asked the 
Council of Europe’s Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) to produce 
a Study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, Facts and figures from the CEPEJ 
questionnaires 2010-2012-2013. The Commission also made use of field studies that were 
commissioned to external contractors for this purpose: Case study on the functioning of enforcement 
proceedings relating to judicial decisions in Member States and study on the economic efficiency and legal 
effectiveness of review and remedies procedures for public contracts”, quoted from The EU Justice 
Scoreboard: Towards more effective justice systems in the EU, 9 March 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/effective-justice/news/150309_en.htm. Refer to European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (2015), Study on the functioning of judicial 
systems in the EU Member States Facts and figures from the CEPEJ questionnaires 2010-2012-2013, 
CEPEJ(2014)17final (v2.0 – 16 feb.2015), 16 February 2015. See Annex 3 of the CEPEJ study which 
provides an ‘Extract of the CEPEJ Scheme for evaluating Judicial Systems’, 867 and ss. 
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1.3.3.4. Mutual evaluation and peer-review 
One of the instruments assessed in the context of the CoE uses a mutual evaluation or 
peer-review method of monitoring and evaluation, i.e. GRECO. The Group of States 
against Corruption implements a ‘horizontal evaluation procedure’ where all State 
parties are evaluated in the same round and which consists of a system of ‘mutual 
evaluation’. So far GRECO has launched four evaluation rounds. Each member identifies 
a maximum of five experts who will be able to perform the evaluation tasks in the scope 
of ‘evaluation teams’. A questionnaire is elaborated for each evaluation round, which 
provides the framework for the evaluation procedure. The evaluation teams will examine 
the answers to the questionnaire and can request additional information from the 
member State parties. This is accompanied by ‘country visits’ following the instruction of 
GRECO for the purpose of gathering extra information related to law or practical 
elements (with two months’ prior notice). The results of the procedure are ‘evaluation 
reports’, which are confidential in nature. 
 
The European Commission has used GRECO data in its 2014 Anti-Corruption Report,68 
which states,  
The Commission was determined to avoid duplicating existing reporting mechanisms and 
adding to the administrative burden on Member States which are subject to various 
resource intensive peer review evaluations (GRECO, OECD, UNCAC, FATF, Moneyval). 
The report is therefore not based on detailed questionnaires or expert country visits. It is 
based on the abundance of information available from existing monitoring mechanisms, 
together with data from other sources including national public authorities, research 
carried out by academic institutions, independent experts, think-tanks, civil society 
organisations etc.69 
 
1.3.3.5. Country visits 
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) uses a country visit model in its monitoring 
competences. The CPT organises visits to places of detention to examine treatment of 
individuals who are deprived of their liberty. CPT members are to be given unlimited 
access to any national detention facilities and can carry out interviews and 
communications with any domestic actor or person of relevance for their assessment of 
the situation in the context at issue.  
 
                                                          
68 European Commission, EU Anti-Corruption Report, COM(2014) 38 final, 3 February 2014. For 
more information refer to http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-
report/index_en.htm. 
69 It also emphasises, “The report does not replicate the detailed, technical analysis included in GRECO or 
the OECD reports, though it builds upon their recommendations whenever they are still not implemented 
and relevant to key issues in focus as identified for a particular country chapter. By bringing to the fore 
selected recommendations that have been previously identified within other mechanisms, the report aims at 
promoting their implementation. The synergy with GRECO is particular important given that it covers all 
EU Member States as well as other European countries of relevance for future enlargement and the Eastern 
Partnership. The Commission is currently taking measures which will allow full accession of the EU in the 
future, allowing also for closer cooperation in view of subsequent editions of the EU Anti-Corruption 
Report”, at 41. 
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The visit leads to the elaboration of a country general report which will lay down the 
facts (findings), taking account of the observations provided by the State party, and 
recommendations to address the situation, along with comments and requests for further 
information, if necessary. The general reports are developed following a set of thematic 
standards which deal with law enforcement agencies, prisons, psychiatric institutions, 
immigration detention, juveniles deprived of their liberty under criminal investigation, 
women deprived of their liberty, documenting and reporting medical evidence of ill-
treatment, combating impunity and electrical discharge weapons. 
 
1.3.4. Follow-up 
1.3.4.1. UN 
The UN Treaty system provides a toolbox of follow-up special procedures and 
institutional arrangements intended to ensure the implementation by State parties of the 
suggestions and recommendations resulting from the several monitoring venues and 
procedures (Annex 3 provides a detailed overview). The status of the ‘follow-up’ 
procedures are provided in a chart which is maintained on the websites of the 
Committees. 
 
Some UN Committees use a special ‘follow-up’ procedure on the implementation of the 
conclusions and recommendations submitted to State parties.70 That is the case, for 
instance, of CAT, CERD, CED, CEDAW and the Human Rights Committee. These 
generally require State parties to provide data on how their recommendations have been 
followed up or implemented.71 Some Treaty bodies issue recommendations on how State 
parties can better ensure the implementation of a specific Convention or Covenant. Some 
recommendations may require ‘immediate action’ by the State concerned and require 
reporting back in a period of one year (e.g. the Human Rights Committee). Some 
Committees (e.g. CERD) may request additional information or even a new written 
report on the implementation of their recommendations.  
 
The Human Rights Committee elaborates a follow-up progress report for every session, 
which in addition to information on follow-up actions includes additional data provided 
by civil society organisations (see Annex 2 for more information).72 It appoints a special 
rapporteur to report back to the Committee on the information received by the State 
party on implementation of the recommendations issued. In cases of non-cooperation by 
the government, the special rapporteur may call for a meeting with a representative of 
the State party. The Human Rights Committee has developed a table containing all the 
relevant information concerning follow-up procedures with State parties since July 2006. 
                                                          
70 For a full overview by Committee refer to 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx. 
71 “In addition to indicating the time frame for follow-up to specific recommendations, CERD also 
draws the attention of the State party concerned to a few recommendations of particular 
importance and requests detailed information their implementation in the next periodic report. 
CAT invites States parties concerned to accept to report under the optional reporting procedure 
within a one-year time frame, in order to prepare the list of issues prior to reporting in a timely 
manner”, at 14. 
72 Id. at 3.  
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In all its concluding observations the CESCR asks the State to report back on 
implementation issues in the next periodic reporting exercise. It may also request that the 
State provide more detailed information or statistics on specific follow-up issues before 
the next reporting period. CESCR can ask a State party to implement a technical 
assistance mission (composed by Committee members). If the State is not willing to 
collaborate in the procedure, the CESCR can refer the issue to the Economic and Social 
Council.  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has had 
a follow-up procedure since 2008, which calls on States to provide follow-up information 
on how they have taken steps to address its recommendations within a period of one or 
two years. Similar to the Human Rights Committee, it also appoints a rapporteur on 
follow-up and a deputy rapporteur who monitors and examines the follow-up 
information. A similar special procedure is practised by the Committee against Torture 
(CAT), which appoints a rapporteur to follow up on the State party’s compliance with 
requests and sends reminders to the governments concerned. Other UN Treaty bodies 
also appoint a rapporteur to follow up and report back to the Committee about activities 
(e.g. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances). 
 
Despite the development of ‘special follow-up procedures’ by UN Treaty bodies, there is 
evidence that some State parties do not comply with their reporting obligations. A clear 
example is the CAT Annual Report (2014-15: Chapter II), which states, 
The Committee deplores the fact that that some States parties do not comply with their 
reporting obligations under article 19 of the Convention. At the time of reporting, there 
were 28 States parties with overdue initial reports and 37 States parties with overdue 
periodic reports. 
 
The same Annual Report makes reference to the oral report to the Committee by the 
Rapporteur in November 2014, which reads, 
…[I]n the light of the treaty body strengthening process and the Convention against 
Torture Initiative to ensure universal ratification within 10 years, it was incumbent upon 
the Committee to enhance the follow-up procedure. [The Rapporteur] also said that two 
overriding questions were how to strengthen compliance with the Convention and how to 
measure the extent of that compliance. In May 2015, he suggested that the follow-up 
procedure could be strengthened in several ways, such as by making the 
recommendations clearer and more implementable, inviting State parties to meet with the 
Committee on follow-up, using an assessment grading system to evaluate compliance, 
and using quantitative indicators to assist with the assessment of implementation. He also 
highlighted the role of civil society organizations in the follow-up procedure.73 
 
Some UN Treaty bodies do not have special follow-up procedures. For instance, the only 
follow-up tools available to the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT) in cases 
where a State party refuses to cooperate and take steps to address its recommendations is 
to request CAT to make a public statement on the matter and publish the SPT country 
report. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does not have a general 
                                                          
73 Page 17 of the annual report. 
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obligation or special procedure either. Still, the State is ‘expected’ to send the Committee 
written information on how it has addressed its recommendations. CRC can send ‘any 
relevant information’ and reports to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International 
Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), containing requests or 
calling for the need to ensure technical assistance/advice to the country concerned. CRC 
has informed State parties that in cases where they do not submit the necessary 
information the Committee will in any case consider the situation of child rights in the 
State. UNICEF contributes to the follow-up of concluding observations by CRC. 
 
As stated above, the monitoring results, conclusions and recommendations resulting 
from UN Special Procedures and Treaty bodies feed into the work of the Universal 
Period Review (UPR). The State under review is expected to provide information on its 
actions to address the recommendations made by the UPR first review. In cases of 
persistent non-cooperation by State parties, the Human Rights Council may decide on the 
appropriate measures to take. 
 
1.3.4.2. Council of Europe 
The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly has at its disposal the 
possibility to penalise ‘persistent failures’ by Member States to comply with their 
obligations and lacking cooperation in monitoring processes. It may adopt a Resolution 
and/or Recommendation “by the non-ratification of the credentials of a national 
parliamentary delegation or by the annulment of ratified credentials”. In case of 
persistence, the Assembly may submit a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers 
for taking appropriate actions (see Annex 3 for more details on specific actions). 
 
Some CoE monitoring bodies have no formal procedures for ensuring the 
implementation of their conclusions and recommendations by State parties. This is the 
case, for instance, of the Venice Commission and CEPEJ, which do not have any specific 
follow-up procedure. The Venice Commission only offers facultative assistance to State 
parties to implement its opinions and recommendations.  
 
GRECO does provide a more elaborate procedure for following, via a graduated 
approach, the implementation of its recommendations by governments. GRECO has the 
competence to re-examine outstanding recommendations and issue compliance reports, 
which may include an overall conclusion on the implementation of all the 
recommendations. GRECO can also issue public statements when a member remains 
passive or has taken insufficient action to address its recommendations. Similarly, the 
CPT may deliver a public statement in cases where a party fails to cooperate or refuses to 
improve the situation in light of its recommendations. 
 
1.4. Scholarly approaches to overcoming challenges  
The Union’s vulnerabilities when it comes to safeguarding its values are fundamental in 
nature and pose a very serious threat to the success of the whole integration project. 
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Given the perceived novel nature of the threat – as the adherence to the values of Article 
2 TEU had been taken for granted before the backsliding of several Member States in 
recent years74 – simply falling back on the old time-tested approaches is not an option: 
academic literature had until recently focused exclusively on the Union’s own adherence 
to the rule of law75 and the candidate countries’ records in this area,76 assuming that any 
– indeed, all – serious rule of law deficiencies within each EU Member State would be 
dealt with by the relevant national authorities.  
 
The problems we are currently facing were thus largely unforeseen in ‘a Community 
based on the rule of law’,77 all the instruments described above notwithstanding. 
Academics and policy-makers have however quickly caught up with the issue of rule of 
law backsliding and constitutional capture in the EU and formulated an array of 
proposals of how to deal with the outstanding problems.78 
 
The majority of proposals focus on institutional action, either within the context of the 
Union, or with the involvement of outside actors and institutions. The first types of 
proposals include the actions by both existing institutions – the Council,79 the European 
Commission,80 the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU81 – and actions by institutions 
                                                          
74 The term has been coined by Jan-Werner Müller, see J.-W. Müller, ‘Safeguarding Democracy 
inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ Working Paper No. 3, Washington DC: 
Transatlantic Academy (2013).  
75 L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 04/09, (2009); M. L. Fernández Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European 
Constitution, The Hague: Kluwer, 1999. One has to note here that such accounts have always been 
self-congratulatory, marking an important weakness of scholarship on this, given that a much more 
critical account is also possible. Once the EU’s own adherence to the rule of law and other values is 
not merely presumed but tested empirically, numerous questions arise: G. Palombella, ‘Beyond 
Legality – before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level System’, in: C. Closa and 
D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, forthcoming; D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the 
Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, Yearbook of European Law, 2015; A. Williams, ‘Taking Values 
Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 549–577 (2009). 
76 E.g. D. Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the 
Copenhagen Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, 8 European Integration online Papers 10 
(2004). 
77 Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, para. 23. 
78 For brief overviews, see C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper (2014); EPRS briefing ‘Member 
States and the rule of law Dealing with a breach of EU values’ (2015) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/554167/EPRS_BRI(2015)554167_E
N.pdf. For more in-depth analyses, see the contributions in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), 
Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016, forthcoming; A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
79 Council of the European Union, Press Release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General 
Affairs, Brussels, 16 December 2014, 20–21; E. Hirsch-Ballin, ‘Mutual Trust: The Virtue of 
Reciprocity Strengthening the Acceptance of the Rule of Law through Peer Review’, in: C. Closa 
and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
80 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement 
Actions’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming (outlining how to empower the 
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yet to be created, such as the proposed ‘Copenhagen Commission’.82 Reliance on the 
Member States’ courts83 and a potential fine-tuning of the EU’s powers through a broad 
interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU84 by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union have also been advocated. The proposals of the second type look to 
the outside, arguing for the involvement of the Venice Commission.85 
 
Not all of the proposals fall within these two categories. Two proposals on the table are 
Member State-focused and go beyond mere supranational/international involvement, 
focusing on what the Member States themselves can do. The first among the two expects 
the Member States to take the lead in bringing systemic infringement actions to the Court 
of Justice,86 while the second investigates Member States’ direct retaliation against 
backsliding peers, grafting the alien tissue of reciprocity on the body of the EU legal 
order.87 A watered down version of direct Member State involvement is the 
encouragement of peer-review among them, which, however, is most likely to happen 
within the framework of the Council, bringing us back to the main bulk of the proposals: 
those focusing on the institutions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
Commission to intervene in the cases related to the breach of Art. 2 TEU based on a so-called 
‘systemic infringement procedure’, allowing for a more effective deployment of Art. 258 TFEU). 
81 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
82 J.-W. Müller, ‘Should the European Union Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Its Member 
States’ 21 European Law Journal 2, 141–160, (2015); J.-W. Müller, ‘The EU as a Militant Democracy’, 
Revista de Estudios Políticos,141–162, (2014). 
83 A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, ‘Reverse 
Solange–Protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States’ 49 Common 
Market Law Review, 2, 489–519 (2012). For analyses, see J. Croon-Gestefeld, ‘Reverse Solange – Union 
Citizenship as a Detour on the Route to European Rights Protection against National 
Infringements’, in: D. Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU 
Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of 
International Law, 145–170 (2014). See also an upgraded versions of this proposal: A. von Bogdandy, 
C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Kottmann and M. Smrkolj, ‘A European Response to 
Domestic Constitutional Crisis: Advancing the Reverse-Solange Doctrine’, in: A. von Bogdandy and 
P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics 
in Hungary and Romania, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 248–267; A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöller and M. 
Ioannidis, ‘Enforcing European Values’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU 
Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
84 A. Jakab, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as the Most Promising Way of Enforcing the 
Rule of Law against EU Member States’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
85 K. Tuori, ‘From Copenhagen to Venice’, in: C. Closa and D Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; J. 
Nergelius, ‘The Role of the Venice Commission in Maintaining the Rule of Law’, in: A. von 
Bogdandy and P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, 
Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 291–310. 
86 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to 
Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’, 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 2, 153–174 
(2015). 
87 I. Canor, ‘My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An Ever Closer Distrust among the Peoples 
of Europe”’, 50 Common Market Law Review 2, 383–421 (2013). 
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Besides the legally-articulated ways, there is of course always a possibility of ad hoc 
actions, akin to the kind that marked the EU’s involvement in Austrian politics 15 years 
ago in reaction to the building of a governing coalition in that State, which involved the 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), an extreme right nationalist party, which was still 
unusual in the political context of the time, but now looks to some degree as a strange 
exaggeration.88 We leave such possible ad hoc actions outside the scope of this Research 
Paper, noting only that their legality is of dubious nature, given the abundance of 
procedures in the Treaties designed specifically to deal with the situation at hand, 
including, but not limited to, the two procedures of Article 7 TEU.89 
 
In this vast sea of academic proposals, eight stand out. They offer contrasting visions, and 
due to the complexity of the problems we are facing, none of them appears sufficient on 
its own to solve the problem at hand, but they nonetheless offer EU policy-makers plenty 
of food for thought. Most important, there is enormous potential to deploy different 
elements of these in combination with each other. While the majority of them attempt to 
offer short-term solutions and are thus deployable immediately (at least according to 
their creators), several unquestionably require a Treaty change, which is clearly an 
unfeasible option in the current legal-political climate. We still chose to include several 
such proposals in this overview in order to demonstrate the options available for long-
term solutions to current problems. One should not doubt that the need to ensure the 
observation of Union values will not disappear in the years to come; it will rather become 
more acute. 
 
The same concerns the emphasis on the actual enforcement of values, which is present in 
the proposals to a varying degree: not all of them come equipped with a fine-tuned 
sanctioning mechanism beyond a possibility to use the exiting instruments, such as the 
shaming of the problematic Member State, or the suspension of the participation of that 
State in the Union institutions via Article 7 TEU or, alternatively, shaping and financial 
penalties via Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU.  
 
The key proposals we chose to discuss in brief include: 
a. Systemic infringement procedure (Scheppele). 
b. Biting intergovernmentalism (Kochenov). 
c. Reverse Solange (von Bogdandy). 
d. The Copenhagen Commission (Müller). 
e. The ‘exit card’ (Closa). 
f. Peer review and ‘Horizontal Solange’ (Hirsch Ballin/Canor). 
g. Unrestricted fundamental rights jurisdiction for the EU (Reding). 
                                                          
88 GG.N. Toggenburg ‘La crisi austriaca: delicate equilibrismi sospesi tra molte dimensioni’ 2 Diritto 
pubblico comparato ed europeo, 735–756 (2001); K. Lachmayer, ‘Questioning the Basic Values – Austria 
and Jörg Haider’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
89 See, for a meticulous analysis, C. Hillion, ‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and 
D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, forthcoming; L. F. M. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 
and the Rule of Law Initiatives’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and 
Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming.  
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h. Outsourcing monitoring and enforcement to non-EU institutions (Buquicchio). 
 
1.4.1. Systemic infringement procedure 
Kim Lane Scheppele’s ‘systemic infringement procedure’ proposal deserves to be 
examined first.90 In a nutshell, this proposal aims to ensure the most effective use of the 
already existing infringement procedures, which have been used relatively successfully 
by the Commission in the context of the enforcement of EU law since the founding of the 
Communities, as analysed above. The proposal makes a sound attempt to address the 
shortcomings of the already existing EU law enforcement machinery concerning its 
ability to deal with any potential as well as actual serious breaches of EU values. This is 
done in two fundamental steps, covering both the procedure for stating the breach of 
values and the enforcement of compliance. 
 
Firstly, Scheppele suggests enabling the bundling up of infringements so as to empower 
the Commission to present a whole infringement package to the CJEU, rather than 
pursuing single instances of non-compliance on a case-by-case basis. The crucial 
underlying assumption in this approach is that pursuing numerous infringements 
simultaneously amounts to more than just the sum of its parts, as it should enable the 
Commission to present a clear picture of systemic non-compliance as regards Article 2 
TEU. In this way – especially if Article 2 TEU is coupled with the duty of loyalty laid 
down in Article 4(3) TEU91 – the Court could for instance hold that the rule of law has 
been breached by a Member State on the basis of multiple single breaches of EU law 
bundled together and submitted by the Commission in one go. Multiple individual 
beaches might not even be required, as long as a complex pattern of developments 
                                                          
90 K.L. Scheppele, ‘Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement 
Actions’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016; her proposal has been analysed in the 
Verfassungsblog in great detail. For the details of the proposal, see K.L. Scheppele, ‘What Can the 
European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic Principles of the European Union? 
The Case for Systematic Infringement Actions’, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-
justice-
2013/files/contributions/45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversi
on_en.pdf; for the proposal in brief, see K.L. Scheppele, ‘EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case for 
the “Systemic Infringement Action”’, Verfassungsblog, 22 November 2013, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/the-eu-commission-v-hungary-the-case-for-the-systemic-
infringement-action/#.Uw4mfPuzm5I. For the discussion, see, Verfassungsblog, ‘Hungary – Taking 
Action, Episode 2: The Systemic Infringement Action’, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/focus/ungarn-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-
scheppele/#.Uw4m4Puzm5J. See also K.L. Scheppele, ‘The EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case 
for the “Systemic Infringement Action,”’ Assizes de la Justice, European Commission, November 
2013, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-
2013/files/contributions/45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversi
on_en.pdf and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Making Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on 
Commission v Hungary, Case C-288/12’ Eutopia, 29 April 2014, 
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-infringement-procedures-more-effective-a-comment-
on-commission-v-hungary-case-c-28812-8-april-2014-grand-chamber/. 
91 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member 
States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union…” 
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described in the case testifies to a violation of EU values. While it is often assumed that 
Article 2 TEU lacks justiciability, combining it with Article 4 TEU could potentially solve 
this problem, with jurisdiction stemming from the overwhelming demonstration of the 
seriousness of the breach. Moreover, this ‘bundling approach’ would not in fact be new, 
although it has only been used so far with respect to a systemic breach of the EU acquis.92 
Scheppele’s proposal should therefore be commended for offering a creative route to 
enforcing Article 2 TEU on the basis of an already existing and well-tried procedure 
through merely altering the mode and scope of its application, by taking a step from 
strictly dwelling in the field of the acquis of the Union into the area of values.  
 
The second part of Scheppele’s proposal is just as important and is designed to deal with 
the limited effectiveness of financial sanctions as a tool to ensure compliance. The 
proposal is simple: Rather than imposing financial sanctions, the EU should seek to 
subtract any EU funds that the relevant Member State is entitled to receive. Although 
some secondary legislation would likely be needed to make this part of the proposal a 
reality,93 it is definitely an approach to be considered very seriously. While the 
effectiveness of this change may not work with respect to countries that do not depend 
on EU moneys, it may well be effective with respect to Member States particularly 
dependent on EU funds, such as Hungary. While both elements of the proposal are 
legally solid, the weakest spot is the second part of the proposal, not the first. Given that 
sanctions are usually particularly ineffective in bringing about a regime change, any 
country which is not merely becoming autocratic but already is will be most unlikely to 
change its ways under financial pressure.94 This problem is generally applicable to 
virtually all the proposals to be considered below, however: not much can be done with 
money against an autocratic government which is particularly nasty and absolutely 
determined. Some other tools should be found. There is a second important weak spot: 
the Commission’s approach to reading Article 258 TFEU and applying this instrument 
seems to be hostile to taking EU values into account when bringing a case. This resulted 
in a number of missed opportunities – the judicial retirement case with regard to 
Hungary, which was a glorified loss, in terms of the Rule of Law, rather than a win, being 
one example. Besides, this approach also sees the value of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union potentially undermined, as no case has been brought under Article 
258 TFEU based, at least in part, on the Charter.95 The proposal, however legally sound, is 
bound to be unworkable, unless the Commission changes its counterproductive and 
artificially narrow approach to the scope of Article 258 TFEU. 
                                                          
92 E.g. Case C-494/01 Commission v. Ireland (Irish Waste) [2005] ECR I-3331. 
93 A certain change in the ECJ’s approach to the calculation of penalties under Article 260 TFEU, in 
particular the criterion of the ‘ability to pay’, could also be in need of a certain rethinking but is 
unlikely to form an overwhelming obstacle to the implementation of the proposal: D. Kochenov, 
‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, 
XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014). 
94 N. Tocci, Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights through the ENP? The Case for Refocusing 
on the Rule of Law, in: M. Cremona and G. Meloni (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy: A 
Framework for Modernisation?, 2007/21 EUI Working Paper LAW, 2007, 23–35, 29. See also D. 
Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements 
Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014), 168. 
95 A. Łazowski, ‘Decoding a Legal Enigma: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and Infringement Proceedings’ 14 ERA Forum, 573–587 (2013). 
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All in all, Scheppele’s proposal creatively attempts to solve two key problems which have 
prevented the effective use of the EU’s infringement procedure against Member States 
guilty of violating Article 2 TEU values.96  
1.4.2. Biting intergovernmentalism 
‘Biting intergovernmentalism’97 builds on the idea of utilising the systemic infringement 
procedure explained above, but offers a potentially more sensitive way to deploy the 
procedure, while not expecting the Commission to change its ways. In this sense, biting 
intergovernmentalism is deployable immediately. The core idea consists in bringing 
systemic infringement cases based on Article 259 TFEU, rather than Article 258 TFEU. 
The former provision allows the Member States themselves to bring to court their peers 
violating the Treaties. The presumption behind the provision is that all the members of 
the Union are equally interested – just as the institutions – in ensuring sustained 
compliance with the Treaties by their peers. Importantly, no demonstration of direct 
concern is needed to meet the standing requirements: the mere fact of a breach of EU law 
is sufficient.98 
 
Under Article 258 TFEU the Commission enjoys absolute discretion in bringing Article 
258 TFEU cases.99 Given that it might choose, at any moment, not to bring a case even 
where there is a clear breach, or, which would be even more counterproductive in the 
context of values enforcement, to bring a case based merely on the violation of the rules 
of the acquis sensu stricto, getting 27 additional potential litigators on board is hugely 
important. True, the Commission is the first point of contact for a Member State bringing 
a case under Article 259 TFEU – the provision even allows the Commission to take over. 
What is crucial in this context, however, is that the Member State is not bound by the 
Commission’s exercise of discretion. This concerns both the Commission’s decision not to 
take over the case and the Commission’s selection of arguments on the basis of which to 
proceed once the case has been taken over. In both instances the Member State concerned 
                                                          
96 For a more detailed assessment and criticism of this proposal, see Verfassungsblog, ‘Hungary – 
Taking Action, Episode 2: The Systemic Infringement Action’, available online at 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/focus/ungarn-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-
scheppele/#.Uw4m4Puzm5J. C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper (2014); D. Kochenov, ‘On 
Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance – Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, 
XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International Law, 145–170 (2014). 
97 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to 
Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’, 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 2, 153–174 
(2015). 
98 This is the case since Article 259 – just like 258 TFEU – is not intended to protect the claimants’ 
rights. Rather, the provisions aim to ensure general compliance with EU law, e.g. Case C-431/92 
Commission v. Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, para. 21. Compare L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The 
Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’, 47 Common Market Law Review 1, 9–61 (2010), 13. 
99 E.g. Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined cases C-466 and 476/98 Commission v. UK et al. [2002] ECR 
I-9741, para. 30. Compare L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement 
Proceedings’, 47 Common Market Law Review 1, 9–61 (2010), 14. 
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with the failure to abide by the Treaties evident from the state of affairs in one (or more) 
of its peers is free to bring the latter to court, construing the case as it sees fit.100 
 
This is the first great advantage of the biting intergovernmentalism proposal over a 
simple systemic infringement action brought by the Commission: the Commission’s 
limited reading of the scope of infringement proceedings cannot deprive biting 
intergovernmentalism of its effectiveness, making the deployment of a systemic 
infringement proposal straightforward and available immediately. 
 
There is a second advantage, however: the Union is constantly criticised for ‘creeping 
competences’ and ‘power grabs’, allowing the Member States failing to comply with the 
values of Article 2 TEU to (misre)present the Commission’s systemic infringement action 
under Article 258 TFEU as a blunt attempt to violate Member States sovereignty by a 
power-hungry Union. The same argument is difficult to make when another Member 
State is bringing a systemic infringement action, which gives the biting 
intergovernmentalism proposal a political edge. 
 
With regard to the actual enforcement of values once a non-compliant Member State has 
been found in breach under Article 259 TFEU, the standard financial sanctioning 
procedure will then need to be applied. 
1.4.3. ‘Reverse Solange’ 
One of the most widely discussed proposals to consider is based on AG Poiares Maduro’s 
Opinion in Centro Europa and was popularised by Armin von Bogdandy.101 Similarly to 
the two proposals discussed above, the existing law and institutional structure of the 
Union are relied upon to address the rule of law crises in the EU, thus no Treaty change 
is required. The core idea focuses on grave violations of fundamental rights. Once the 
seriousness of rights violations in a given Member State is particularly grave, this allows 
the Union courts (including that very Member State’s courts in their capacity as enforcers 
of EU law) to intervene. The graveness of violation would create jurisdiction.102 
                                                          
100 See, e.g. Case 141/78 France v. UK [1979] ECR 2923. For an overview of relevant practice, see, e.g. 
L. Prete and B. Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’, 47 Common Market 
Law Review 1, 9–61 (2010), 27 (and the references cited therein). 
101 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-380/05 Centro Europa [2007] ECR I-349, para. 14 et seq. 
See, for an academic articulation: A. von Bogdandy, M. Kottmann, C. Antpöhler, J. Dickschen, S. 
Hentrei, M. Smrkolj, ‘Reverse Solange–Protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU 
Member States’ 49 Common Market Law Review, 2, 489–519 (2012). For the criticism of von 
Bogdandy’s proposal, see: Verfassungsblog, ‘Recue Package for Fundamental Rights’, available at 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/rettungsschirm-fr-grundrechte-ein-onlinesymposium-auf-dem-
verfassungsblog-2/#.Uw4rVPuzm5I. See also D. Kochenov, ‘On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance 
– Reverse Solange and Systemic Infringements Analyzed’, XXXIII Polish Yearbook of International 
Law, 145–170 (2014), and the upgraded versions of the proposal: A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöhler, J. 
Dickschen, S. Hentrei, M. Kottmann and M. Smrkolj, ‘A European Response to Domestic 
Constitutional Crisis: Advancing the Reverse-Solange Doctrine’, in: A. von Bogdandy and P. 
Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in 
Hungary and Romania, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 248–267; A. von Bogdandy, C. Antpöller and M. 
Ioannidis, ‘Enforcing European Values’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU 
Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
102 In this sense the proposal is in line with the case law of the Court of Justice, which finds 
jurisdiction based on the gravity of consequences caused by the deprivation of rights, e.g. D. 
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This proposal is known as the ‘Reverse Solange’ as it purports to espouse the logic of the 
Budesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in the so-called Solange I and Solange II cases.103 In these 
two cases, the BVerfG reserved for itself the final say on matters of EU law in situations 
where EU law could threaten the core of human rights protection established by the 
German Basic Law. Although the BVerfG has never actually acted on its threat, its Solange 
jurisprudence led the Court of Justice to reconsider its earlier stance regarding human 
rights protection in the early 1960s and hold that respect for human rights is one of the 
key conditions governing the lawfulness of EU acts.104  
 
The essence of von Bogdandy’s proposal is to ‘reverse’ the Solange approach by allowing 
the Court of Justice to move within the domain of the national law with a view to 
protecting EU values. The authors of the proposal presume that such a jurisdictional 
move would only be possible in truly exceptional cases of systemic non-compliance.105 It 
is suggested that in a situation where human rights would be systemically violated in a 
‘captured’ Member State, national courts should be empowered to make a preliminary 
reference under Article 267 TFEU in order to invite the Court of Justice to consider the 
legality of national actions in the light of Article 2 TEU, which the Court is not currently 
entitled to do. 
 
While normatively defensible, this proposal however suffers from several shortcomings, 
as it is most likely unworkable both in theory and in practice. Most important, it does not 
even address the key issues related to the lack of compliance with Article 2 TEU in some 
Member States. This is due, first of all, to the proposal’s heavy reliance on national courts, 
whereas the judiciary is normally the first institution which illiberal forces would seek to 
capture, as the Hungarian example shows. Tellingly, Poland follows suit very closely, as 
obstructing the work of the Constitutional Tribunal was among the priorities of the new 
government. If national courts are packed and decapitated,106 one can hardly expect them 
to play any effective role in promoting Article 2 TEU compliance in the captured State of 
which they are part. 
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More important, however, the requirement of systemic non-compliance makes the 
implementation of the proposal practically impossible: the threshold is simply too 
high.107 Ultimately, the presumption that the logic of trying not to give up existing 
jurisdiction – the original driver behind BVerfG’s Solange – and the logic behind claiming 
new powers by the ECJ – which is the driver behind the Reverse Solange proposal – are 
comparable seems to significantly underplay the fundamental differences between the 
two.108 As a consequence, the so-called ‘Reverse Solange’ seems to be misnamed.  
 
The last thing to say about this proposal is that not all backsliding in terms of the rule of 
law implies grave and persistent human rights violations. Quite the contrary seems to be 
true: a well-executed dismantlement of the rule of law and the constitutional checks and 
balances can happen – or at least go through crucial initial stages – without blunt 
violations of human rights.109 Once the main jurisdictional argument made in Reverse 
Solange is considered outside of its rights context, however, it is very similar in essence to 
the one employed in the context of the systemic infringements proposal: the graveness of 
violation as such combined with their demonstrable character allows for intervention. For 
the reasons above, however, it is abundantly clear that systemic infringement procedures 
– via either Article 258 TFEU or Article 259 TFEU – are overwhelmingly preferable to 
Reverse Solange: they are not limited in their deployment to human rights; the thresholds 
are more manageable and formulated more clearly; they do not rely on the national 
institutions in the backsliding Member States. 
 
The problem of enforcement sensu stricto is as acute with Reverse Solange as with other 
proposals discussed: it comes down to Article 260 TFEU again, the effectivene ss of which 
is not beyond doubt.  
1.4.4. The Copenhagen Commission 
None of the proposals mentioned above suggested the creation of a new EU body, unlike 
the proposal put forward by Jan-Werner Müller who proposed to create a ‘Copenhagen 
Commission’. This new body would ensure regular monitoring and the enforcement of 
compliance of current EU Member States with Article 2 TEU. Thus this proposal does 
not, unlike the previous proposals, rely on existing law and structures.110 
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The creation of a special Copenhagen Commission is potentially very attractive, as it will 
be an important step in the direction of establishing a “swift and independent monitoring 
mechanism and an early-warning system”, which the Tavares Report also wanted to see 
in place.111 The new body would build on the Copenhagen criteria idea, going back to the 
1993 European Council in Copenhagen, which established, inter alia, the political 
conditions for membership in the Union, including respect for democracy, the rule of law 
and the protection of fundamental rights, which had to be complied with by all the 
countries willing to join.112 
 
Unlike the previously examined proposals, which are mostly related to mending the 
holes in the EU’s Article 2 TEU enforcement by relying on the existing tools already in 
place, the creation of a special organ with a new mechanism would clearly amount to a 
systemic mid- to long-term solution, which is no doubt preferable, as it would potentially 
allow for turning the EU into a full-fledged militant democracy.113 This being said, the 
institutional innovation in question should not be viewed as necessarily stemming from a 
Treaty change. Some authors argued that it was possible to establish a binding 
‘Copenhagen mechanism’ within the current Treaty framework, by inter-institutional 
agreement with the contribution of independent academic experts in the process of 
monitoring Member States’ compliance with article 2 TEU.114 Yet another option to 
consider, in this regard, is to involve the Fundamental Rights Agency of the Union more 
in the matters of Article 2 TEU compliance, which will most likely require only the 
amendment of some secondary legislation.115 
 
The proposal is, however, of little use in addressing immediate challenges, as the creation 
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of any new EU body of this nature would no doubt require the approval, as well as full 
participation, of the Member State already experiencing problems with Article 2 TEU 
compliance. Moreover, questions remain as to the desirability of further complicating the 
institutional structure of the Union, as well as, fundamentally, the mechanics of the actual 
enforcement of the decisions of the Copenhagen Commission. 
1.4.5. The ‘Exit Card’  
A more radical proposal still, which would definitely require a Treaty change, has been 
advanced by Carlos Closa.116 It suggests the introduction of a provision akin to Article 8 
of the Statute of the Council of Europe and a number of other international 
organisations,117 on the basis of which the EU could force out a chronically non-compliant 
EU Member State. Such a new provision would complement Article 50 TEU, which 
currently permits voluntary withdrawal from the Union.118 As outlined by Closa,119 the 
idea is not to start throwing countries out of the Union, but to increase credibility in the 
sanctions, which the EU may adopt on the basis of either Article 7 TEU or Article 260 
TFEU.  
 
The option to force an EU country out would be even more radical than the so-called 
‘nuclear option’ laid down in Article 7 TEU and which, as previously noted, has never 
been used. It may be that the sheer possibility of being ‘kicked out’ of the EU would be of 
greater persuasive value for the non-compliant Member State in question than the mere 
possibility of losing voting rights in the Council.120  
 
The crucial problem with this proposal is that it can only be deployed in the long-term 
and unquestionably requires a Treaty change. Moreover, such a proposal will have truly 
far-reaching implications for the concept of EU citizenship.121 Viewed from the citizens’ 
standpoint, ejecting a Member State facing severe troubles in the field of the rule of law 
and human rights could potentially demonstrate the Union’s inability to guarantee actual 
Article 2 TEU compliance and protect the citizens of the ‘captured’ State. Building upon 
the presumption that this option would enter the Treaties on the assumption that it is 
never to be used, like the Council of Europe’s own Article 8 of the Statute, adding the 
possibility of ejecting a Member State is definitely helpful, as it will dispel the 
unfortunate sense that Article 7 TEU is the last resort measure and should thus not be 
used. Enriching EU law with a Member State ejection option is thus likely to be a positive 
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development, notwithstanding the fact that, strictly speaking, it will not help solve the 
problems of the non-compliant Member State.  
1.4.6 Peer review and Horizontal Solange 
Peer review and ‘Horizontal Solange’ options are profoundly interconnected as, similarly 
to the biting intergovernmentalism proposal, they attempt to involve the Member States, 
not the Union institutions, as much as possible in solving the rule of law crises. Unlike 
biting intergovernmentalism, however, the deployment of these two options is either 
potentially non-consequential (peer review) or potentially too costly in terms of ensuring 
the proper functioning of the law of the Union (Horizontal Solange). One could be 
branded as a ‘positive’ version of the other. 
 
The positive proposal has been made by Ernst Hirsch Ballin and a team of researchers in 
the Netherlands and focuses on mutual peer review of the Member States’ compliance 
with the rule of law.122 To a degree the Council has heeded this proposal.123 Peer review 
would allow the EU to avoid a number of problems, which are at the core of all the other 
proposals under review. Namely, it would not require any clear definition of the scope of 
EU law and the acquis, since peer review is to happen based on the agreements between 
the Member States outside of the framework of EU law. Although there is an obvious 
problem with detaching Article 2 TEU compliance from the EU legal system, the peer 
review solution could be swiftly implemented. The obvious drawback of the proposal is 
the presumption that naming and shaming works, while we know from experience that it 
often does not, which explains, for instance, the inclusion of Article 260 TFEU in the 
Treaties: initially, the Court did not have a legal ability to fine non-compliant Member 
States. The Treaties were amended in the face of the reality that Member States failing to 
comply with EU law would ignore Court decisions calling on them to respect the law.124 
It is indeed difficult to expect fundamental change from an illiberal national government 
as a result of other governments stating that tout n’est pas rose there. The problem of 
enforcement persists. 
 
The ‘negative’ proposal allows the Member States rather than the EU to enforce sanctions 
against the non-compliant government by de facto disapplying EU law in bilateral 
relations with the ‘guilty’ state. This approach, recently analysed by Iris Canor, has been 
branded ‘Horizonal Solange’.125 Although the idea is not new, such treatment of non-
compliant Member States profoundly undermines the very foundations of EU law, which 
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is not based on reciprocity.126 It strikes therefore at the core of the acquis and is thus 
unattractive for both normative and pragmatic reasons. In essence, it has the potential to 
turn the EU’s internal market chaotic by opening up the Pandora’s box of mutual 
accusations and immediate retaliation by Member States – precisely what the EU has 
been so successful in outlawing over so many decades. This approach is thus of very 
limited attractiveness, merely offering countless possibilities for abuse.  
1.4.7. Unrestricted fundamental rights jurisdiction for the EU 
In her speech of 4 September 2013, the former Commission’s Vice-President Reding 
indicated a preference for the abolition of Article 51 of our Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which states that the provisions of the Charter are applicable to the Member 
States “only when they are implementing Union law, so as to make all fundamental 
rights directly applicable in the Member States, including the right to effective judicial 
review.”127 Such a move would certainly have a federalising effect, which would lead to a 
situation where the EU Charter becomes a ‘federal standard’ as, similarly to the Federal 
Bill of Rights in the US, it would eventually apply “irrespective of the subject-matter at 
issue, that is to say irrespective of whether it falls within federal or State competence.”128 
In this scenario, however unlikely due to reluctance of several EU Member States to 
revise the EU Charter along these lines, the Court of Justice would be entrusted with “the 
task performed by the US Supreme Court, that of protecting any individual citizen, on 
the basis of a ‘federal’ standard of respect for fundamental rights, against any public 
authority of any kind and in any area of substantive law.”129 Article 51(1) of the Charter, 
however, currently clearly precludes such a ‘federal’ evolution as it unmistakably implies 
that the EU Courts still lack the power to review the compatibility with EU fundamental 
rights – including those of a procedural nature such as the right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial – of national rules which fall outside the scope of Union law.  
 
Be that as it may, Reding’s proposal did demonstrate a certain appetite within the 
Commission for a potential power-grab, however unrealistic, at least in the short- to 
medium-term, as a Treaty change would be required to change or abolish the provision 
in question. Not unsurprisingly, there is little consensus or even a sense of urgency on 
this issue amongst the Member States, which tend to prefer focusing on the EU’s alleged 
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democratic and possibly also justice deficit.130 Because of the EU’s own limitations when 
it comes to complying with its own values, it has been suggested that it would be unwise 
to grant the EU a wide competence to police rule of law issues and other values at 
national level, as he who lives in a glass house shouldn’t throw stones.131 However 
promising, Reding’s proposal is in any event unrealistic, as is the suggestion that the 
Court of Justice should neutralise entirely the limitations Article 51(1) imposes on its 
human rights jurisdiction.132 Such a judicial move would actually undermine the rule of 
law by negating the clear intent of the Union’s constituent power, i.e. its Member States.  
1.4.8. ‘Outsourcing’ the monitoring/enforcement of EU values  
The President of the Venice Commission, Gianni Buquicchio, put forward another 
noteworthy proposal.133 He suggested that the EU should avail of the expertise of his 
institution. The Venice Commission, which is not an EU organ, belonging to the Council 
of Europe system instead, has built up a solid reputation on the issues of the rule of law 
both in the context of its protection and promotion in the EU countries, and elsewhere in 
Europe.134 All the Member States are represented in it. 
 
The Venice Commission proposal did not come as a surprise to those interested in the 
enforcement of EU values, as this body of legal experts has traditionally played an 
important role in ensuring compliance with the rule of law in current EU Member 
States.135 Given the established tradition of fruitful cooperation between the EU and the 
Venice Commission, which is already a reality, deepening the relations between the two 
offered a promising path. Buquicchio’s offer does however raise two fundamental 
problems for the EU: one of a practical nature, the other of a normative nature.  
 
From a practical point of view, one must note that the Venice Commission, although it 
obviously possesses an impressive track-record and admirable expertise, cannot boast 
any enforcement machinery to ensure Article 2 TEU compliance where it is most needed. 
In other words, outsourcing rule of law questions to the Council of Europe would not 
solve the key issue: how to guarantee actual change in the non-compliant Member States? 
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From a normative point of view, it is important to stress that Article 2 TEU established 
the core values on which both the Union and the Member States are built. Outsourcing 
Article 2 TEU issues thus potentially amounts to sending a signal of the EU’s inability to 
deliver on its core promise. For this reason alone taking up the kind offer from the Venice 
Commission would seem to be inappropriate, as it would most likely undermine further 
EU authority in this fundamental area. In the light of the Venice Commission’s inability 
to enforce compliance with the rule of law standards it may formulate, taking up the 
offer, next to being inappropriate, would also be of little use.  
 
1.5. Institutional approaches to overcoming problems  
History and recent events proved the Copenhagen dilemma to be a very vivid one in the 
EU. It exists despite the fact that the EU is already a rule-of-law actor, relying on a set of 
policy and legal instruments, assessing (to varying degrees) Member States’ compliance 
with democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights under the current treaty 
configurations.136 It is so because these mechanisms constitute a scattered and patchy 
setting of Member States’ EU surveillance systems as regards their obligations enshrined 
in Article 2 TEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 
The only ‘hard law’ having a Treaty-basis is Article 7 TEU as described in Chapter 1.2.1. 
Article 7 consists of a preventive arm in Section (1) (determining a clear risk of a breach) 
and a corrective arm in Sections (2)-(3) (determining a serious and persistent breach). 
These require different thresholds to become operational. Article 7(1) requires four-fifths 
of the Member States’ votes in the Council to become operational, whereas Article 7(2) 
requires unanimity of all Member States except the one in breach of EU values. 
Determination of sanctions does not require unanimity, but only applies as a follow-up to 
Article 7(2). The scope of application is rightly broad, and has the clear advantage, as 
compared to other mechanisms, of being not only limited to Member States’ actions when 
implementing EU law but also of covering breaches in areas where they act 
autonomously. It also provides for more or less clear sanctions: if there is a serious and 
persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, this Member 
State might be sanctioned and suspended from voting at Council level. Article 7 has 
however never been activated in practice due to a number of political and legal obstacles.  
 
Other EU-level instruments that evaluate and monitor (yet do not directly supervise) 
Article 2-related principles at Member State level (discussed supra under Subchapters 
1.3. and 1.4.) present a number of methodological challenges. First, they constitute soft 
policy, i.e. are non-legally binding, or make use of benchmarking techniques and 
exchange ‘good practices’ and mutual learning processes between Member States. 
Second, they are affected by politicisation and as a consequence make use of non-neutral 
and subjective evaluation methodologies. Third, many of these are characterised by a 
lack of democratic accountability and judicial control gaps, with a limited or non-existent 
role for the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union.137 
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The new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, described in Chapter 1.2.3, can be 
seen as a first attempt to construct a viable mechanism.138 While the EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule of Law can be seen as a step in the right direction, it has a number of 
limitations:139  
 
The formulation of a pre-Article 7 procedure is a milestone in a worrying trend of non-
enforcement of European values spanning almost two decades.140 The Amsterdam Treaty 
introduced the Article 7 sanction mechanism in 1999, and soon a situation arose 
triggering the potential applicability of the provision. Whereas Article 7 came into 
existence foremost out of fear of post-Communist countries’ retrogression, it was 
ultimately Austria, one of the old Member States with a consolidated democracy, which 
was seen as taking a dangerous path towards rule of law backsliding by an extreme 
right-wing party entering into the governing coalition. The remaining then 14 Member 
States opted for political and diplomatic segregation of Austria; seven months later the 
Three Wise Men entrusted with assessing the Austrian situation came to the conclusion 
that European values – and in particular minority rights – were being respected.141 The 
incident was “swept under the carpet as an event which was embarrassing for everyone 
involved”.142 More important for our purposes, the case also triggered the amendment of 
Article 7 by adding a preventive arm to it and breaking down the mechanism into Article 
7(1) and Articles 7(2) and (3) (the previous Article 7). When Hungary – a new candidate 
for the mechanism – entered the scene, instead of making use of the already diluted 
procedure of Article 7(1), the Commission decided to water down the process by 
inserting a preventive-preventive process.  
 
The application of this heavily problematic procedure raises even further questions. First, 
the monitoring dimension is rather weak in nature. It is a crisis-led monitoring 
instrument and does not offer a comparative and regular/periodic assessment by 
relevant thematic area (corresponding with the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU 
Charter) for each individual EU Member State, so as to have a country-by-country 
assessment on the state of the rule of law.143 Second, the discretion held by the 
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141 M. Ahtisaari, J. Frowein and M. Oreja, ‘Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to 
the Common European Values, in Particular Concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees and 
Immigrants, and the Evolution of the Political Nature of the FPÖ’ (The Wise Men Report), 40 
International legal materials: current documents 1, 102–123 (2001). 
142 R. Wodak, M. Reisigl, R. de Cillia (eds.), The Discursive Construction of National Identity, 2009, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 236.  
143 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available 
at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf. 
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Commission to assess the situation in a Member State and activate the Framework 
remains great. The assessment and operability of the Framework are not subject to any 
sort of external scrutiny or judicial and democratic accountability method (i.e. specific 
roles for the Parliament and the CJEU). Third, the framework does not propose any 
specific model, internal strategy or policy cycle144 for EU inter-institutional coordination 
between the findings resulting from the rule of law assessment and those from other EU 
monitoring or evaluation processes of Member State performances, such as the European 
semester cycle and soft economic governance.145 Fourth, and most important, it 
potentially gravely undermines the effectiveness of the deployment of Article 7 TEU, in 
the context when more than one Member State is backsliding or in a state of 
constitutional capture and the Framework is only activated in relation to one, leaving the 
second one free to block the application of Article 7 TEU sanctions, should such a need 
arise.  
 
The Communication was acknowledged by the General Affairs Council meeting of 18 
March 2014.146 Yet it has not been followed up by the Council since then. Instead, EU 
Member States’ representatives raised several institutional and procedural questions 
regarding the Commission’s initiative, which were examined by the Council Legal 
Service (CLS) in an Opinion issued in May 2014.147 The CLS emphasised that “the respect 
of the rule of law by the Member States cannot be the subject matter of an action by the 
institutions of the Union irrespective of the existence of a specific material competence to 
frame this action, with the sole exception of the procedure described in Article 7 TEU”. 
Tongue in cheek, it concluded that Article 7 TEU cannot constitute the appropriate basis 
to amend this procedure and that the Commission’s initiative was not compatible with 
the principle of conferral. It also stated that there is no legal basis in the Treaties that 
empowers the institutions to create a new supervision mechanism for the respect of the 
rule of law by the Member States, additional to what is laid down in Article 7 TEU, either 
to amend, modify or supplement the procedure laid down in this Article. Were the 
Council to act along such lines, it would run the risk of being found to have abased its 
powers by deciding without a legal basis. The CLS suggested as an alternative the 
conclusion of an intergovernmental international agreement designed to supplement EU 
law and to ensure the respect of Article 2 TEU values. This agreement could envisage the 
participation of European institutions, and specific ways in which EU Member States 
would commit to subject themselves to a ‘review system’.  
 
The opinion of the CLS is, with all due respect, legally dubious, however. In response to 
their chief criticism of lacking legal basis, one may on the contrary assert that since the 
Commission is one of the institutions empowered, under Article 7 TEU, to trigger the 
procedure contained therein, it should in fact be commended for establishing clear 
guidelines on how such triggering is to function in practice. In other words, a strong and 
                                                          
144 As proposed by European Parliament (2012), Resolution on the situation of fundamental rights 
in the EU (2010-2011), P7_TA(2012)0500, 12 December 2012, Rapporteur: Monika Flašíková Beňová. 
145 See also European Parliament (2015), Draft Report on the situation of fundamental rights in the 
European Union (2013-2014), (2014) 2254 (INI), 2015, Rapporteur: Laura Ferrara. 
146 Press Release, Council meeting, General Affairs, 3306th, Brussels, 18 March 2014. 
147 Council of the European Union, Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to 
strengthen the Rule of Law: Compatibility with the Treaties, Doc. 10296/14, Brussels, 27 May 2014. 
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convincing argument can no doubt be made that Article 7(1) TEU already and necessarily 
implicitly empowers the Commission to investigate any potential risk of a serious breach 
of the EU’s values by giving it the competence to submit a reasoned proposal to the 
Council should the Commission be of the view that Article 7 TEU ought to be triggered 
on this basis.148 Moreover, given the overwhelming level of interdependence between the 
EU Member States, and the blatant disregard for EU values in at least one EU country, 
the Commission fulfilled its duty as Guardian of the Treaties by putting forward a 
framework that would make Article 2 TEU operational in practice.149 
 
The General Affairs Council of 16 December 2014 adopted Conclusions on ensuring 
respect for the rule of law as described in Chapter 1.2.4.150 The Council committed itself 
to establishing a dialogue among all EU Member States to promote and safeguard the 
rule of law “in the framework of the Treaties”. Such an inter-governmental framework of 
cooperation unquestionably cannot be conducive to effectively addressing current rule of 
law challenges across the Union.151 
 
Upholding and promoting European values, or reversing the trends in the deterioration 
of some sub-elements of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, may follow 
a “‘sunshine policy’, which engages and involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, a 
“value-control which is owned equally by all actors”152 – but only if the Member State in 
question is playing by the rules, i.e. accepts the validity of European norms, the power of 
European institutions to supervise these, and is benevolently following recommendations 
and good practices. Since the success of such a positive approach is very much dependent 
on the willingness of the recipients to adhere to the concept of cooperative 
constitutionalism, it will not work when a state systematically undermines democracy, 
deconstructs the rule of law and/or engages in massive human right violations. There is 
no reason to presume the good intentions of those in power to engage in a sunshine 
approach involving a dialogue and soft measures to make the entity return to the concept 
of limited government – a notion that those in power wished to abandon in the first 
place.  
 
                                                          
148 Such a reading is fully in line with the Commission’s practice regarding Article 49 TEU. In the 
context, the Commission regularly adopts a number of ‘monitoring’ documents in which EU 
candidate countries’ progress and alignment with EU acquis are reviewed: D. Kochenov EU 
Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality, Kluwer Law International, 2008, Chapter 2.  
149 See, for further criticism, D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of 
Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
150 General Affairs Council, Meeting n°3362, 16 December 2014, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2014/12/16. 
151 D. Kochenov, L. Pech and S. Platon, ‘Ni panacée, ni gadget: Le ‘nouveau cadre de l’Union 
européenne pour renforcer l’Etat de droit’ Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, (2015), forthcoming. 
152 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
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1.6. A pair of test cases for the European Union 
Whereas there are several candidates that could well deserve the stigma of ‘rule of law 
backsliders’, the direct triggers for establishing an efficient supervisory mechanism for 
European values are the current contexts and events in Hungary153 and Poland.154 
 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 and the constitutionally relevant cardinal laws 
are used as tools in deconstructing checks on the government, ruled in Hungary by the 
majoritarian unicameral Parliament.155 The ruling party was famous for not tolerating 
any kind of internal dissent,156 and after forming the second Fidesz government it 
eliminated – at least in the domestic setting – all potentialities of criticism by both the 
voters and the state institutions, which might have materialised in the form of effective 
checks and balances. 
 
Should a discontent electorate wish to correct deficiencies, it will be difficult for it to do 
so due to the novel rules of the national ballot. Gerrymandering, extension of citizenship 
and the introduction of the one-round election procedure all fundamentally endanger the 
fairness of future elections. Leaks about secret lists of voters’ party preferences, and the 
general sense of insecurity and arbitrariness157 that can touch upon anyone, might have a 
                                                          
153 I. Vörös, ‘Hungary’s Constitutional Evolution During the Last 25 Years’, 63 Südosteuropa 2, 173–
200 (2015); I. Vörös, ‘The constitutional landscape after the fourth and fifth amendments of 
Hungarian Fundamental Law’ 55 Acta Juridica Hungarica 1–20; P. Bárd, ‘The Hungarian 
Fundamental law and related constitutional changes 2010-2013’, 20 Revue des Affaires Européennes: 
Law and European Affairs 3, 457–472 (2013); G.A. Tóth (ed.) Constitution for a disunited nation, 
Budapest: CEU Press, 2012. 
154 Is Poland a failing democracy? POLITICO asked leading thinkers, politicians and policymakers 
to weigh in on the Polish question, 13 January 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-
democracy-failing-pis-law-and-justice-media-rule-of-law/; E. Maurice, Polish government curtails 
constitutional tribunal’s powers, 23 December 2015, https://euobserver.com/political/131662; T.T. 
Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and 
Constitutional Self-Defense, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, 6 December 2015, 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-
constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-defense; A. Śledzińska-Simon, Poland’s 
Constitutional Tribunal under Siege, 4 December 2015; A. Śledzińska-Simon, Midnight Judges: 
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal Caught Between Political Fronts, 23 November 2015, 
http://verfassungsblog.de/midnight-judges-polands-constitutional-tribunal-caught-between-
political-fronts/. 
155 Some argue that this point was reached in the fall 2012. This view is shared by, among others, 
former HCC Judge Imre Vörös and representatives of the Eötvös Károly Institute. Others associate 
the deconstruction of the rule of law with the Fourth Amendment adopted in the spring 2013. The 
first HCC President and former President László Sólyom is among them. See Sz. Nagy, ‘Eltemetett 
demokrácia – Vörös Imre volt alkotmánybíró szerint államcsíny történt’, Vasárnapi Hírek, 25 
November 2012; Eötvös Károly Institute (L. Majtényi, Z. Miklósi, B. Somody, M.D. Szabó and B. 
Vissy), A jogállam helyreállításának elvei nyolc tételben. Ajánlat a demokrácia híveinek, September 2012, 
http://www.ekint.org/ekint/ekint.news.page?nodeid=557; L. Sólyom, ‘A hatalommegosztás 
vége’, Népszabadság, 11 March 2013, http://www.nol.hu/archivum/20130311-
a_hatalommegosztas_vege. 
156 Former Fidesz MP István Hegedűs locates the beginning for eliminating dissent in January 1991 
already. See Gy. Petőcz (ed.), Csak a narancs volt, Budapest: Irodalom, 2001, 146. 
157 M. Komiljovics, ‘Unions slam new Labour Code’, 30 January 2012, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/11/articles/hu1111011i.htm; A. Tóth, ‘The New 
Hungarian Labour Code – Background, Conflicts, Compromises’, Working Paper, Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation Budapest, June 2012. 
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significant chilling effect through self-censorship. Judicial oversight and the 
Constitutional Court’s room for correcting the failures of a majoritarian government have 
been considerably impaired,158 along with the powers of other fora designed to serve as 
checks on government powers. Distortions of the media and lack of public information159 
lead to the impossibility of a meaningful public debate and weaken the chances of 
restoring deliberative democracy.  
 
Along with negative measures to silence dissenting views, positive reinforcements have 
also been introduced. Support by the electorate is enhanced through emotionalism, 
revolutionary rhetoric, catch phrases such as ‘law and order’, ‘family’, ‘tradition’, 
‘nation’, symbolic lawmaking, and identity politics in general. Emotionalism has a 
nationalistic connotation unifying an allegedly homogenous Hungarian nation along 
ethnic lines,160 and at the same time – by way of a negative definition – excluding from its 
members ‘others’ including unpopular minorities (for example suspects, convicts, 
homosexuals, drug users, Roma, the poor) or anyone diverging from the ‘ordinary’ (for 
example members of small churches or advocates of home birth).  
 
The friend/foe dichotomy is artificially created through ‘punitive populism’, 
scapegoating and removing protections, sanctioning, criminalising or aggravating 
criminal sanctions on the ‘foe’ categories, partially through building on pre-existing 
prejudices, partially by creating new enemies, such as multinational companies, or 
persons challenging Hungarian unorthodoxy on the international scene. Positive 
reinforcements are also applied vis-à-vis the institutions: important posts are filled with 
‘friends’ whose long-term appointments guarantee their continuous support. The concept 
of the political becomes the existential basis for any other domain that reaches the level of 
politics trumping state policies’ moral, aesthetic or economic dimensions, and it also 
becomes the basic element of identity.161  
 
Very similar events took place in Poland in recent months, curbing the powers and 
balanced constellation of the Constitutional Tribunal, and jeopardising the independence 
of the management and supervisory boards of the Polish public television broadcaster 
and public radio broadcaster. 
 
Two weeks before the general elections for the Sejm in October 2015, the outgoing 
legislature nominated five judges for the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, to be appointed 
                                                          
158 A. Vincze, ‘Wrestling with Constitutionalism: the supermajority and the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court’, 7 ICL Journal 86–97 (2013). 
159 Cf. Curtailing freedom of information via Act CXII of 2011 and also ECtHR, TASZ v Hungary, 
Application no. 37374/05, 14 April 2009.  
160 Zs. Körtvélyesi, ‘From “We the People” to “We the Nation”,’ in: G.A. Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a 
Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, Budapest: CEU Press, 2012, 111–140. 
161 That is difficult to grasp for someone outside the scope of this paradigm. See Neelie Kroes 
rushing out of the room after a Hungarian politician broke his promise made a few minutes before 
they jointly addressed the public. ‘Kroes threatens nuclear option against Hungary’, 9 February 
2012, http://euobserver.com/justice/115209; Francis Fukuyama was equally puzzled when a 
Hungarian State Secretary turned to the editors of the journal publishing his piece concerning some 
factual mistakes that did not have any influence on the message he tried to convey. F. Fukuyama, 
‘What’s Wrong with Hungary?’ The American Interest 6 February 2012, http://blogs.the-american-
interest.com/fukuyama/2012/02/06/whats-wrong-with-hungary/. 
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by the President of the Republic. It was foreseen that three judges would take seats 
vacated during the mandate of the outgoing legislature, while two would take seats that 
became vacated after the elections. The newly elected legislature, in an accelerated 
procedure, amended the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, so as to open the way for 
annulling the judicial nominations made before the elections by the previous legislature 
and to nominate five new judges. The five new judges were nominated in December 
2015.  
 
The amendment at the same time considerably shortened the terms of office for the 
President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal from nine to three years, 
meaning that their term of office expired three months after the amendment’s adoption.  
 
The Constitutional Tribunal delivered two judgments on the appointment of judges in 
December 2015. In the first judgment the Court ruled that the previous legislature was 
entitled to nominate three judges for seats vacated during its mandate but should not 
have made nominations for the seats vacated during the term of the new legislature. In 
the second judgment the Court ruled that the new legislature was not entitled to annul 
the nominations for the three appointments under the previous legislature. The Tribunal 
also held the shortening of the terms of office of the Tribunal’s President and Vice-
President to be unconstitutional. As a result of these judgments the President of the 
Republic was obliged to appoint the three judges nominated by the previous legislature. 
However, the President of the Republic already appointed all five judges nominated by 
the new legislature.  
 
Once the Tribunal was thus filled with the new judges the new legislature preferred, the 
legislature took another step to weaken the possibility of government criticism by way of 
constitutionality checks. It rendered the conditions under which the Tribunal may review 
the constitutionality of newly passed laws more burdensome, by increasing the number 
of judges hearing cases and raising the majority needed in the Tribunal to hand down 
judgments from simple to two-thirds.  
 
Another form of internal government criticism was weakened when the Polish Senate 
adopted a media law on the management and supervisory boards of the Polish public 
television broadcaster and public radio broadcaster, putting these formerly independent 
boards under the control of the Treasury Minister. The new law also paved the way for 
the immediate dismissal of the existing management and supervisory boards. 
 
The value of European integration lies in upholding the foundational European values 
and legal principles that were fought for over centuries, sometimes at great cost, and in 
not permitting Member States to abandon them, even if all internal checks and balances 
fail. 
 
The Hungarian case is long overdue for an Article 7 TEU procedure, and there are good 
reasons to believe that the Polish case is ripe, too. Political forces, alliances and scholars 
propagated the use of the so-called ‘nuclear option’, and a Citizens’ Initiative to launch 
procedures against Hungary for alleged violations of the EU’s fundamental values was 
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started by the European Humanist Federation.162 The initiative was successfully 
registered by the Commission.163 Due to political considerations and the practical 
difficulties of launching a high-threshold Article 7 procedure, no steps were taken vis-à-
vis Hungary. 
 
The situation is different with regard to Poland. The first case where the new EU 
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law has been used in practice is against Poland.164 
The main reasons behind this move were the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
and the changes in the Law on Public Service Broadcasters. During his intervention 
before the European Parliament’s Plenary Session in Strasbourg on 19 January 2016, Vice-
President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans made clear that in case “there 
is an issue of the rule of law, there is no hiding behind national sovereignty, because you 
(Member States) have agreed in the Treaty you have signed and ratified that these issues 
can be discussed at the European level.”165 Whereas these words cannot be contested, one 
wonders why he did not invoke the preventive arm of Article 7 instead of the EU rule of 
law framework. The answer may be found in Commissioner Timmermans’ speech in 
2015 at Tilburg University: in his view Article 7 “is a measure of last resort – not to be 
excluded, but I would hope that we never let a situation escalate to the stage that it 
would require its use. I believe that the case of Austria, with Jörg Haider’s party joining 
the government, has weakened the EU’s capacity to react in such a case. It was a political 
response which completely backfired at the time, and since then Member States have 
been reluctant to take issue with other Member States on this basis…Precisely to be able 
to address emerging threats to the rule of law before they escalate, the Commission has 
adopted a Rule of Law Framework.” 
 
Beyond the fact that the formulation of the pre-Article 7 procedure is yet another step in a 
two-decade-long trend of watering down original Article 7, its application of this heavily 
problematic procedure raises even further questions. Triggering the Rule of Law 
Framework against one Member State but not another may call into question the 
objectivity and impartiality of the EU rule of law system, and the principle of equal 
                                                          
162 http://humanistfederation.eu/our-work.php?page=wake-up-europe-act-4-democracy, 
http://act4democracy.eu/index.html. 
163 European Commission Press release, Commission registers European Citizens’ Initiative on EU 
fundamental values in Hungary, Brussels, 30 November 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6189_en.htm. 
164 See Rule of law in Poland: Commission starts dialogue, 13 January 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2016/01/20160113_en.htm, which states, “The College agreed to come 
back to the matter by mid-March, in close cooperation with the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. 
Echoing what President Juncker said last week, First Vice-President Timmermans underlined after the 
College meeting that this is not about accusations and polemics, but about finding solutions in a spirit of 
dialogue. He underlined his readiness to go to Warsaw in this context.” See also European Commission – 
Fact Sheet, College Orientation Debate on recent developments in Poland and the Rule of Law 
Framework: Questions & Answers, Brussels, 13 January 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm. 
 
165 Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Commissioner Günther Oettinger – 
EP Plenary Session – Situation in Poland, Strasbourg, 19 January 2016, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-114_en.htm. 
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treatment of all member countries.166 The case for criticising EU institutions is 
particularly strong since the problems in Hungary and Poland are very similar and 
closely interrelated; in fact, it seems as if the latter was mimicking the former. 
In light of years of inaction against a Hungarian government that has made many 
controversial decisions over years, starting the procedure against a Polish government 
that just started deconstructing the rule of law a couple of months ago creates an 
impresssion of treating Member States arbitrarily and in an unequal manner.167 It seems 
as if the Hungarian governing party Fidesz, which belongs to the large party family of 
the European Peoples’ Party, was given more leeway in departing from EU values than 
the Polish Law and Justice Party, which is affiliated with the less influential group of 
European Conservatives and Reformists.168 
 
Selectively initiating the Rule of Law Framework poses an additional difficulty: a 
scenario with not just one but two States violating European values was not foreseen by 
the drafters of Article 7(2). If more than one State is sliding down the slope, they will 
protect each other and veto the use of Article 7(2), which they can always do, since the 
provision requires unanimity.169 This is what happened when the Hungarian Prime 
Minister warned that the EU will never get Hungary’s vote in favour of applying 
sanctions against Poland.170 The only way to make Article 7 operational when more than 
one Member State violates the rule of law is to make use of Article 7(1). For an Article 7(1) 
procedure no unanimity is needed, so the EU could condemn all States in question, or all 
problematic States, except the one against which an Article 7(2) procedure is to be 
initiated. Then Member States could argue that no country undergoing any Article 7 
procedure may vote on another Member State’s Article 7 case.171 (This method is only 
operational if less than one-fifth of the Member States still having voting rights are 
effected.) Stripping States of their voting rights will of course be challenged by the 
member countries under an Article 7 supervision, so ultimately the CJEU will need to 
decide whether such a reading excluding Member States that are undergoing Article 7 
                                                          
166 For immediate criticism see D. Kochenov, The Commission vs. Poland: The Sovereign State Is 
Winning 1-0, 25 January 2016, http://verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-vs-poland-the-
sovereign-state-is-winning-1-0/; G. Gotev, Tavares: Discussing rule of law in Poland separately 
from Hungary will lead ‘nowhere’, 13 January 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-
home-affairs/tavares-discussing-rule-law-poland-separately-hungary-will-lead. 
167 As Sophie In ´t Veld, ALDE Group first vice-president and European Parliament’s rapporteur 
for the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights put 
it: “by choosing to intervene in Poland, but not in Hungary, the Commission appears to apply 
arbitrary standards and political considerations.” S. In ´t Veld, Poland dispute: EU needs annual 
Rule of Law “Health check”, 12 January 2016, http://www.sophieintveld.eu/poland-dispute-eu-
needs-annual-rule-of-law-health-check/. 
168 G. Gotev, Tavares: Discussing rule of law in Poland separately from Hungary will lead 
‘nowhere’, 13 January 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/tavares-
discussing-rule-law-poland-separately-hungary-will-lead. 
169 Id. 
170 “The European Union should not think about applying any sort of sanctions against Poland, 
because that would require full unanimity and Hungary will never support any sort of sanctions 
against Poland”. G. Szakacs and C. Fernandez, Hungary PM flags veto of any EU sanctions against 
Poland, 8 January 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-hungary-sanctions-
idUSKBN0UM0L220160108. 
171 K.L. Scheppele, EU can still block Hungary’s veto on Polish sanctions, 11 January 2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-can-still-block-hungarys-orban-veto-on-polish-pis-sanctions/. 
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procedures from any other Article 7 procedure is correct. The Luxembourg Court could 
argue that finding otherwise would undermine the effet utile of the provision. 
 
Now that Poland has a chance to enter into a dialogue within the Rule of Law 
Framework, which can only be understood as a pre-Article 7 procedure,172 the Hungarian 
government will reasonably expect the same before an Article 7(1) procedure could be 
started against it. That will undoubtedly result in unnecessary prolongation of the 
process. Let us for a moment turn back to Commissioner Timmermans’ above-quoted 
forewarning that the EU institutions could fall into the trap of the Haider affair. The 
parallel drawn between the Austrian and Hungarian situations is misleading for 
numerous reasons. The most obvious point is that the institutions could not have made 
use of a yet non-existing preventive arm of the Article 7 procedure at the time the FPÖ 
entered the government, and there was no reason to make use of the provision as it then 
stood. Given the lack of a legally pre-defined preventive procedure, a political action was 
taken in the Haider case that need not be taken vis-à-vis Hungary in light of Article 7. The 
political quarantine vis-à-vis Austria started right after the formation of the government, 
before those in power could have eroded European values, and once the situation was 
thoroughly investigated, the Three Wise Men commissioned with this task did not find a 
violation of EU values, and accordingly suggested lifting the political sanctions.173 
Whereas it is understandable that EU politicians and Eurocrats do not wish to end up in 
such an embarrassing situation a second time, the Hungarian situation cannot be 
compared to the former Austrian one, since the former is long since in the state of 
constitutional capture, i.e. in the third scenario – a fact well documented in the literature. 
Finally, it is difficult to assess whether the treatment of Austria backfired, since it is 
impossible to second-guess what would have happened without the political reactions. 
Despite these criticisms Commissioner Timmermans’ words acknowledge the difficulty 
in drawing the line between a set of serious, but not necessarily interrelated, 
depreciations in European values, and their systemic erosion.174 The EU Rule of Law 
Framework. according to this positive interpretation, could be understood to be inspired 
by the Hungarian case, which outgrew the framework by the time it was adopted, and 
when the pre-Article 7 procedure was adopted it long passed the stage where “emerging 
threats to the rule of law [could be halted] before they escalate”. Instead, an Article 7 
procedure should be invoked. In order to reaffirm this benevolent reading the 
Commission should of course depart from its insistence that the Hungarian case was not 
yet ripe for Article 7.175  
  
                                                          
172 “The adopted Rule of Law mechanism is in fact a ‘pre-article 7 procedure’ and a diluted version 
of parliament’s proposal.” G. Gotev, Tavares: Discussing rule of law in Poland separately from 
Hungary will lead ‘nowhere’, 13 January 2016, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-
affairs/tavares-discussing-rule-law-poland-separately-hungary-will-lead. 
173 M. Ahtisaari, J. Frowein and M. Oreja, ‘Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to 
the Common European Values, in Particular Concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees and 
Immigrants, and the Evolution of the Political Nature of the FPÖ’ (The Wise Men Report), 40 
International legal materials: current documents 1, 102–123 (2001). 
174 Cf. Renáta Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to 
Comparative Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary’ (2015) 13 I-CON 279–300. 
175 Most recently stated by Commissioner Věra Jourová during an EP debate on 2 December 2015, 
on the “Situation in Hungary: follow-up to the European Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2015”. 
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2. Distilling general methodological issues to be tackled 
when developing an EU Scoreboard  
2.1. What is a Scoreboard?  
As a previous 2013 European Parliament study on the subject showed,176 there is already 
a multi-level and multi-actor European patchwork of mechanisms engaged to different 
degrees in the assessment of Member States’ compliance with Article 2 TEU principles. A 
typology was proposed in that study, which categorised these mechanisms into four 
main types of methods (i.e. monitoring, evaluation/benchmarking and supervision) in 
order to facilitate a better understanding of their scope, common features and 
divergences. This categorisation pays particular attention to the kinds of methodological 
features and assessment procedures used. 
 
As the analysis in Section 1.2 above of existing EU instruments assessing Member States’ 
compliance with the legal principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU reveals,177 there are a 
number of methodological challenges affecting the effectiveness in their usage and 
implementation.  
 
These relate first to their nature as ‘experimental governance techniques’ and ‘policy 
tools’, which constitute soft policy steering and coordination frameworks making use of 
benchmarking, exchange of ‘good/best practices’ and mutual learning processes between 
Member States at EU level. European integration takes place and develops not only 
through the institutional and decision-making parameters designed in the EU Treaties, 
but also through a benchmarking logic consisting of the framing and diffusion of 
common challenges, indicators and standardisation, and best practices/solutions.  
 
They affect the rule-of-law features in the design of the EU inter-institutional balance, 
which has been granted to the so-called ‘Community method of cooperation’, and modify 
the ways in which EU decision-shaping and -making are supposed to take place 
according to the EU Treaties. Particular issues of concern include matters of democratic 
accountability and judicial control gaps, or the unbalanced way in which they handle 
scrutiny, and a lack of coherency/consistency with other existing EU legislative 
frameworks and policy agendas. Similar concerns have been raised concerning ongoing 
EU surveillance and monitoring systems in the field of economic policy coordination, in 
particular the European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination.  
                                                          
176 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available 
at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf; G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and 
the Role of Fundamental Rights: Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), 
Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016, forthcoming. 
177 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU, Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, CEPS 2013, available 
at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fundamental%20Rights%20DemocracyandRoL.pdf, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET%282013%29493031_EN.pdf. 
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The use of benchmarking and indicator-driven methodologies poses additional 
methodological challenges to the attempts to conduct a fully comprehensive qualitative 
assessment of Member States’ systems and their evolving domestic (context-specific) 
particularities in a reliable, accurate and objective manner. The use of benchmarking 
should therefore be limited and approached with great caution.  
 
At this point it might be beneficial to deconstruct the ‘triangle’ – democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights – and differentiate between more fluid concepts and 
phenomena with more solid definitions and legal foundations that are often 
constitutional entrenchments. The rule of law belongs to the former group, and there is 
no single ideal formula for achieving such a complex social phenomenon. It is very much 
context specific, and therefore, as Ginsburg noted in his authoritative paper on 
measuring the rule of law, “one-size-fits-all solutions and ‘best practices’ may simply be 
illusory…[I]ndividual components of the rule of law might not be absolute goods, but 
rather, goods for which we should think of in terms of optimal rather than absolute 
values” (emphasis in the original).178 Fundamental rights, as described above, have a 
solid legal basis, its definitional elements have authoritative interpretations and therefore 
both measuring and benchmarking make more sense with regard to fundamental rights.  
 
Since the focus of the EU Scoreboard is on the overall status of the intertwined values of 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, the benchmarking logic should 
preferably be abandoned. Instead, an EU Scoreboard shall be defined as a ‘process’ 
encompassing a multi-actor and multi-method cycle. 
 
2.2. Benchmarking: political challenges, neutrality and impartiality 
The foundational added value of a supranational approach to monitoring and enforcing 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be in its contribution to the 
militant democracy concept taking root at the supranational level, and in granting 
additional protection to individuals and societies against abuses of state power, 
arbitrariness and violations of fundamental rights, when other channels of limited 
government become non-operational.179 Those in power will inevitably argue against the 
validity of the criticism or challenge the legitimacy of the critic. Yet it has been 
persuasively argued that the Council of Europe and the EU would act precisely as a 
‘guarantor’ of democracy and the rule of European organisations in the countries of 
central and eastern Europe.180 
 
                                                          
178 T. Ginsburg, ‘Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law’, 3 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2, 269–280 
(2011), 272. 
179 For an enlightening analysis, see: J.-W. Müller, ‘Should the European Union Protect Democracy 
and the Rule of Law in Its Member States’ 21 European Law Journal 2, 141–160, (2015); J.-W. Müller, 
‘The EU as a Militant Democracy’,165 Revista de Estudios Políticos, 141–162 (2014); P. Bárd, ‘The 
Hungarian Fundamental law and related constitutional changes 2010-2013’, 20 Revue des Affaires 
Européennes: Law and European Affairs 3, 457–472 (2013). 
180 W. Sadurski, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
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In order to ensure objectivity, techniques that are not neutral shall be disregarded. This is 
the main reason for being cautious with benchmarking techniques using indicators, as 
suggested above. What do ‘indicators’ indicate? As Sergio Carrera (2008) explained, 
“[B]enchmarking is not neutral. It needs to be understood as carrying implications for 
strong political action through the setting of norms for disciplining national politics, 
policies and eventually laws. European integration takes place not only through norms, 
but also on the basis of figures, graphs and matrices presented as unquestionable, whose 
nature may actually justify any sort of purported strategy or politics.”181 The challenge 
lies less in what indicators to select – and indeed there is a wide range to select from – 
than in which standards to be complied with. “The indicators are used as a measuring 
tool to pinpoint a specific issue related to a policy or law and to examine whether that 
policy or law is in compliance with the approach set by ‘the ideal standard’”, or the 
principle guiding the evaluation.182  
 
The degree of criticism of course depends on conceptualisation and the theoretical 
framework used, which always underlies any set of standards. But one should not fall 
into the trap of accepting the argument of those who are criticised and thus frame the 
tensions along ideological lines, as happened in Hungary. Initially, deliberately mixing 
liberalism with the concept of liberal democracy, the Hungarian government claimed that 
criticism was influenced by party politics and the liberal school of thought,183 and, going 
a step further, equated liberalism with “unfettered capitalism and full freedom of choice 
in personal lifestyles”.184  
 
Similar objections have been made by the current rulers of Poland in the face of the 
Commission’s criticism.185 This is certainly a misinterpretation of the situation, as the 
Hungarian and Polish cases do not fit any – let alone their own self-proclaimed 
majoritarian or conservative – ideological tradition: whereas they claim their authority 
from the majority, they do not respond to the will of the people but often engage in an 
elitist approach that either patronises the majority against its will or falsely claims a 
certain minority’s opinion to be the majority’s desire. Acknowledging the antagonistic 
nature of these tensions and the impossibility of associating the novel legal institutions 
and procedures with conservative ideology, or with majoritarianism, the government 
claimed to realise “unorthodox” policies.186 Later, gaining strength and self-confidence, 
                                                          
181 S. Carrera, Benchmarking Integration in the EU. Analyzing the debate on integration indicators 
and moving it forward, https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/GP_Benchmarking_Integrati
on_in_the_EU.pdf, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2008, 49. 
182 Id. at 52. 
183 Speech by the Hungarian Prime Minister given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 2014. The original 
speech is accessible in video format via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXP-6n1G8ls. 
184 J.-W. Müller, The Problem With “Illiberal Democracy”, 21 January 2016, https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/the-problem-with-illiberal-democracy-by-jan-werner-mueller-2016-
01#6ouqJhI9PLfjVf1V.99. 
185 E. Zalán, Poland defends controversial measures in EU letter, 21 January 2016, 
https://euobserver.com/political/131935; A. Rettman, Poland rebukes ‘left-wing’ EU commission, 
12 January 2016, https://euobserver.com/justice/131799. 
186 J. Stanford, Is Hungary the New EU? A Wildcard in the Future of the European Union, London: The 
Bruges Group, 2013, http://newbruges.wadesigns.london/enlargement/48-
issues/enlargement/169-is-hungary-the-new-eu, 5–6. 
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the government even questioned the validity of liberal democracies and claimed to build 
an illiberal democracy,187 rejecting the idea of open society.188 It is not the objective of the 
present Research Paper to second-guess the reasons behind the Hungarian unorthodoxy 
or the Polish changes. Whatever the objectives, on the path to achieving them, 
ingredients of the rule of law, basic democratic principles and respect for fundamental 
rights, i.e. foundational European values, were lost. 
 
A related attempt to delegitimise the rule of law mechanism disguises the tensions as 
European diversity189 or a clash of constitutional identities.190 When a state departs from 
the rule of law, it is hardly ever a case of an alternative constitutional identity. 
Deconstruction of the rule of law is typically a project of the governing elite as opposed 
to mirroring the wish of the people. The dividing line is thus not between constitutional 
identities – as is often contended by illiberal forces – but is still – as in 1941 when Altiero 
Spinelli authored his Manifesto – between “those who conceive the essential purpose and 
goal of struggle as being the ancient one, the conquest of national political power, and 
who, albeit involuntarily, play into the hands of reactionary forces, letting the 
incandescent lava of popular passions set in the old moulds, and thus allowing old 
absurdities to arise once again, and those who see the main purpose as the creation of a 
solid international State, who will direct popular forces towards this goal, and who, even 
if they were to win national power, would use it first and foremost as an instrument for 
achieving international unity.”191 It is therefore indispensable to bear in mind that 
attempts to undermine the rule of law typically go against the social consensus of the 
national state in question. 
 
Diversity and tolerance are two of the core strengths of Europe, but clear lines shall be 
drawn as to which differences can be celebrated, which differences must be tolerated, 
and what are the European core values in relation to which disagreement cannot be 
accepted without putting the European project in danger.192 As First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans stated in his address to the European Parliament, “There is no such thing as 
an illiberal democracy. Our Union is built on a break from the past; on the principle that 
                                                          
187 The term was coined long ago, but it gained practical relevance in the EU after the Hungarian 
Prime Minister praised such State structures in his speech given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 2014. 
The original speech is accessible in video format via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXP-
6n1G8ls. Cf. Frans Timmermans’ speech: “[T]here is no such thing as an illiberal democracy”. F. 
Timmermans, ‘EU framework for democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights’, Speech to the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015. 
188 See the speech by the president of the Hungarian Parliament: Kövér: Nem akarjuk a Soros-félék 
nyitott társadalmát (Kövér: We don’t want Soros-type open societies), 13 December 2015,  
http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20151213_kover_nem_akarjuk_a_soros_felek_nyitott_tarsadalmat/fullsi
te. 
189 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
190 V. Constantinesco, Le statut d’État européen: quelle place pour l’autonomie et l’identité 
constitutionnelle nationales?, 20 Revue des Affaires Européennes: Law and European Affairs 3, 447–456 
(2013). 
191 A. Spinelli, For a Free and United Europe – A Draft Manifesto, Ventotene (1941). 
192 Cf. the talk of MEP Frank Engel at the ALDE conference on the EU Democratic Governance Pact, 
4 February 2015, http://www.sophieintveld.eu/alde-presents-eu-democratic-governance-pact/. 
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societies should be free and open, sheltered from arbitrariness and force. This great leap – 
that is what Europe stands for.”193  
 
Should the illiberal state government not be able to call into question the validity of the 
criticism, it may question the legitimacy of the critic – in this case international 
organisations, or more particularly their institutions and bodies – by claiming it acted 
ultra vires, without a mandate, or in violation of the vertical separation of powers. 
Therefore, there should be a particularly strong emphasis on solid treaty bases, 
legitimacy and accountability. (For such challenges against the EU and EU institutions 
see Chapter 3.2.) 
 
Finally, not only the neutrality and power of the institution concerned, but the 
individuals assessing respect for European values might become subject to criticism. The 
importance of ensuring the provision of independent academic knowledge is central to 
the legitimacy and trustworthiness of any evaluation and supervisory methods. Any new 
interdisciplinary platform of academics with proven expertise on rule of law aspects 
which would issue an annual scientific report on the situation of fundamental rights, 
democracy and rule of law in the EU would need to be independent from the political 
and EU inter-institutional arenas.  
 
2.3. Links to other rule of law instruments: synergies and avoiding 
duplication 
Section 1.2 above showed that several of the currently existing EU instruments assessing 
Union Member States’ compliance with rule of law-related aspects post-accession make 
use of and often rely heavily on already existing data and evaluation instruments in the 
context of the Council of Europe and the UN.  
 
This is the case, for example, of the EU Justice Scoreboard, which has been implemented 
through a methodology based on externalising the analysis to the non-EU actors, chiefly 
the CoE CEPEJ, and using its model of evaluation/benchmarking and its resulting 
findings covering EU Member States. Similarly, the EU Anti-Corruption Report makes 
use of already existing assessment (non-EU specific) sources of information and analysis, 
in particular the GRECO model and its findings in measuring EU Member States’ 
performance on specific anti-corruption policies.  
 
A widespread concern when discussing furthering or deepening EU action in assessing 
Member States’ compliance with Article 2 rule of law legal principles and developing a 
‘Scoreboard’ is the wide array of information which already exists in other international 
and regional fora. There is a large consensus, often emphasised in EU official documents, 
about the need to avoid ‘duplication’ with these same sources and actors. A case in point 
                                                          
193 Speech of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 
February 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4402_en.htm. It does not take 
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is and there used to be such as a thing as illiberal democracy. J.-W. Müller, The Problem With 
“Illiberal Democracy”, 21 January 2016, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-
problem-with-illiberal-democracy-by-jan-werner-mueller-2016-01#6ouqJhI9PLfjVf1V.99. 
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has been the work of the CoE and its different bodies in monitoring compliance by State 
parties to the ECHR and other CoE legal instruments and standards.  
 
These concerns have important merits. Synergies and cross-fertilisation with already 
existing monitoring and evaluation instruments and actors in the CoE and UN are a sine 
qua non when considering the value added and design of a future EU Scoreboard. That 
notwithstanding, relying on non-EU specific sources and actors may pose fundamental 
questions from the perspective of the autonomy and specificities characterising the EU 
legal system and its common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice “in pursuing its own 
specific objectives”.  
 
This challenge has been clearly highlighted by the much criticised CJEU Opinion 2/13 of 
December 2014194 on EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU held in its Opinion, “The 
autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation to 
international law requires that the interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within 
the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU”,195 thereby potentially denying the 
synergies outlined above and undermining the rule of law architecture of the EU.196  
 
The lack of an EU-specific monitoring and evaluation system or ‘Scoreboard’ may cause 
difficulties when ensuring “consistency and uniformity”, not so much as regards the data 
gathered by EU Member States but rather in the actual interpretation of EU Member 
States’ compliance with EU legal founding principles and “the specific characteristics of 
EU law”. This is particularly so when reading or considering the implications of threats 
or challenges to EU general principles and legal standards and rights envisaged in 
European secondary legislation. 
 
This consistency challenge, coupled with an imperative obligation to respect the Council 
of Europe standards and the potential disagreement in the reading or interpretation of 
monitoring data covering EU Member States’ compliance with rule of law, may become 
particularly pertinent in those domains of European law living upon the so-called 
‘principle of mutual recognition’ and the principle of mutual trust which are indeed of 
fundamental importance in domains like EU asylum and criminal justice cooperation 
legislation. The development of an EU rule of law Scoreboard could provide further 
guarantees and strengthen the practical viability of the mutual trust principle in AFJS 
policies. 
 
2.4. Theoretical framework 
Drawing up a Scoreboard is a complex interdisciplinary task of lawyers engaged in legal 
theory and dogma, and statisticians aware of methodological issues of data selection and 
handling. Without entering into the details of designing indices on democracy, the rule of 
                                                          
194 Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
195 Paragraph 170 of Opinion 2/13. 
196 For critical accounts, see, e.g. P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and 
Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’ 38 Fordham International Law Journal 4, 955–992 (2015); 
D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, 
Yearbook of European Law, 2015. 
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law and fundamental rights, critical foundational issues will be tackled in what follows. 
An agreement on these questions is the sine qua non of a functional Scoreboard. Vital 
issues include conceptualisation of the values to be measured; interpretation and 
comparison of data; and recognising the uses and acknowledging the limits of various 
forms of mechanisms to assess compliance with democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights. 
 
2.4.1. The need for the triangular approach 
In the following the relationship among the three key interrelated principles – the 
protection of rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights – will be discussed, along 
with the challenges that arise in reflecting on ways to strengthen EU mechanisms to 
ensure the primacy of all three of these principles. The cross-cutting challenges affecting 
their uses, effective implementation and practical operability are a central point of 
analysis. The three criteria are inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and 
interdependent on each of the others, and they cannot be separated without inflicting 
profound damage on the whole and changing its essential shape and configuration.  
2.4.2. Democracy 
The EU’s democratic deficit is proverbial,197 but active steps are being taken to bridge the 
gap between the daily practice of democracy in the Union and the stated value of Article 
2 TEU. The European Parliament is endowed with new powers at every Treaty revision, 
and scholarly investigations lead to the EU’s reconceptualisation as a working democracy 
and even as a ‘Republic’.198 The EU rather functions as a demoicracy, in Kalypso 
Nicolaïdis’ useful characterisation.199 Yes, the institutional structure is quite atypical, but 
the EU is definitely the most democratic among all the international organisations of its 
kind and, probably more important, commands more trust than the national 
governments in a handful of the Member States.200  
 
One can state that the EU has taken this aspect of the triangular relationship of 
democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights on board in first accepting that the 
Council, although comprised of democratically elected representatives of the Member 
States, does not secure democracy at the EU level. The distance between a national 
election and the EU legislator was too great to satisfy the demands of civil society in the 
EU for properly functioning democratic institutions in the EU which are subject to direct 
election. From the transformation of the Assembly into the European Parliament, as well 
                                                          
197 For a recent reminder on throwing stones in a glass house see J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Living in a Glass 
House: Europe, Democracy and the Rule of Law’, in: C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J.H.H. Weiler, 
‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’, 2014/25 RSCAS Working Paper 
(2014), 25–29. 
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42 Common Market Law Review 4, 913–94 (2005). 
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Nikolaides, and S. Weatherill, Whose Europe? National Models and the Constitution of the European 
Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 137–152. 
200 See Standard Eurobarometers’ sections on “Trust in national governments and parliaments, and 
in the European Union”. E.g. most recently, European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 83, 
Spring 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf, 6. 
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as from the granting of direct EP elections in the 1970s, the struggle for democracy in the 
EU has taken a very specific ‘governance’ form.201  
 
The accumulation of power to the European Parliament to which the Lisbon Treaty 
added yet another step is a telling example of the governance demoicracy in action: it is a 
democracy of means, as the objectives to be reached are set in stone in the Treaties.202 The 
struggle to find the appropriate balance of democratic representation at the supranational 
level is thus ongoing. The importance to the European Parliament of rule of law is self-
evident – direct elections subject to rule of law requirements of the franchise is only the 
starting point. The struggles for transparency as essential to rule of law and democracy 
together are part of this relationship. The efforts of the European Parliament to reach out 
to national parliaments to ensure their voice is heard and respected in the governance of 
the EU have also been key in this regard.  
 
However, rule of law without democracy can be a hollow and totalitarian principle. Rule 
by rules can be used equally by dictatorships and absolute rulers as well as by liberal 
democracies. Democracy may become substandard without the two other foundational 
values in the triangular relationship mentioned above. “Elections, open, free and fair, are 
the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by 
elections may be inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, dominated by special 
interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These 
qualities make such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic. 
Democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the relation of democracy to other 
public virtues and vices can only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished 
from other characteristics of political systems.”203 These tensions and the understanding 
of the rule of law making up for the efficiencies of the majority rule are apparent in the 
rule of law debate discussed infra. 
 
2.4.3. Rule of law 
All three Article 2 values, the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, are value-
laden constructions, and therefore one cannot have a wide consensus on all or even the 
majority of definitional elements. A challenge facing any rule-of-law debate at EU level 
relates to its conceptual vagueness. The notion of rule of law is an elusive and 
controversial one. The thematic contributions composing the CEPS report on “The 
triangular relationship between Fundamental rights, Democracy and Rule of law in the 
EU – Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism” revealed that there is an ‘embeddedness’ 
of this term with specific national historical diversities of a political, institutional, legal 
and imaginary nature. Indeed, legal theory distinguishes between multiple concepts.  
 
                                                          
201 Ph. Allott, ‘European Governance and the Re-Branding of Democracy’, 27 European Law Review, 
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The proliferation of detailed definitions of the rule of law notwithstanding, it is necessary 
to realize that defining it in the best possible way cannot cancel the nature of the rule of 
law, which is an essentially contested concept.204 It is thus necessary to keep in mind that 
even the most detailed definition, to be true to the idea of the rule of law, has to contain a 
share of vagueness in order to accommodate rule of law’s very nature. This requirement 
of vagueness plays strongly against any Quichotean attempts to turn the rule of law into 
a shopping list of elements, even if some examples of relatively good lists are known. 
Eliminating vagueness entirely, on such a reading, profoundly undermines the 
usefulness of the concept itself.205 
 
There are some uncontroversial common elements of the rule of law, though. Both the 
thin and thick concepts of the rule of law require more than rules created by the elected 
majority.206 In other words, the rule of law necessarily presupposes a balance between 
gubernaculum – the day-to-day law-making and application of the law by the sovereign – 
and jurisdictio – the checks on the law, which lie beyond the sovereign’s reach.207 Even the 
thinnest understanding claiming that any law that a democratically elected Parliament 
passes can be the foundation of a rule of law presupposes a minimum element: that 
people retain the right of expressing their discontent at least at the next democratic, i.e. 
free and fair, elections.208 Besides, the observance of fundamental rights standards as well 
as the norms of international law cannot be departed from, thus providing a ‘natural’ 
check on any sovereign authority.209 Raz prescribes “(1) that people should be ruled by 
the law and obey it, and (2) that the law should be such that people will be able to be 
guided by it.”210 Fuller identifies a number of principles, such as generality, publicity, 
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prospectivity, clarity, consistency, possibility of compliance, constancy and faithful 
administration of the law.211 Before going on with further potential constituent elements, 
Krygier’s warning shall be remembered: it is impossible to list the prerequisites of a rule 
of law in anatomical terms; instead it shall be seen as a teleological notion.212  
 
Weber brings us closer to the desired objective: although they have good chances to 
survive, neither traditional nor charismatic authority will render a system legitimate 
without adhering to some minimum element of rationality,213 which is often formulated 
as salus populi suprema lex esto,214 the good of the people as the supreme law. A social 
contract can never be rewritten in a way that does not respect at least this minimum 
requirement.215 Dworkin straightforwardly rejects the value of majoritarianism as a 
legitimising force,216 and searches for the substantive value behind the majority rule, 
which he traces to political equality.217 Along these lines he argues for an alternative 
concept of democracy, which he calls the partnership conception,218 meaning 
“government by the people as a whole acting as partners in a joint-venture of self-
government.” In the same vein, Sajó argues219 that the majority – and even more so the 
supermajority – of MPs in so-called representative democracies might subvert a rule of 
law first by not representing the majority voters as opposed to their mandate220 and 
second by becoming too responsive to popular wishes, denying the rule of law to the 
powerless, i.e. those who do not have a mandate. Crucially, however complex the legal-
philosophical notion, it is the tention between gubernaculum and jurisdictio that lies at the 
core of the meaning of the rule of law emerging, as theorised by Gianluigi Palombella, as 
                                                          
211 L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 43. 
212 According to Krygier the rule of law is “concerned with the morphology of particular legal 
structures and practices, whatever they turn out to do. For even if the structures are just as we want 
them and yet the law doesn’t rule, we don’t have the rule of law. And conversely, if the institutions 
are not those we expected, but they do what we want from the rule of law, then arguably we do 
have it. We seek the rule of law for purposes, enjoy it for reasons. Unless we seek first to clarify 
those purposes and reasons, and in their light explore what would be needed and assess what is 
offered to approach them, we are bound to be flying blind.” Martin Krygier, “Four Puzzles about 
the Rule of Law: Why, what, where? And who cares?,” Talk delivered as the 2010 Annual Lecture 
of the Centre for Law & Society, University of Edinburgh, 18 June 2010, UNSW Law Research Paper 
No. 2010-22, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1627465. 
213 M. Weber, Politik als Beruf, München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1919. 
214 Originally mentioned by Marcus Tullius Cicero, de Legibus (book III, part III, sub. VIII), as ollis 
salus populi suprema lex esto, also referenced by Locke in the Second Treaties and Hobbes in his 
Leviathan, who believed that it is rationality that makes men abandon the natural state of mankind, 
i.e. the state of bellum omnium contra omnes. For a summary see P. Costa, The Rule of Law. A historical 
introduction, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009, 73–74.  
215 Cf. V. Orbán, ‘Új társadalmi szerződés született’ (A new social contract was born), Demokrata, 25 
May 2010, http://www.demokrata.hu/cikk/orban_uj_tarsadalmi_szerzodes_szuletett/. 
216 R. Dworkin, ‘What Is Democracy’, in: G.A. Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On 
Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law, Budapest: CEU Press, 2012, 25–34, 31. 
217 Id. at 29. 
218 Id. at 26 and 31. 
219 A. Sajó, ‘Courts as representatives, or representation without representatives’, Speech delivered 
in Yerevan, Armenia at the conference on ‘The European standards of rule of law and the scope of 
discretion of powers in the Member State of the Council of Europe’, 3–5 July 2013. 
220 András Sajó is arguing about the need of the representatives to be responsive to popular 
demands. H.F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1967. 
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an institutional ideal.221 
 
Lord Bingham’s eight principles of the rule of law are highly authoritative in the quest 
for the elements of the concept. These include that the law must be accessible, intelligible, 
clear and predictable; questions of legal right and liability should as a main rule be 
resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion; equality before the 
law, except and to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation; public 
officers shall exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose 
for which the powers were conferred, not ultra vires and not unreasonably; protection of 
fundamental human rights shall be guaranteed; means shall be provided for resolving 
without prohibitive cost or inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes; adjudicative 
procedures shall be fair; the state shall comply with its obligations in international law 
and domestic law.222 
 
The notion of EU rule of law is a more elusive and controversial one than the rough 
characterisation above might indicate. This is particularly the case when rule of law is 
considered from a bottom-up approach. The CoE European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (the Venice Commission) has provided one of the few more widely 
accepted conceptual frameworks for rule of law in Europe, and it represents a helpful 
starting point. The ‘embeddedness’ of this term has multiple specific national historical 
diversities of a political, institutional and legal nature. Concepts such as, for instance, 
Rechtsstaat in Germany, État de droit in France, rule of law in the UK, stato di diritto in Italy, 
or правова държава in Bulgaria are far from being synonymous and present distinctive 
features, including their relationships to the other notions of democracy and fundamental 
rights.223 The material scoping of rule of law in Member States’ arenas, and its linkages 
with the other two criteria, also remain shifting and are difficult to capture from a 
normative viewpoint, which necessarily affects possible EU-level understandings, where 
the emerging ideal of the rule of law is, in the wise words of Laurent Pech, “hollystic”,224 
which does not detract from its relative clarity.225 Since the path-breaking work by Bebr at 
least, the EU has been a rule of law community, all the difficulties of defining the term 
notwithstanding.226 
                                                          
221 G. Palombella, È possibile una legalità globale? Il Rule of law e la governance del mondo, Bologna: il 
Mulino, 2012, Chapter 2. 
222 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, London: Allen Lane, 2010. 
223 Cf. D. Kochenov ‘The EU Rule of Law: Cutting Paths through Confusion’, 2 Erasmus Law Review 
1, 5–24 (2009). 
224 L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’, in: D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The 
European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013, 108–129. 
225 L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union’ Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No. 04/09 (2009), (and the literature cited therein). See also M.L. Fernandez Esteban, 
The Rule of Law in the European Constitution, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999; U. 
Everling, ‘The European Union as a Federal Association of States and Citizens’, in: A. von 
Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, Oxford/Munich: Hart 
Publishing/CH Beck, 2010, 701–734; M. Zuleeg, ‘The Advantages of the European Constitution’, in: 
A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, Oxford/Munich: Hart 
Publishing/CH Beck, 2010, 763–785, 772–779. 
226 G. Bebr, Rule of Law within the European Communities, Brussels: Institut d’Etudes Européennes de 
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1965. 
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In a rule of law emerging as an institutional ideal, built-in correction mechanisms compensate 
for the deficiencies of a majoritarian government: in the first scenario these mechanisms 
engender healthy consequences upon departing from identity politics, whereas in the 
second they compensate for the weaknesses of identity politics, either by granting 
participation to those groups who have been excluded from ‘we, the people’ or by 
representing their interests while being excluded. In this sense international correction 
mechanisms can be seen as means of militant democracy227 operating along the lines of 
mature constitutionalism implying the existence of robust precautionary measures into 
democratic systems to protect them against a future potential government acquiring and 
retaining powers at all costs, i.e. by superseding constitutional government by autocratic 
government.228 
 
Rule of law is officially recognised as the primary tool of EU governance in all its forms, 
even if doubts are emerging as to whether the rule of law – a Treaty value and principle – 
actually amounts to the institutional ideal of the European Union, the EU’s self-
congratulatory rhetoric notwithstanding.229 EU activities are officially based on a 
profound respect for rule of law230 – the law-making activities which engage most of the 
EU actors either as part of the EU legislator or in the adoption of secondary legislation. 
The Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties is based on the principle of rule of law, 
which is the foundation for its powers of enforcement and infringement proceedings. The 
primacy of the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the sole 
legitimate source of interpretation of EU law is perhaps the most striking of the rule of 
the law tools of EU governance. Its power to sanction the recalcitrant backsliding 
Member State, which got somewhat diversified with the Lisbon revision of the Treaties, 
reveals the extraordinary importance which the EU ascribes to rule of law.  
 
In this sense it matters little how sceptical of the EU’s rule of law and democratic 
credentials one can eventually be: by supplying an additional level of checks on Member 
State governments, the EU, along Dworkinian lines, can only play a positive role in terms 
of monitoring and addressing rule of law backsliding in the Member States, turning itself 
into a vital supranational element of militant democracy.231 
 
                                                          
227 For a full description see K. Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights,’ 31 
American Political Science Review 417–433 and 638–658 (1937). For a most recent authoritative 
account of such a function of international legal mechanisms, see R. Dworkin, ‘A New Philosophy 
of International Law’ (2013) 41 Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 2–30 (2013). 
228 On international mechanisms correcting the failure of domestic law to protect minorities see for 
example A. Verdross, Die Einheit des rechtlichen Weltbildes auf Grundlage der Völkerrechtsverfassung, 
Tübingen: Mohr, 1923. 
229 G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level 
System’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without 
the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, Yearbook of European Law, 2015. 
230 For a critical analysis by the leading academics, see, L. F. M. Besselink, F. Pennings and S. 
Prechal (eds.), The Eclipse of Legality in the European Union, The Hague: Kluwer, 2010. 
231 J.-W. Müller, ‘Should the European Union Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Its 
Member States’ 21 European Law Journal 2, 141–160, (2015); J.-W. Müller, ‘The EU as a Militant 
Democracy’,165 Revista de Estudios Políticos, 141–162, (2014). 
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2.4.5. Fundamental rights 
The third principle – fundamental rights – has been something of a late comer in the EU’s 
triangular relationship. As European history testifies, democracy is not infallible. 
Democratic States have and continued to adopt intolerant laws and failed to respect 
fundamental rights in their enforcement (respecting the principle of rule of law). This sad 
truth underlies the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. 
The fact that no State can be a member of the Council of Europe without ratifying the 
ECHR and accepting the principle of individual application and adjudication by the 
European Court of Human Rights is a reflection of this relationship of necessity.  
 
For the EU, however, the long story of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
revealed just how reluctant some Member States are of further embedding in the EU 
fundamental rights even when they go no further than those by which the Member States 
had already been bound in other texts, preventing the growth of supranational human 
rights jurisdiction.232 Unwittingly, the CJEU, previously pushed to constitutionalise 
fundamental rights in a (then even more) rights blind Community by the decisive actions 
of the Italian Corte costituzionale and the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, failed to take 
the Treaty obligation spelled out by the Herren der Verträge in the most unequivocal way 
to heart, securing a setback for the EU’s track record and provoking scholarly criticism of 
a one-sided Opinion it delivered.233  
 
The Lisbon Treaty’s transformation of the Charter from a persuasive document into a 
legally binding one is critical in this development, even though the Charter became 
binding following yet another watering down of its scope.234 The Charter, the rich CJEU 
case law on the matter, and the EU’s upcoming accession to the ECHR235 completes the 
triangle requiring all activities of the EU and its Member States acting within the scope of 
EU law to be consistent with the EU’s goals and in line with the nascent fundamental 
rights policy.236 Due to the fact that fundamental rights have a solid legal foundation and 
an attached European case law developed over decades, the definitional elements and the 
tools for measuring rights are easier to use than the elements and tools related to the 
triangle’s other two concepts.  
 
One might characterise current EU rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights (in the 
form of fundamental rights in the Charter and the obligation to respect fundamental 
                                                          
232 A. Knook, ‘The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the European Union’ 42 
Common Market Law Review 2, 367–398 (2005). 
233 Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. For critical accounts see, e.g. D. 
Halberstam, ‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defence of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to 
the ECHR, and the Way Forward’ 16 German Law Journal 105–146 (2015); and P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’ 38 Fordham 
International Law Journal 4, 955–992 (2015); D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the 
Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, Yearbook of European Law, 2015. 
234 H. Kaila, ‘The Scope of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
in the Member States’, in: P. Cardonnel, A. Rosas and N. Wahl (eds.), Constitutionalising the EU 
Judicial System, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, 291, at 294–302. 
235 Even thought the prospects of accession are overshadowed by Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession 
II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
236 Ph. Aston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000. 
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rights as contained in the ECHR) as the profound architecture of the EU. It is for this 
reason that sound EU supervisory mechanisms to ensure that all three principles are fully 
respected is critical to the success of the European integration project as a whole.  
2.5. Contextual, qualitative assessment 
It is critical that all assessments of the compliance of Member States and their actors with 
rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are fully objective, academically sound 
and carried out in a manner consistent with the highest standards of scientific rigour. 
This will require investment of substantial resources in the analytical process to ensure 
that the interpretation of all the information which is included in the Scoreboard fulfils 
the above requirements. We will highlight the most relevant methodological pitfalls of a 
scientifically sound, objective and methodologically correct interpretation of indices. 
 
Evaluating the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights cannot be an automated 
exercise on either the input or the output side. On the input side, the identification of 
standards and accordingly the acquisition of data are a challenge. On the output side, 
indicators “are tools for obtaining a diagnosis, not the diagnosis per se.”237 A uniform 
approach of interpretation with rigid numerical indicators might well result in 
substandard outcomes.  
 
The first issue is ‘what’ quantitative indicators and statistics can actually capture. Most 
often, they mirror the laws, i.e. States’ commitments to achieving certain goals and ideals, 
but benchmarking cannot cover and mirror ‘sociologies of law’. This is also reflected in 
the attempts of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights – and on that 
basis the Fundamental Rights Agency – to capture not only laws, institutions (structures) 
and policies (processes), but also, and most important, the situation on the ground 
(outcome).238 A pilot study conducted by the Fundamental Rights Agency with the 
participation of three Member States, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands, in three 
areas, namely hate crime, access to justice and discrimination and independence of non-
judicial bodies, showed the difficulties in agreeing on standards and accordingly on 
indicators. Whereas member countries could come to an agreement on indicators on the 
laws, and to some extent also on processes, it was close to impossible to reach an 
agreement with regard to the outcomes.239 
 
Once this fundamental problem is tackled, interrelations between data and the 
causalities behind them need to be interpreted, and they can be interpreted in multiple 
ways. Most important, data shall be contextualised, instead of only quantifying the 
problem.240 Context-specific qualitative evaluations are difficult to automatise, and 
therefore there shall be a heavy reliance on expert knowledge.  
                                                          
237 J.C. Botero, R.L. Nelson and C. Pratt, ‘Indices and Indicators of Justice, Governance, and the Rule 
of Law: An Overview’, 3 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 2, 153–169 (2011), 157. 
238 Promoting the rule of law in the European Union. FRA Symposium Report, 4th Annual FRA 
Symposium, Vienna, 7 June 2013, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-4th-annual-
symposium-report.pdf. 
239 Talk of G. Toggenburg, Senior Legal Advisor, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
at the LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs meeting on 10/12/2015. 
240 For a detailed assessment, see K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why 
Governance Checklists Do Not Work’, 26 Governance 4, 559–562 (2013). 
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Case study: hate crimes 
The lack of data on a certain type of criminality may indicate the lack of that particular type of 
criminality, but it may also indicate high latency. Hate crime statistics are illustrative in this 
regard. As the Fundamental Rights Agency and national studies have proven, hate crime 
provisions often remain inoperational or become counterproductive. This has been shown 
through the yawning gap between victims’ surveys and the number of court files in the 
Member States.  
 
According to FRA victim surveys up to a third of Jewish people personally experienced verbal 
or physical anti-Semitic violence. Between 16% and 32% of Roma and between 19% and 32% 
of persons of African origin were victims of assault, threat or serious harassment with a 
perceived racist motive in the 12 months before the research. A quarter of the 93,000 LGBT 
people, and one-third of transgender people surveyed in the EU experienced violence in the 
five years preceding the survey.241 Official statistical data show, however, that most of the 
crimes do not reach the investigation stage, and even those that do are halted, suspended, or 
poorly investigated, or, if they reach the judicial phase of criminal procedure, the bias motive 
often cannot be proven. The number of hate crime cases in the Member States annually varies 
between a dozen and some 200, which is a small fraction of the actual criminality. The 
European Union classified the official data collection mechanisms of the Member States 
pertaining to hate crimes and only four can be labelled as comprehensive data providers. 
Most of them (14) are providing limited or no data; some of them (9) are good data 
providers.242 Moreover, all the relevant supranational law notwithstanding, the case law on 
the matter is virtually non-existent.243 
 
Longitudinal research data are again subject to interpretation. Certain data are relatively 
constant, and may only have an impact in extreme cases, such as the effects of the 
judiciary’s budget on its independence. Changes in trends also need context-specific 
interpretation. Rising figures in criminality may be explained by the growing tendency of 
criminality, the strengthening of criminal policy, or the lowering of the age of criminal 
culpability. Also, decreasing figures might be explained by decriminalisation of certain 
types of human behaviour or their classification as petty or non-recordable offences 
instead of crimes. The same can be said for the number of perpetrators registered: 
decreasing numbers may be explained by lesser crimes; or the willingness of parties to 
turn to restorative justice methods, victim-offender mediation, or other out-of-court 
dispute settlement that the domestic law allows; or an emphasis on the principle of 
opportunity instead of the principle of legality, i.e. prosecutors may get a wider leeway to 
press on with the charges or not; but even the defect or failure of investigation might be 
behind the decreasing numbers. And vice versa.  
 
Oftentimes, it is impossible to say even whether a trend is positive or negative, without 
                                                          
241 http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/survey-data-explorer-
lgbt-survey-2012. 
242 European Union Fundamental Rights Agency: Making Hate crimes visible in the European 
Union: Acknowledging victims’ rights, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 
2012, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012_hate-crime.pdf, 38. 
243 U. Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-Discrimination Law: Comment on 
Asociaţia ACCEPT’ 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 2 237–259 (2015). 
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context-specific interpretation of figures and data. For example, an increase in lost cases 
against a given country before regional human rights tribunals may indicate the 
deterioration of the fundamental rights situation in that country but may also show that 
individuals are more aware of their rights or that legal professionals’ training in the 
admissibility criteria has been successful.  
 
Again due to the context-specific nature of any evaluation, cross-country comparative 
analyses on the basis of indices entail substantial dangers. Some even argue against any 
attempt to engage in cross-country comparisons. They contend that during the process of 
comparison, context is inevitably lost, and the over-generalisation renders the 
comparison meaningless, if not distorting, giving governments inclined to violate EU 
values pretexts to attempt to justify their corrupt institutional designs, which would not 
emerge as problematic in out-of-context comparisons.244 Therefore, rule of law 
benchmarking and cross-country comparisons should be used sparingly, and in the latter 
case only similarly situation countries should be compared.245  
 
Case study: conviction rates  
A typical example is the indicator showing whether those charged with an offence are 
ultimately convicted. Such indicators are often invoked to measure the success of public 
prosecutors,246 whereas high figures may not only indicate prosecutions’ efficiency, but also a 
biased or overburdened judiciary or a young and inexperienced democracy, where judges 
take the easy way out and – without questioning and double-checking the correctness of 
prosecutors’ assessment of the case – copy and paste charges and prosecutors’ reasoning into 
the judgments. 
  
Whereas conviction rates show the importance of context-specific interpretation of causalities, 
here the differences with cross-country comparisons will be highlighted. At the same time it 
may show the preparedness of the prosecutors. In a 2005 research paper Raghav, Ramseyer 
and Rasmusen studied the difference between the conviction rates in the US, where 
prosecutors win 87-88% of federal cases and 85% of state cases, and Japan, where 99.9% of 
those charged are sentenced.247 If basic conceptual issues are tackled (such as whether the first 
instance decisions or final judgments are taken into account, or whether the person charged 
needs to be guilty on all accounts, or it suffices if he or she is liable on at least one of them) 
and data become comparable, one might draw conclusions with regard to the reasons behind 
the differences and the high percentage in Japan. Some contended that it must be the lack of 
independence of Japanese judges or an informal pressure to make parties settle cases out of 
court. Before jumping to unjustified conclusions, it is worth looking at the number of 
                                                          
244 K.L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not 
Work’, 26 Governance 4, 559–562 (2013). See also, R. Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal 
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prosecutors. In Japan there are 1,200 prosecutors, whereas in the US, a country with double 
the population, there are 32,000 prosecutors – 25 times more prosecutors for only twice as 
many people. In the US there are 14 million arrests per year, meaning 438 cases per 
persecutor, whereas in Japan the number of arrests is one-tenth of that in the US, but due to 
the small number of prosecutors there are only 1,166 prosecutions per year. Of course, these 
data are also difficult to compare due to the fact that different behaviours qualify as crimes 
and as grounds for arrest, but the numbers are sufficient to understand that, most likely, 
Japanese prosecutors will not ‘waste’ their time on cases where they do not have absolutely 
solid evidence. Such indicators do not tell us anything about the quality of justice and 
adherence to procedural guarantees. Without contextualisation and detailed qualitative 
descriptions, it is impossible to derive any methodologically sound and valid conclusions 
from indices. This is even truer for cross-country analyses. 
 
2.6. Quality versus speed  
The efficiency of a Scoreboard depends on the quality of the information which informs it 
and that of the outcome’s interpretation. The higher the quality of the data and its 
assessment, the more efficient the Scoreboard will be in achieving its objective of 
providing a clear and comprehensive view of the field. The poorer the quality of the data 
and the corresponding interpretation, the less efficient the Scoreboard for the purposes of 
EU compliance with rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. However, 
excellence in data collection and interpretation also has a price in terms of speed.  
 
A particularly burdensome collection system and lengthy data analysis method have 
three disadvantages. First, by the time the potentially negative assessment is published, 
the State scrutinised might have changed its laws or practices, triggering another 
measurement and interpretation of outcomes. The new laws adopted or practices 
introduced may be equally substandard, and continue to do harm until yet another 
assessment becomes public. Second, legal consequences attached to a negative 
assessment may lose their impact over time. Criminal lawyers and criminologists are well 
aware of the fact248 that it is not the gravity of the criminal sanction but its inevitability 
and proximity to the crime committed that have deterrent effect. The same applies to 
States. Applying this wisdom to the situation at hand, it is regrettable that the EU has a 
relatively slow mechanism for responding to violations of its own foundational 
principles. Third, the often irreversible and severe harm done in the meantime shall also 
be taken into account with regard to the speed of the response, potentially allowing for 
interim evaluations and measures. 
 
The greater the demand for speed, the more corners are likely to be cut on quality and the 
more subject to challenge any Scoreboard is likely to be. There will always be some 
compromises necessary in getting this relationship right.249 The temptation to use ‘tick 
                                                          
248 At least since Cesare Beccaria wrote his famous work 250 years ago. For an English language 
version see C. Beccaria, On crimes and punishments, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. 
249 On this trade-off see the evaluation by András Jakab of a Hungarian initiative responding 
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box’ approaches in order to speed up the completion of what must be a periodic and 
regular task should be avoided. Such approaches, which simplify comparability, provide 
profoundly distorted views of the actual state of affairs regarding the subject matter.  
 
Comparability should never compromise the accuracy of the information or the scientific 
analysis of interpretation of data in the Scoreboard. This may mean that more expertise is 
needed to analyse and understand the data, but this is a reasonable cost in light of the 
importance of the project. If the objective is to ensure that the three principles are fully 
respected in the EU by all Member States and at all levels of governance, then the 
investment in accurate and up-to-date information and methodologically sound, context-
specific interpretations of indices cannot be underestimated.  
  
                                                                                                                                                               
Hungarian index developed by the Eötvös Károly Institute and HVG, a weekly economic 
magazine, see L. Majtényi and M.D. Szabó (eds.), Az elveszejtett alkotmány, L’Harmattan – EKINT, 
2011, 13-62. 
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3. Addressing objections to the supranational tackling of 
the issue by the EU 
3.1. The need for an EU approach 
The EU received its core values at its inception: achieving peace and prosperity, the 
immediate goals of the Union still with us since the times of the Schuman declaration, 
had a strong implied liberty component. Dictatorships and any countries which were not 
‘free’ were not welcome to join the Union.250 Notwithstanding the fact that democracy 
and the rule of law were not part of the black letter law of the Communities for a long 
time, both have clearly been regarded as important unwritten principles, which became 
codified thanks to the pre-accession strategy in the context of the preparation of the ‘big-
bang’ enlargement to the east of the continent.251 It is this process, alongside the political 
initiatives of the institutions and the obiter dicta in the case law of the CJEU, that resulted 
in the distillation of the core elements of the principle of the rule of law in the context of 
EU constitutionalism.252 
 
The development of the written law on principles has been uneven, if not sloppy. 
‘Principles’ would be the established way of referring to the foundational, enforceable 
and legally meaningful assumptions informing every aspect of the functioning of a given 
legal system – which unquestionably places rule of law and democracy among the 
principles of EU law.253 Yet, for the first time in EU history, the Lisbon Treaty expressly 
refers to some among the established legal principles as ‘values’, introducing a double 
confusion in what is now Article 2 TEU.254 The first confusion is terminological, given 
that the rule of law is clearly a ‘principle’ in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
has the power of primary law of the EU. Moreover, it has been a principle at least since 
                                                          
250 D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the 
Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008, Chapters 1 and 
2.  
251 For the whole story, see Id. 
252 L. Pech, ‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of the Rule of Law as a 
Constitutional Principle of EU Law’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359–396 (2010). On the 
analysis of this distillation process and its outcomes, see D. Kochenov ‘The EU Rule of Law: 
Cutting Paths through Confusion’, 2 Erasmus Law Review 1, 5–24 (2009). 
253 See, for the core contributions, M.L. Fernandez Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European 
Constitution, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999; also U. Everling, ‘The European Union as 
a Federal Association of States and Citizens’, in: A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law, Oxford/Munich: Hart Publishing/CH Beck, 2010, 701–734; M. Zuleeg, 
‘The Advantages of the European Constitution’, in: A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law, Oxford/Munich: Hart Publishing/CH Beck, 2010, 763–785, 772–779. 
EU Institutions’ own accounts of what is meant by the rule of law beyond the tautology of ‘being 
bound by law’ present a most diverse account, which found an expression in the EU’s external 
action: L. Pech, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad’, in: D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The 
European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013, 108–129. 
254 For an analysis, see L. Pech, ‘“A Union Founded on the Rule of Law”: Meaning and Reality of 
the Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review 359–
396 (2010). 
 PE 579.328  91 
the oft-cited ECJ decision in Les Verts.255 The second confusion is theoretical: legal 
scholarship shows clear differences between values, which are desirable ideals, and 
principles with a more solid binding force. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, however, 
“values” is a misnomer that results in an erroneous synonymisation of the two words.  
 
It is clear, however, as Laurent Pech has persuasively argued, that the unfortunate 
wording of Article 2 TEU does not deprive the rule of law of a legal value of a core legal 
principle in the context of EU law.256 Read in conjunction with the rule of law in the 
Charter and the case law of the Court as well as drawing on the rich history of the rule of 
law as a constitutional principle of the EU, Article 2 TEU thus means that the EU based 
on the rule of law is a Wertegemeinschaft,257 a community based on common values. This 
should not undermine the legal significance of the rule of law in the edifice of EU law. 
The EU views the rule of law as one of its raisons d’être, inspiring its internal and external 
action, and recognises the rule of law as being one of the interrelated trinity of concepts 
already referred to above.258  
 
Within the scope of the acquis these values were reinforced by the entry into force of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, while outside the scope of the acquis Article 7 TEU is the 
usual approach to enforcing the same values.259 Most important, the fundamental nature 
of European values referred to in Article 2 TEU strongly resonates with the peoples of 
Europe. When asked about the most important values that characterise the European 
Union, they most often cite peace, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. For 
European individuals personally, peace, human rights and respect for human life are the 
values that matter most.260 
 
All the above notwithstanding, the EU remains vulnerable as far as its values are 
concerned: problems exist at both the supranational and national levels. Firstly, the EU’s 
own understanding of its values is atypical, when approached from the traditional 
constitutionalism standpoint,261 allowing for a theoretical possibility of certain principles 
of its law, particularly the principle of autonomy of EU law, to trump the substance of 
                                                          
255 Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, 23. See also Opinion 1/91 
EEA Agreement [1991] ECR 6097. 
256 Id. 
257 See for example Konrad Adenauer on 7 December 1951 in an address at the Foreign Press 
Association in London, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung Nr. 19/51, 314. 
258 G. de Búrca, ‘Europe’s raison d’être’, in: D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), European Union’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 21–37. 
259 B. Bugarič, ‘Protecting Democracy inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and the Hungarian Turn to 
Authoritarianism’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the 
European Union, Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; L. F. M. Besselink, ‘The Bite, the 
Bark and the Howl: Article 7 and the Rule of Law Initiatives’, in: A. Jakab and D. Kochenov (eds.), 
The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
260 See Eurobarometer 82 for Autumn 2014. 
261 E.g. G. Palombella, È possibile la legalità globale?, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012; L. Morlino and G. 
Palombella (eds.), Rule of Law and Democracy: Inquiries into Internal and External Issues, Leiden: Brill, 
2010; G. Palombella and N. Walker (eds.), Relocating the Rule of Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009; 
M. Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law. An Abuser’s Guide’, in: A. Sajó (ed.), The Dark Side of Fundamental 
Rights, Utrecht: Eleven, 2006, 129–161. 
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values, which has been overwhelmingly criticised in the literature.262 The concept of 
autonomy can be traced back to the seminal Costa v ENEL case,263 where the ECJ 
completed a line of argument it started to develop a year earlier in Van Gend and Loos,264 
famously proclaiming that Community law may have direct effect. As the ECJ argued, 
direct effect may not be meaningul, should national courts be able to overwrite it, as 
argued earlier by the Italian constitutional court, and therefore European laws shall enjoy 
supremacy over domestic ones. At this point of the reasoning the principle of autonomy 
kicked in. In the ECJ’s view, laws based on the Treaties constitute an autonomous legal 
order [une source autonome], which must not be overwritten by national rules, however 
these latter are formulated. Thus, “according to the ECJ, the EU forms a unified, self-
referential legal order, with its own internal claim to validity, which, at a minimum, is no 
longer part of the mainstream of international law.”265 As presented by the Union, this is 
all about the exercise of its competences.266 Approaching this critically, however, we are 
dealing with a recurrent claim by the Union that its power should be unchecked 
externally, based on the strength of an ‘autonomy’ argument.267 Secondly, the EU is 
lacking an evaluation process and enforcement mechanism of these foundational values 
at the national level, as has been demonstrated in Part I of this Research Paper. In other 
words, the values of Article 2 TEU are overwhelmingly procedural at the supranational 
level, where they need the substance the most, and absolutely toothless in the context of 
ensuring compliance at the national level, where the majority of violations – at least at 
this stage, when the EU itself is behaving well – is most likely to occur. 
                                                          
262 P. Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or 
Autarky?’, 38 Fordham International Law Journal 4, 955–992 (2015); G. Palombella, ‘Beyond Legality – 
before Democracy: Rule of Law Caveats in the EU Two-Level System’, in: C. Closa and D. 
Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
263 ECJ, Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585. 
264 ECJ, Case 26/62 Van Gend and Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen ECR [1963] 3. 
265 J.V. van Rossem, The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?, Between Autonomy and Dependence: The 
EU Legal Order Under the Influence of International Organisations, The Hague: Asser Press/Springer, 
2013, 19.  
266 Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 192. 
267 Piet Eeckhout made a most persuasive argument that the allocation of powers per se cannot 
possibly play any role here, since, no matter which level of government is responsible, the 
fundamental values, as expressed in the ECHR, have to be respected, as rightly put by Eeckhout 
“for the CJEU […] to assume that responsibility and division of competences are one and the same, 
is not an example of proper judicial reasoning, to say the least”. It is thus clear that the ECJ simply 
deploys ‘autonomy’ as a flimsy pretext to ensure that its own jurisdiction is unchecked: P. 
Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or 
Autarky?’, 38 Fordham International Law Journal 4, 955–992 (2015).  
Other scholars argues along similar lines. For some immediate comments after the Opinion from 
among the many valuable contributions, see S. Peers, The CJEU and the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR: a clear and present danger to human rights protection, 18 December 2014, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/the-cjeu-and-eus-accession-to-echr.html, 
International Commission of Jurists, EU Court Opinion a major setback for human rights in 
Europe, 18 December 2014, http://www.icj.org/eu-court-opinion-a-major-setback-for-human-
rights-in-europe/, S. Douglas-Scott, Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a Christmas 
bombshell from the European Court of Justice, 24 December 2014, 
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/opinion-213-eu-accession-echr-christmas-bombshell-
european-court-justice/#.VbUtp0sk9uY, J. Polakiewicz, L. Brieskova: It’s about Human Rights, 
Stupid!, 12 March 2015, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/its-about-human-rights-stupid/#_ftnref. 
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This double vulnerability is behind the emergence of a particularly dangerous reality, 
where acting within the realm of the acquis, the Union can potentially diminish the 
national level of fundamental rights protection and the respect for the rule of law in the 
compliant States,268 while at the same time being apparently powerless to deal with the 
States where the rule of law is undermined. That plenty of rule of law and human rights-
sensitive issues lie within the realm of EU competence to enforce mutual recognition is 
particularly dangerous in this respect: the Union can oblige Member States to honour 
each other’s decisions, even if this would lead to absurd results, while it is at the same 
time unable to affect the substantive build-up and the nature of the national legal systems 
that take the decisions the EU enforces.269  
 
This set-up of strong enforcement of mutual recognition without an ability to affect in all 
cases what is recognised, is potentially explosive and demonstrates the urgent need to 
tackle the two core drawbacks plaguing the functioning of the rule of law in the EU as a 
legal principle as soon as possible.270 In other words, it is impossible to solve the rule of 
law challenge merely by thinking in terms of enforcement of values at the national level 
in the Member States: an important part of the challenge lies firmly within the realm of 
supranational law and has to do with the EU’s own framing of the substance of its law as 
well as the reach of its powers. 
 
This being said, the challenges underlying enforcement lie in the familiar debate over the 
conferral of powers and national sovereignty, subsidiarity and proportionality, i.e. 
turning to enforcement sunsu stricto is to a large degree about the legal framing of the 
vertical separation of powers between the EU and its constitutive elements. With special 
regard to purely internal situations, the legitimacy of EU interference is repeatedly 
questioned by Member States. But there would be something paradoxical about confining 
the Union’s possibilities of action to the areas covered by Union law and asking it to 
ignore serious breaches in areas of national jurisdiction. If a Member State breaches the 
fundamental values, this is likely to undermine the very foundations of the Union and 
the trust between its members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs.271 
 
Beyond harming nationals of a Member State, all Union citizens in that State will also be 
detrimentally affected. Lack of limits to illiberal practices272 may encourage other 
                                                          
268 Cf. CJ, C-399/11 Melloni EU:C:2013:107 
269 The problem is not merely theoretical, as both Eeckhout and Mitsilegas have demonstrated: Id.; 
V. Mitsilegas, ‘The symbolic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in Europe’s 
Area of Criminal Justice’ 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 4 (2015). 
270 Cf. D. Kochenov, ‘The EU and the Rule of Law: Some Critical Observations’, in: E. Hirsch Ballin, 
M. Adams, A. Meuwese (eds.), Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming.  
271 European Commission, Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union - Respect 
for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, 15 October 
2003, 5; G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
272 The term was coined long ago, but it gained practical relevance in the EU after the Hungarian 
Prime Minister praised such State structures in his speech given in Tusnádfürdő on 25 July 2014. 
The original speech is accessible in video format via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PXP-
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Member States’ governments to follow, and subject other countries’ citizens to abuse. In 
other words, rule of law violations – if no consequences occur – may become 
contagious.273 Moreover, all EU citizens will to some extent suffer due to the given State’s 
participation in the EU’s decision-making mechanism, or to say the least, the legitimacy 
of Union decision-making will be jeopardised. Therefore, a state’s departure from the 
rule of law standards and the European consensus will ultimately hamper the exercise of 
rights of individuals EU-wide.  
 
As anticipated in Section 2.3 above, we shall also address an important specificity of EU 
law, namely the nature and future faith of instruments covering the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.274 As long as fundamental rights are not enforced in a uniform 
manner throughout the Union, and as long as a member country cannot take judicial 
independence in another State for granted, mutual trust- and mutual recognition-based 
instruments in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice will be jeopardised.275 As long 
as Member States are worried about their citizens’ basic rights and respect for their 
procedural guarantees due to different fundamental rights standards, they leave short-
cuts in their legislation so as not to enforce EU law and at the same time they interpret 
EU law in a restrictive way.276 As long as the Member States – with or without good 
reason – have no confidence in each other’s human rights protection mechanisms, the 
administration of EU criminal justice will remain cumbersome and – what could 
potentially have fatal consequences for the EU legal system – the Member States may 
                                                                                                                                                               
6n1G8ls. Cf. Frans Timmermans’ speech: “there is no such thing as an illiberal democracy”. Frans 
Timmermans, “EU framework for democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights”, Speech to the 
European Parliament, Strasbourg, Speech/15/4402, 12 February 2015. 
273 ‘Viktor Orbán: The conservative subversive’, Politico 28, 2015, 12–15, 15. 
274 It goes without saying that problems can easily arise in a handful of other contexts, in particular 
with relation to the four freedoms, which imply the existence of well-functioning loyalty between 
the Member States and the Union. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is most prone to 
providing an opening to the most atrocious violations of human rights which could be multiplied 
and amplified by the EU’s mutual recognition requirements, as described above. Cf.: M.P. Maduro, 
‘So close yet so far: The paradoxes of mutual recognition’ 14  
Journal of European Public Policy 5, 814–825 (2007); K Nicolaïdis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing 
Europe through mutual recognition’, 14 Journal of European Public Policy 5, 682–698 (2007).  
275 As the CJEU has recently stated, “…[T]he principle of mutual trust between the Member States 
is of fundamental importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be 
created and maintained. That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, 
security and justice, each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other 
Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights 
recognised by EU law.” Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 on the 
compatibility of the draft agreement on the EU accession to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) with the EU and TFEU Treaties 
of 13 December 2014, para. 191. 
276 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The symbolic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in 
Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 4 (2015); V. Mitsilegas, 
‘The limits of mutual trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From automatic 
inter-State cooperation to the slow emergence of the individual’, 31 Yearbook of European Law, 1, 
319–372 (2012); G. Vermeulen, W. De Bondt, Ch. Ryckman (eds), Rethinking international cooperation 
in criminal matters in the EU. Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality, Antwerpen, 
Apeldoorn, Portland: Maklu, 2012, 269–270.  
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invoke the protection of basic human rights in order to permit exemptions from the 
principle of primacy of EU law.277  
 
The CJEU has accepted that the presumption of EU Member States’ compliance with 
fundamental rights may be rebuttable.278 However, in the eyes of both the academic 
literature279 and the European Court of Human Rights,280 the Court has not gone far 
enough in articulating the law on this issue, as the threshold for rebutting the 
presumption established by the CJEU is clearly much higher than the one the ECtHR 
would demand, thus potentially violating the standards of the Convention.281 If EU 
Member States cannot properly ensure an efficient, human rights-compliant and 
independent judiciary to carry out that test, how possibly could the principle of mutual 
recognition stand in EU JHA law?282 This constitutes also a direct challenge to the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the role and attributed scrutiny functions of European 
institutions like the European Commission and European Parliament. The establishment 
of a uniform EU fundamental rights regime might be the answer to this challenge.  
 
The heads of States and governments reached the same conclusion in the 2010 Stockholm 
programme and were surprisingly honest regarding the principle of mutual recognition. 
The Stockholm programme expresses a straightforward criticism and intends to establish 
that mutual trust, which was the alleged cornerstone of several third pillar documents 
adopted after 11 September 2001, was in reality absent. In order to remedy the problem 
and create trust, the multi-annual programme proposes legal harmonisation. “The 
approximation, where necessary, of substantive and procedural law should facilitate 
                                                          
277 See the seminal Solange cases of the German Federal Constitutional Court: Solange I, BVerfGE 
37, 271, 29 May 1974; Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339, 22 October 1986. 
278 Court of Justice of the European Union, C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for Home Department 
[2010] OJ C 274/21; and C-493/10, M.E. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2011] OJ C 13/18, 21 
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unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of 
asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum 
seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the 
meaning of that provision.” 
279 V. Mitsilegas, ‘The symbolic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in 
Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice’ 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 4 (2015); P. Eeckhout, 
‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or Autarky?’, 38 
Fordham International Law Journal 4, 955–992 (2015); D. Kochenov, ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law: 
Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?’, Yearbook of European Law, 2015. 
280 ECtHR, Tarakhel v Switzerland Application No. 29217/12, 4 November 2014 (Reconfirming 
ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011). 
281 The insufficient standard of the CJEU has recently been reconfirmed in Case C-294/12 Abdullahi 
v Bundesasylamt [2010] ECR I–1493. 
282 S. Carrera and E. Guild, Implementing the Lisbon Treaty Improving the Functioning of the EU on 
Justice and Home Affairs, Manuscript. 
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mutual recognition.”283 By 2012 several important EU laws were passed to this effect, for 
instance laws on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, the 
right to information in criminal proceedings and the establishment of minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime – issues all covered in 
the Justice chapter of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.284  
 
The development of judicial cooperation as illustrated above supports the neo-
functionalist explanation of the evolution of European integration. At the early stage of 
integration, Member States declined each and every rudimentary formal criminal 
cooperation, even if cooperation based on mutual recognition has been the cornerstone of 
EU law for decades before the principle entered the domain of criminal law.285 The free 
movement of persons in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in addition 
to the formation of subjects of legal protection at Community level, necessitated common 
criminal investigation and cooperation in European decision-making (first spillover 
effect).286 The initially stalling criminal cooperation and Member States’ fear of losing a 
considerable part of their national criminal sovereignty resulted in the formation of 
norms that are highly influenced by politics, difficult to enforce and represent lower 
levels of cooperation: instead of legal harmonisation the adopted provisions comply with 
the principle of mutual recognition.  
 
However, in the absence of adequate, communautarised, enforceable minimum 
procedural guarantees and a fundamental rights mechanism, such provisions were not 
able to operate effectively. Currently, we are witnessing how due process guarantees 
complement existing provisions and how an EU criminal procedural law system evolves, 
as a second spillover effect, in order to maintain and promote an effective criminal 
cooperation. This is how minimum harmonisation of due process guarantees – or in other 
words, how making fundamental rights justiciable permits – the survival of mutual 
recognition-based laws.  
 
Beyond the political costs of the democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights deficit 
exposed in the non-compliant Member States, the social and economic costs should also 
be mentioned.  
 
When discussing social costs, the point of departure should be the deficiency of 
democracies, which results in the depreciation of the other two values. The elected 
                                                          
283 Stockholm Programme, Section 3.1.1. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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284 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the 
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286 E.B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-state, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964; Ph.C. Schmitter, 
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legislative branch can by necessity not represent the whole of the population, and 
oftentimes it does not even represent the interests of those who voted it into the 
parliament. There are a number of ways by which elected representatives misrepresent 
the people. Some voters may remain without representation due to the simple fact that 
their preferred candidates don’t make it into the parliament. Those candidates who are 
democratically elected might ignore the interests of the opposing candidate’s voters, but 
elected representatives might also turn against those who elected them by not fulfilling 
the promises made during the electoral campaign.  
 
Also – and most important for our purposes – certain groups of people are denied the 
chance of being represented right from the outset, by being excluded from exercising 
even a most foundational first generation human right, namely the right to vote. These 
are the groups that are traditionally called – depending on the jurisdiction in question – 
insular or vulnerable minorities, such as children, individuals living with mental 
disabilities, and certain groups of foreigners. Lacking political rights, they are typically 
protected by the judiciary, first and foremost by apex courts.287 Depreciation of the rule of 
law therefore hits these individuals much harder than it hits those capable of influencing 
to some extent electoral processes.  
 
Finally, as proven in Annex 4 by Wim Marneffe, a state based on democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights creates an institutional climate that is determinant for stable 
economic performance: “Rational law presents a necessary condition for economic 
transactions, and its application creates a sense of foreseeability and predictability on the 
part of economic agents. The latter is a necessary condition in order for rational economic 
actions to occur.” One of the most interesting studies in this research domain is Haggard 
& Tiede288 proving that control of private capture and corruption, institutional checks on 
government, protection of property rights and mitigation of violence are all in close 
correlation with economic performance. (For the details see Annex 4.) Especially in times 
of financial and economic crises solid State institutions based on commonly shared 
values play a key role in creating or restoring confidence and fostering growth.289  
 
In sum, as a result, partly, of the deficiencies of the Union’s own rule of law framing, 
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Member States failing to comply with the values of Article 2 TEU undermine the very 
core of the Union, which can end up undermining the state of values in compliant 
Member States through a strict enforcement of mutual recognition in an atmosphere 
where it has no say concerning the substance of the rules enforced in a huge array of 
cases. In addition to intra-State concerns, rule of law backsliding and constitutional 
capture will thus harm nationals of the Member State in question, as well as EU citizens 
as a whole; erode mutual trust on which instruments in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice are based; incur economic, social and political costs for the EU; and diminish 
credibility in external affairs, especially when promoting democracy, the rule of law, and 
fundamental rights in third countries. Current initiatives by EU institutions shall 
therefore be welcome, as what is at stake is the rule of law, the foundational European 
value, the sine qua non of European integration, without the safeguarding and 
enforcement of which the EU as we currently know it would cease to exist.  
 
3.2. Sovereignty challenges of an EU approach  
It is the very constitutional structure of the EU – a multi-layered system of governance 
following a quasi federal model290 – which is based on the principle of conferral that 
makes the criticism of EU intervention possible. Indeed, unlike what would be the case 
with unitary states, for instance, the EU simply cannot intervene in the matters which are 
outside the scope of competences conferred to it by the Herren der Verträge – the Member 
States. The easiest way to describe it is to state that the Union, although a constitutional 
system, is an atypical one, as it does not possess Kompetenz Kompetenz. Playing with this 
understanding, the governments of the Member States undermining the rule of law and 
other values of Article 2 TEU usually fall short of telling the full story of what conferral 
means and how it functions, focusing merely on the rule that powers not delegated to the 
EU rest with the Member States. 
 
The picture is in fact somewhat more complicated. Not only can the EU intervene to 
protect its constitutional core, which is, through the values, shared with those of the 
Member States. It is also unequivocally obliged by the Treaties to act. This obligation has 
both an internal component, reflected in Article 7 TEU, and an external component, 
articulated in, e.g. Article 3(1). Part of the legal confusion seemingly playing in favour of 
the abusive governments is that the values of Article 2 TEU occupy a somewhat atypical 
place in the body of EU primary law, since they cannot serve as a basis for legislation, 
providing a solemn restatement of the EU’s constitutional nature shared with the 
Member State. Not being part of ordinary acquis does not disqualify them as law, 
however. Moreover, their binding nature is crystal clear and unquestionably operates 
equally within and outside the scope of conferred EU competences, since conferral, as the 
very existence of a rule of law-abiding democratic system of supranational law protecting 
fundamental rights and also ensuring that the objectives of the Union are reached, would 
be profoundly undermined – indeed, made impossible – should any of the Member 
States of the Union fall seriously short of meeting the basic standards of the value-
provisions in the Treaties.  
                                                          
290 O. Beaud, Théorie de la federation, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007; R. Schütze, From 
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This explains why Article 7 TEU, put in place specifically to police the adherence of the 
Member States to the requirements of Article 2 TEU, does not contain any competence 
limitations. Indeed, it would be utterly unproductive to demand EU intervention only in 
the case of a falsified EP election, for instance, while leaving a falsified national election 
in a backsliding Member State unaffected. Rule of law examples stemming from the 
requirement of the proper functioning of a national court system are even more telling. 
National courts of the Member States act both as national courts sensu stricto and as 
enforcers of EU law or ‘European courts’. In this sense, they constantly enjoy a dual 
function within the Union. Should the interpretation of the narrow approach to the 
enforcement of values prevail – thus, wrongly, connecting them with the scope of 
competences where the EU can legislate – it would be necessary, in every individual case, 
to determine whether the judge raising an issue of EU law or sensing a preliminary 
question to the CJEU is sufficiently independent and properly appointed, while not 
looking at these issues if the judge sits in a purely national case. 
 
To make matters worse, the difference between purely national and EU-related can be so 
blurred, that even the experts are at times puzzled, making such determinations difficult 
if not almost impossible.291 Such is the nature of the overlap of the layers in the European 
legal system: the Member States are responsible only for one layer, but are thereby able to 
affect the other every single minute. This is where the duty of loyalty and sincere 
cooperation kicks in, prohibiting the national (and also the EU) authorities from the 
obstruction of the achievement of the goals of integration as well as requiring each 
authority in the Union – be it national or supranational – to assist in the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives. In this context any departure by any national authority from the strict 
adherence to the values of Article 2 TEU generates an obligation for the EU to act, to 
ensure that the proper and uniform functioning of the Union legal system throughout the 
whole territory of all the Member States remains unobstructed. In other words, the scope 
of the acquis as such is necessarily much narrower than the scope of application of the 
values of Article 2 TEU. This discrepancy cannot convincingly be interpreted as 
potentially obstructing EU intervention with the aim of ensuring that the values of 
Article 2 TEU are complied with.  
 
It thus becomes clear that although Article 2 values, including, most importantly, 
democracy and the rule of law, are not within the scope of ordinary acquis in the sense 
that the Union cannot legislate based on this provision, their inclusion within the broader 
ambit of EU law cannot be disputed, as underlined by scholars on numerous occasions.292 
A most obvious sign of the crude legal nature of this provision is the existence of Article 7 
TEU, which contains a specific enforcement mechanism. Besides, Article 2 values are 
unquestionably part of the ‘Treaty’, which the Commission is empowered to protect with 
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the help of the ordinary infringement procedures allowing it to bring recalcitrant 
Member States to court (Article 258 TFEU).293 
 
To explain why the values of Article 2 TEU enjoy such an atypical place within the 
context of EU law and do not follow the simple rules of the acquis, a brief turn to the 
history of the values’ articulation is useful. It demonstrates a gradual move from the 
presumption of compliance of the Member States with values toward the articulation of an 
enforced presumption via the introduction and constant amendments of Article 7 TEU.  
 
The democratic and rule of law-abiding nature of the Member States of the Union has 
always been presumed: the initial Communities were given neither powers nor legal 
tools to intervene in this field. This being said, as we already mentioned, the essential role 
democracy, the rule of law and other values play in the very construct of the Union is 
undeniable: the purpose of unification was ensuring peace, prosperity and liberty for the 
peoples of Europe, which was characterised both by limiting the range of national 
political as well as democratic choices.294 
 
That only democratic States with a strong rule of law and fundamental rights record 
could join the Union was not part of its black-letter law but has been assumed from the 
very beginning.295 The presumptions about the democratic maturity of the Member States 
survived several rounds of enlargement, including those extending membership of the 
bloc to the newly-democratised countries with no strong historical the rule of law record. 
The belief of the time seems to have been that the transformative power and the gains of 
integration and the internal market made any backsliding impossible. The Member States 
assembled in the Council always had the upper hand in enforcing the presumption, 
overruling the cautious assessment of the European Commission with regard to Greek 
membership, for instance.296 
 
By the time of the ‘big-bang’ enlargement to the east the problems related to this 
approach became apparent: not only did Greece cause problems within and outside of 
the scope of the acquis; there was no trust in the newly-democratised states emerging 
from behind the Iron Curtain. This is when democracy and the rule of law as 
requirements addressed to the Member States, as opposed to the Union itself,297 made it 
into EU law, first through enforceable political proclamations, then through the profound 
amendments of the Treaties’ provisions on the principles on which the Union and the 
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Member States were founded as well as changes in the EU enlargement procedure.298 The 
role of the Commission in this context was absolutely crucial, as this institution was de 
facto the only one entrusted with the monitoring of the candidate countries’ adherence to 
the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights protection, through the 
implementation of the Copenhagen criteria of 1993.299 While a huge bulk of documents 
able to shed light on the emerging European consensus with regard to the meaning of the 
rule of law and its place in the context of modern constitutionalism was produced in the 
process, the ultimate results turned out to be both inconsistent and unreliable in terms of 
triggering transformation,300 and unstable in terms of guaranteeing lasting change, to 
which the backsliding in a number of the Member States testifies.301 The Commission is 
one of the key actors responsible for the failure of conditionality in the area of democracy 
and the rule of law. 
 
On the positive side, however, the pre-accession strategy, including the Commission’s 
engagement, resulted in three important developments. Each of these, just like the 
negative side which is one of the roots of the current crisis of the rule of law, inform the 
legal-political nature of the Union today. 
 
Firstly, the pre-accession engagement with the rule of law unquestionably contributed to 
the distillation of the meaning of this fundamental principle of law in the context of EU 
law, which, albeit broad and complex, is clear.302  
 
Secondly, the pre-accession engagement led to the articulation of the need to include the 
key principles promoted through the Copenhagen criteria among the written principles 
of EU law – a step forward following their embrace through the case law of the Court of 
Justice. In this sense, the pre-accession strategy played a crucial role and resulted in the 
reshaping of European constitutionalism as such, as Sadurski has clearly 
demonstrated.303 
 
As part of this process, thirdly, a special political provision – Article 7 TEU – was 
included in the Treaty of Amsterdam to enable the Union to act when the principles of 
the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights protection are breached by one of the 
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Member States.304 Although not deployed in the case of the public overreaction against 
the Austrian FPÖ coalition,305 this provision marked a definitive departure from dozens 
of years of constitutional practice and is of crucial importance. For the first time since the 
inception of the Communities, the Treaty of Amsterdam laid to rest the unworkable 
assumption that all the Member States will naturally adhere to democracy and the rule of 
law merely as a consequence of the membership of the Union as such. 
 
The legal framing and articulation of the idea that the values of Article 2 TEU can and 
should be enforced created the current state of affairs, where EU legal tools are available 
for use only in this field. This enrichment of EU law made the legal system of the Union 
more complex, as the law now – and since the times of the pre-accession strategy at least 
– de facto and also de jure includes the acquis sensu stricto – the law created by the Union 
within its scope of competences – and the acquis on values, which does not have such 
competence limitations but, at the same time, lying in the realm of core constitutional 
importance for the EU and the Member States alike, makes formal legislation on its basis 
impossible. Enforcement is always a possibility, however.  
 
Subsidiarity, respecting the power of the lowest possible authority to act, should 
seemingly guide any action in this sensitive field. In other words, the EU is absolutely 
barred from encroaching on the constitutional essence of the Member States in situations 
where the adherence to values has not deteriorated beyond the thresholds established by 
Article 7 TEU. How to establish this?  
 
In order to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity and, by consequence, the sovereignty 
of the Member States is respected, it is indispensable for the Union to create reliable, 
permanent and periodic mechanisms of data collection, monitoring and exchange, to 
enable it to be always on top of the situation on the ground in all the Member States. 
Monitoring is of crucial importance to make sure that the limits of powers set in the 
Treaties are respected. The pre-Article 7 procedure of the Commission, initiated against 
Poland on January 13 this year, is a great example of a competence-sensitive and 
constructive approach to tackling the issue of vital knowledge. By designing a special 
procedure of information exchange with the Member State suspected of potentially 
falling short of Article 7 standards, the European Commission managed to establish a 
transparent and reliable procedure which is as constructive as it is forward-looking. Yet, 
and most unfortunately, it will most likely not be effective at all in reaching the goals it 
set for itself, as explained above. 
 
The European Parliament is as empowered as the Commission to step up its activity in 
this domain, as, just like other institutions, the EP is expected to play a role in the Article 
7 procedures, once activated. To make sure that a meaningful role is played and the 
principle of the division of competences is safeguarded, it is absolutely necessary for the 
Parliament to be in possession of all the necessary information concerning the state of 
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democracy and the rule of law on the ground in the Member State suspected of a 
violation. 
 
To sum up, it is necessary to state that although EU values do not make up part of the 
standard Union acquis by lying within the grey area in terms of competences, the 
departure from the presumption of compliance with the values of the EU by all the 
Member States brought about by the big-bang enlargement to the east and the 
introduction of the special procedures of the enforcement of values, changed the 
paradigm of EU engagement in this sensitive area, creating a new legal reality compared 
to, say, 30 years ago. Once the obligation to enforce and promote the values appeared in 
the Treaties, the Member States were barred from making any legally sound arguments 
tailored to preventing EU intervention in the area based on the lack of Kompetenz 
Kompetenz considerations. Quite on the contrary, in light of the obligation to uphold and 
promote the values of the Union as well as the duty of loyalty, one can expect each 
Member State to actively participate in the attempts of the Union to restore the adherence 
to the values in any part of the Union’s territory. 
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4. Specific suggestions for the elements of an EU 
Scoreboard  
European integration is based on core values: the EU’s watchdog function over the rule 
of law, liberal democracy and fundamental rights; upholding the heritage of 
enlightenment; allowing rationality to penetrate politics and law-making; and granting 
protection for individuals against the State or supranational entities. In the following, and 
based on the previous parts of this Research Paper – mapping the state of the art and 
existing mechanisms in the EU, CoE and UN contexts to assess democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights, and highlighting general and EU-specific methodological 
issues – the main points to be taken into consideration when establishing an EU 
Scoreboard will be summarised. 
 
4.1. Annual cycle: an all-encompassing approach 
In its Resolution of 10 June 2015 the European Parliament called for an annual 
monitoring of compliance with democracy, the rule of law and the situation of 
fundamental rights in all Member States through a Scoreboard, to be established on the 
basis of common and objective indicators. The first issue to be tackled is ‘what’ a 
Scoreboard is, what methodology and what model it shall follow. A Scoreboard could be 
a combination of ‘discussion and dialogue’, ‘monitoring’, ‘measuring/evaluating and 
benchmarking’ and ‘supervision’, with various actors and methods channelled into one 
EU-specific system. In this sense a Scoreboard could be described as a ‘process’ 
encompassing a multi-actor and multi-method regular cycle.  
 
4.2. Conferral and subsidiarity 
Member States often claim European institutions act ultra vires when intruding into their 
purely domestic affairs. As it was shown in Section 3.2 above, not only can the EU 
intervene to protect its constitutional core, but it is also unequivocally obliged by the 
Treaties to act. Member Sates are interdependent in multiple areas, and depreciation of 
EU values will have EU-wide effects in all possible ways. Beyond harming nationals of a 
Member State, Union citizens residing in that State will also be detrimentally affected. 
Illiberal practices encourage other Member States’ governments to follow, and subject 
other countries’ citizens to abuse. All EU citizens will to some extent suffer due to the 
given State’s participation in the EU’s decision-making mechanism. Furthermore, the 
mutual trust underlying many European laws will be fundamentally undermined, 
jeopardising the Union’s legal system. To complicate matters further, the difference 
between national and EU-related can be blurred, so as to make reference to purely 
domestic matters meaningless.  
 
At the same time subsidiarity should guide any EU action in the field. In other words, the 
EU is absolutely barred from encroaching on the constitutional essence of the Member 
States in the situations where the adherence to values has not deteriorated beyond the 
thresholds established by Article 7 TEU. In order to ensure that the principle of 
subsidiarity and, by consequence, the sovereignty of the Member States are respected, it 
is indispensable for the Union to create reliable instruments of data collection and 
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exchange, to enable it to be always on top of the situation on the ground in all the 
Member States. A Scoreboard instrument in this sense is not in contravention of the 
subsidiarity principle but, quite to the contrary, would contribute to making it 
operational.  
 
4.3. EU self-check and a Scoreboard mechanism for the Member 
States 
In the supranational context, in order to strengthen the EU’s position as a rule of law 
actor and to prevent hypocrisy, preferably both the supranational entity – in the case at 
hand, the EU – and its constitutive elements, i.e. the Member States, shall be scrutinised 
via a Scoreboard.  
 
How likely is a scenario where the EU would violate European principles? Let us here 
refer to the highest European authority, the main European guardian of fundamental 
rights, the ECtHR, which found that the protection of fundamental rights by EU law 
could be considered “equivalent” to that of the Convention system.306 There might be 
pragmatic reasons behind the presumption – the ECtHR not wanting to engage in a 
direct conflict with the EU or with the Member States that might become inflexible and 
jeopardise enforcement if they found themselves between a rock and a hard place, i.e. 
either meet their obligations stemming from EU law or comply with the Convention.307 
Still, that does not take away from the importance of the Bosphorus presumption, i.e. that 
EU law provides a system of fundamental rights protection similar to the Convention 
system. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly 
deficient.308  
 
The sheer fact that the presumption is rebuttable shows that the EU’s adherence to 
European values cannot be taken for granted. Even more illustrative is the fact that in 
cases where the ECtHR refused to apply the Bosphorus test, pieces of EU laws – when 
scrutinised through the conventional test – were found to be in violation of the 
Convention.309 Whereas in a handful of cases the CJEU found EU instruments to be in 
violation of EU values,310 there are worrying instances when the Luxembourg Court did 
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not draw the right balance between competing private and public interests – as we 
retrospectively know from ECtHR judgments.311 The number of such cases is only likely 
to grow after Opinion 2/13, which gave preference to vague structural considerations of 
EU federalism over the substance of the fundamental rights of EU citizens in a situation 
where there was no apparent conflict between the two, as Piet Eeckhout, among others, 
has demonstrated.312 That proves all too well the necessity to apply the Scoreboard vis-à-
vis the EU including its laws and policies, and the actual realisation of goals to which the 
Union is committed, and not only its member countries. That will also enhance the EU’s 
internal and external legitimacy.  
 
At the same time European values not only influence European law-making on the 
supranational scene but also have an impact on national laws and policies, and vice versa; 
mutual trust among EU Member States and their respective legal systems is the 
foundation of the Union legal system. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to regularly 
check the way European values are implemented at the national level. 
 
4.4. Possibilities and limits of borrowing from existing mechanisms  
There is a complex matrix of existing actors, methods and instruments monitoring, 
evaluating and to some extent supervising democracy, the rule of law and the protection 
of fundamental rights. There is a strong belief – also shared by interviewees – ‘not to 
reinvent the wheel’ but instead to rely on existing mechanisms, and if needed to 
complement existing systems and make them EU-specific. As has been shown in this 
Research Paper, this is already happening, with the EU Justice Scoreboard relying among 
others on the CoE CEPEJ model of evaluation/benchmarking, and the EU Anti-
Corruption Report making use of the GRECO model. Borrowing may take place with 
regard to information, data, standards, structures and mechanisms.313  
 
One option is to bring together all existing data and analyses from the international scene 
under one umbrella, in a ‘one-stop shop’, like the European Fundamental Rights 
Information System within the frame of the Fundamental Rights Agency. EFRIS would 
not aggregate data or indices; instead it would allow for a sophisticated search to check 
in a coherent format all data and reports on a given Member State, in a given time frame 
on a given topic. It would enable gaps to be identified and allow additional data to be 
acquired and conclusions to be drawn. In addition annual reports could be drafted on the 
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basis of available materials.314 This Study argues that already existing data and analyses 
on various ‘rule of law-related dimensions’ at the CoE and the UN should be taken in 
consideration during the EU Rule of Law Scoreboard.  
 
At the same time, bringing together data and analysing synergies, or even making 
comparisons as suggested in the literature, is an exercise that is close to impossible and 
more akin to ‘alchemy’. As shown in Chapters 1.2 and 1.3 of this Paper, standards, 
sources, data, data-handling methods and the interpretations of each of the various sets 
of tools are so different in nature and fundamentals, they necessitate a very tedious 
methodological exercise for making international mechanisms comparable and 
conclusions and findings meaningful.  
 
While relying on external sources and mechanisms, the EU element or specificity of the 
process shall always be kept. In other words, a rule of law mechanism shall never be 
‘contracted out’ entirely to third parties, since non-EU actors fail to take due account of 
their relevance or links with existing European law and policies as well as general 
principles of European law, such as that of mutual recognition of judicial/administrative 
decisions. 
  
As the CJEU put it: “In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member 
States to be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting 
Parties which are not Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, 
including where such relations are governed by EU law, require a Member State to check 
that another Member State has observed fundamental rights, even though EU law 
imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States, accession is liable to 
upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law.”315 No 
external non-EU mechanism would put such a heavy emphasis on the specificities of the 
EU legal system and the autonomy, primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. If the 
path taken by the CJEU is to be followed, the EU shall not allow a third party to 
determine exclusively how European values shall be construed in the EU’s multi-level 
constitutional system.316 
 
The stance of the Court can of course be harshly criticised. Should the Court be „serious 
about its claim that the Union constitutes an entity with distinct constitutional features, it 
should be prepared to translate this into a policy of deference towards external norms. 
(...) Under a modern, liberal reading of the concept, more autonomy vis-à-vis 
international law in effect might mean less autonomy.“317 In the present context the sui 
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generis constitutional character of EU law predestines it to the status of “domestic law” 
that could potentially be reviewed by the ECtHR. 
 
But there is a strong argument for respecting EU law autonomy: the EU shall be allowed 
to set higher standards than other international mechanisms. Take the example of a 
Member State found in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights due to its 
widespread overcrowding of prisons.318 Is the Member State free to refuse surrendering 
suspects or alternatively to make surrender conditional upon an assurance that minimum 
detention conditions are met in the issuing state?319  
 
And on what basis? In the N.S.320 case the Court of Justice – echoing the Strasbourg 
judgment in M.S.S.321 – emphasised international reports. So does a requested State have 
to wait until a prisoner exhausts all domestic remedies and turns to the Strasbourg Court, 
which ultimately renders a decision? Or will it be accountable to make an assessment on 
a case-by-case basis, thereby overwriting the principle of mutual trust? Or somewhere in 
between, does it have to register a certain level of rights infringement in order to engage 
in an assessment of the merits of the case? Does it have to wait until it can rely on 
international documents, e.g. until the Council of Europe anti-torture Committee visits 
the issuing country and publishes a negative report? Instead of being at the mercy of 
external bodies, the EU could develop its own control mechanism and prevent mutual 
recognition work even before there was international condemnation for a human rights 
violation. As Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild suggested, “[A] permanent 
EU assessment board could be established in order to carry out a constant monitoring of 
the quality of Member States’ criminal justice systems and verify whether they fulfil 
international and European standards on the rule of law.”322  
 
The EU Rule of Law Scoreboard could fit into the timetable of the European Semester and 
could be linked to the Cycle of Economic Governance. Beyond necessary overlaps in data 
collection however the EU Scoreboard shall be detached from other existing mechanism, 
with special regard to the latter’s weaknesses with regard to enforcement.323 In the former 
mechanism the low enforcement rate remains without much echo, whereas the essence of 
the proposed EU Scoreboard is enforcement of foundational EU values beyond 
monitoring. 
 
                                                          
318 The case is not entirely hypothetical, see ECtHR, Varga and Others v Hungary, Application nos. 
14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015. 
319 Questions soon to be answered by the CJEU in Case C-404/15 Aranyosi, request for a 
preliminary ruling lodged on 24 July 2015. See also Opinion of AG Bot in  C‑ 404/15 Aranyosi and 
C‑ 659/15 PPU Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:140. 
320 Cases C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for Home Department [2010] OJ C 274/21; and C-493/10, 
M.E. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2011] OJ C 13/18. 
321 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
322 D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild, The CHALLENGE Project: Final Policy Recommendations on 
the Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, 2009, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/12224/1/1905.pdf, 12. 
323
 Darvas, Z. and Leandro, Á. ‘The Limitations of Policy Coordination in the Euro Area Under the 
European Semester, Brussels: Bruegel Institute‘, Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 2015 
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4.5. Contextual, qualitative assessment, little if no benchmarking 
A case-by-case approach would be needed, where assessment through numerical 
indicators could be an element, but it should not constitute the core of the new 
Scoreboard. Instead, emphasis shall be placed on a contextual, qualitative assessment of 
data and a country-specific list of key issues, in order to grasp interrelations between data 
and the causalities behind them.  
 
Limits of the Scoreboard should also be acknowledged: it would not be suitable to predict 
or prevent future trends; rank Member States according to who is performing ‘better’ or 
‘worse’; or conduct simplistic cross-country comparative analyses.  
 
Fundamental rights to a lesser extent, but democracy and even more the rule of law are 
fluid concepts and phenomena, and there is no single ideal formula to achieve them. Rule 
of law is a contested concept, and even the most detailed definition, to be true to the idea 
of the rule of law, has to contain a share of vagueness in order to accommodate rule of 
law’s very nature. This requirement of vagueness plays strongly against any Quichotean 
attempts to turn the rule of law into a shopping list of elements, even if some examples of 
relatively good lists are known. Eliminating vagueness entirely, on such a reading, 
profoundly undermines the usefulness of the concept itself. Therefore we argue against 
designing the standards along indicators – a rather dubious exercise that can easily be 
attacked as politically or ideologically biased. It is suggested to carefully consider 
whether needed and sparingly use benchmarking methods and indicators.  
 
Lack of agreement on standards and a context-sensitive analysis is not only benefiting 
states, but at the same time it does not allow rule of law backsliders to hide their efforts 
by referencing other states and claiming that there was nothing unorthodox about their 
structures. Whereas it may be true that formally a state borrowed the existing legal 
solutions, institutions and practices from various other jurisdictions, it might well be a 
selection of ‘worst practices’ and taken as a whole, a “Frankenstate” may be in the 
making.324  
 
The contextualization of a rule of law assessment shall be a nuanced exercise and 
particular care shall be taken not to rely on a standardised benchmarking system that 
could potentially veil or blur problems in the subparts of EU values – thereby doing more 
harm than good, or even more harm than not having an EU Scoreboard at all. 
 
4.6. Three scenarios 
On a positive note, the ongoing rule of law debate shifted its focus from an Article 7 TEU 
emergency-led context toward a discussion on shared European values and legal 
principles. Over time the scope of the discussion became broader, in at least two 
dimensions: emphasis shifted beyond supervision to the active promotion of EU values, 
and the material scope widened beyond the rule of law incorporating all aspects of the 
triangular relationship including also democracy and fundamental rights. This also 
                                                          
324 K. L. Scheppele, ‘The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not 
Work’, 26 Governance 2013, 559. 
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means that very different scenarios are covered in the debate, and these shall be clearly 
distinguished, as they trigger different responses. We systemised possible stages of 
respect for European values and identified three scenarios.  
 
In the first scenario, the boundaries of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights 
are primarily set by national constitutional law and domestic bills of rights, whereas the 
enforcement of the values is first and foremost the task of the domestic courts. 
Acknowledging that decisions are made by fallible human beings, in-built guarantees 
emerged over history to remedy mistakes and biases, such as the requirement of an 
impartial and independent judiciary, the possibility of appeal, but broader concepts 
including separation of powers or checks and balances are also supposed to contribute to 
the enforcement of values. Therefore in a functioning democracy based on the rule of law 
respecting fundamental rights, an external mechanism is not vital. Still, it can have an 
added value, with special regard to the positive obligations of the EU to promote 
European values. (cf. Article 3 TEU) At the same time the only way to ensure co-
ownership of the Scoreboard of Member States in general, is to have countries involved 
in the scoreboarding process and invite them to cooperate, irrespectively where they 
stand with the enforcement of European values. 
 
In a second scenario a Member State still adhering to democracy, the rule of law and 
fundamental rights might be in violation of certain individual rights, due to individual 
mistakes or structural and recurrent problems. In such cases as a general rule, if domestic 
mechanisms (such as a constitutional court, civil society or media pressure) are incapable 
of solving the problem, the national law will be overwritten by international law and 
deficiencies in application of the law will be remedied to some extent by international 
apex courts. That applies both to individual rights infringements and structural 
problems. In this second scenario international law is invoked vis-à-vis a democratic 
nation state based on the rule of law and respecting fundamental rights, where there 
necessarily emerge some law-making mistakes or anomalies in the application of the law. 
In other cases with a chronic lack of capacity to solve systemic problems such as 
corruption, international norms and fora cannot remedy the problems, but can point to 
them and contribute to the domestic efforts tackling them. In this second scenario 
emphasis shall be placed on the various sub-elements of European values; Member States 
should be warned if these are at risk, in what concerns specific issues or themes; they 
shall receive an in-depth analysis of key problem areas; and particular care shall be taken 
not to rely on a standardised benchmarking system that could potentially veil or blurred 
problems in the subparts of democracy, and the rule of law or fundamental rights.  
 
There is also a third scenario, which is qualitatively different from the situations described 
in the previous points. In this last scenario domestic checks, all channels of internal 
criticism failed; there is a systemic breach of separation of powers, constitutional 
adjudication; there is a failure of the ordinary judiciary and the ombudsman system; and 
neither civil society nor the media is capable of fulfilling their watchdog functions. In a 
state which is off the track of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, only the 
control mechanism of international law including international courts protecting the rule 
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of law is left.325 Accordingly we regard international norms and enforcement mechanisms 
as external tools of militant democracy whereby the unrepresented are granted 
protection against their substandard representatives, against arbitrary use of power and 
mass violations of individual rights and freedoms when all domestic channels of criticism 
have been silenced and all domestic safeguards of democracy became inoperational – in 
other words, when the rule of law has been efficiently deconstructed in the national 
setting, i.e. when a Member State is in a state of constitutional capture,326 sometimes also 
referred to as constitutional overhaul327, or if it is on its way towards such a state, also 
referred to as rule of law backsliding.328 In such states no areas of social life remain intact 
and arbitrariness penetrates all state policies. 
 
Whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are singled out for the 
present analysis, the division of scenarios shall also be applicable to other European 
values, as well. The system developed could also include rule of law obstruction and 
weakening of the EU’s international presence through well-articulated actions preventing 
EU foreign policy from achieving its desired results.329  
 
Construction of an illiberal state cannot go unnoticed. It is quite apparent when a state 
departed from the concept of liberal democracies, especially when it openly propagates 
an alternative state structure. Even if it is not self-proclaimed, the steps taken clearly 
delineate the path towards an authoritarian regime. Still, an “I know it when I see it” 
approach is not viable,330 and will immediately be subject to criticism claiming the 
political and ideological nature of the attack. It is not easy to pinpoint the date and time 
when the line between the second and third scenarios has been crossed, and determine 
when an illiberal state is in the making. Benchmarking, indexing and an accordingly 
conducted “comparative analysis may overlook the building of a constitutional regime in 
which constitutional constraints on the exercise of political power evaporate, signs which 
point to clear departures from the global fold.”331  
 
                                                          
325 Cf. “[I]n contemporary Europe, some of the most important institutional checks on power are 
those exercised by the EU and the broader international community, rather than anything within 
Hungary itself.” Francis Fukuyama, ‘Do Institutions Really Matter?’ The American Interest, 23 
January 2012, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/01/23/do-institutions-
really-matter/#sthash.DOa5ys3f.dpuf. 
326 J.-W. Müller, Constitutional Patriotism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.  
327 Renata Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to 
Comparative Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary’ (2015) 13 I-CON 279–300, 282. 
328 J.-W. Müller, ‘Safeguarding Democracy inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order’ 
(2013) Working Paper No. 3 (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy).  
329 E. Basheska and D. Kochenov, ‘Thanking the Greeks. The Crisis of the Rule of Law in EU 
Enlargement Regulation’, April 2015, 39 Southeastern Europe 92–414 (2015). 
330 Justice Steward first used this now colloquial expression in relation to hard-core pornography in 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), at 197, explaining why the material at issue was not obscene 
and therefore protected by freedom of expression: “I shall not today attempt further to define the 
kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of ‘hard-core 
pornography’], and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see 
it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.” 
331 R. Uitz, ‘Can You Tell When and Illiberal Democracy Is in the Making? An Appeal to 
Comparative Constitutional Scholarship from Hungary’ 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law 
1, 279–300. (2015). 
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Measuring the severity of the violation will not help either: whereas the depth of the 
violation may be indicative, it is not necessarily decisive as to a systemic threat or breach: 
however grave the infringement, if there is a commitment to foundational values by the 
supranational entity or the state, it is meaningful to engage in a dialogue and remedy the 
situation. (Scenario 2)332 Instead a methodologically sound, objective annual EU 
Scoreboard mechanism may be of help to draw the borderline between the second and 
the third scenarios, i.e. indicate when the breaches of European values become 
qualitatively different from a set of individual violations.  
 
Graph 3: The three rule of law scenarios 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
4.7. Objectivity and equality 
A key challenge of any Scoreboard is how to preserve its autonomy and legitimacy when 
governments and the various EU institutions will accuse it of being ‘political’ and ‘non-
neutral’.  
 
In particular a country in a constitutional capture will question the validity of or simply 
disregard external criticism, and/or challenge the legitimacy of the critic, by claiming it 
acted ultra vires, without a mandate, or in violation of the vertical separation of powers. 
Therefore there should be a particularly strong emphasis on solid treaty bases, legitimacy 
and accountability. 
 
The challenge is even greater, since supervisory mechanisms for states in a constitutional 
capture include the introduction of proportionate, dissuasive and effective sanctions – 
                                                          
332 For an overview of the terms systemic threat, systemic violation and serious breach, see D. 
Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and 
Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015). 
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ultimately harsher measures than what Member States are used to in the arena of fluid 
European values, and therefore it is of utmost importance to be objective, not to apply 
double standards and establish institutions and procedures the legitimacy of which are 
beyond doubt.  
 
Examples for infringing single elements of European values as opposed to systemic threats 
and violations 
Display of insignia of totalitarian regimes 
Should a certain domestic legal institution contravene European standards, the rights of those 
effected may seriously be hampered. However if the rule of law is not systematically 
deconstructed, there will be mechanisms to remedy the situation. Remedies may include 
domestic ones, or if they fail, the individual steps of enforcement of ECtHR judgments 
through an impartial judiciary, and the general steps of enforcement through a lawmaker 
adhering to the rule of law, modifying black letter law. Vice versa, in a state where the rule of 
law is systematically deconstructed and is lacking an impartial judiciary the situation will not 
be remedied, and ECtHR judgments will not be properly enforced. This is no hypothetical 
scenario. 
Whereas there are tensions between several domestic jurisdictions and the Convention 
system,333 the Hungarian state refused to enforce a Strasbourg decision in an unprecedented 
way. The basis of the dispute was the case of János Fratanoló, member of the “Workers’ Party 
2006”, who was sentenced in a criminal proceeding for wearing a five pointed red star at the 
celebration organized on the occasion of Hungary’s EU accession and Workers’ Day.334 Based 
on its previous decision Vajnai v. Hungary with virtually the same fact pattern the ECtHR held 
Hungary to be in violation of Article 10 ECHR guaranteeing freedom of expression, for 
criminalizing wearing the red star. Had Hungary enforced Vajnai, the Fratanoló case would 
never have reached the Strasbourg court. But instead of enforcing the second judgment with 
the same findings, a Parliamentary Resolution disapproved of the Strasbourg judgment 
Fratanoló v. Hungary.335  
Resolution 58/2012 (VII.10) of the Hungarian Parliament pointed out that “the provision of 
the Criminal Code prohibiting the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes was adopted for the 
protection of the democratic social order, with a view to the country’s historical past, in line 
with principles which guarantee respect for human dignity and in compliance with the 
constitutional order. Therefore, Parliament disagreed with the judgment application No. 
29459/10 finding Hungary in violation of the Convention, the opinion of the ECtHR and with 
the amendment of the Criminal Code”. The Resolution also stated that the amount of 
compensation Hungary will be obliged to pay in the future due to the application of the 
Criminal Code’s relevant provision should be paid from the parties’ budget. In a laconic 
reasoning336 Parliament made reference to the Constitutional Court’s decision passed a decade 
                                                          
333 Ch. Grabenwarter, ‘Grundrechtsvielfalt und Grundrechtskonflikte im europäischen 
Mehrebenensystem – Wirkungen von EGMR-Urteilen und der Beurteilungsspielraum der 
Mitgliedstaaten’, 38 Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 8, 229–232 (2011). 
334 ECtHR, Fratanoló v Hungary, Application no. 29459/10, 3 November 2011. 
335 10 July 2012 Parliamentary Resolution 58/2012 (VII.10.) stated that the Parliament “does not 
agree with the modification of the Criminal Code”. 
336 Proposal for a Parliamentary Resolution, H/6854.  
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before the ECtHR judgments,337 which found the relevant provision of the Criminal Code to 
be in compliance with the Constitution. Without elaborating on the Resolution338 two 
comments need to be made here. First, the Vajnai and Fratanoló judgments do not suggest that 
the only way to guarantee compliance with the Convention is through the amendment of the 
Criminal Code. Instead the judgments give clear instructions on how the provision 
prohibiting the use of symbols of totalitarian regimes can be applied by the judiciary without 
infringing the Convention. Second, invoking the Constitutional Court’s decision rendered in 
the year 2000 as a justification for not amending the relevant provision of the Criminal Code is 
clearly mistaken because at the time it had no chance to take the later Vajnai and Fratanoló 
judgments into account. Indeed the Constitutional Court in 2013 reviewed its position and 
found – in heavy reliance to the the Strasbourg cases – that the criminal offense of using 
symbols of totalitarian regimes as formulated by the Criminal Code at the time violated the 
constitutional principle of legal certainty and freedom of expression.339 The invalidated 
provision was later replaced by introducing additional definitional elements: the use of 
symbols of totalitarian regimes in itself is insufficient to commit the crime, the display of 
symbols of totalitarian regimes is punishable only if done in a manner that is suitable for 
disturbing public peace, and in particular violates the dignity of victims or the memory of 
deceased victims of dictatorships.340 Despite the ending, the long saga of the Hungarian red 
star cases illustrates how states might attempt to delegitimize European supervisory 
mechanisms. 
 
Life imprisonment cases 
Sometimes the questioning of the Convention’s and the ECtHR’s authority is more subtle. In a 
more recent case, the Hungarian system of life imprisonment without parole was challenged 
and held to be in violation of the Convention in Magyar v Hungary.341 In a series of relevant 
judgments the Hungarian Constitutional Court342 and the Supreme Court343 proved that they 
were neither capable of enforcing European standards, nor of complying with European 
review mechanisms. The former erfused to decide on the constitutionality of the Hungarian 
life imprisonment regime in the merits, and the latter instructed ordinary courts not to 
directly consider the Convention, but apply domestic law instead,344 even if in clear 
                                                          
337 Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 14/2000 (V. 12.) 
338 For a detailed analysis of the legal, moral, and political implications of the nonenforcement of 
the Fratanoló judgment see P. Bárd, ‘The Non-enforcement of Strasbourg Decisions and Its 
Consequences’ ,in J. Busch and K. Lachmayer et al. (eds.), International Constitutional Law in Legal 
Education. Proceedings of the Erasmus IP NICLAS 2007–2012, International and Comparative Public 
Law Series (Schriften zum Internationalen und Vergleichenden Öffentlichen Recht) (Vienna: 
Nomos, 2013), 8, or in greater detail P. Bárd, ‘Strasbourg v Hungary’, in: Kriminológiai 
Közlemények, Budapest: Magyar Kriminológiai Társaság, 2012, 145–204. 
339 Hungarian Constitutional Court, HCC Decision No. 4/2013 (II. 21.). 
340 See Act XLVIII of 2013 introducing Article 335 into the Criminal Code, i.e. Act C of 2012. 
341 ECtHR, Magyar v Hungary, Application no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014. 
342
 Hungarian Constitutional Court, HCC Resolution 3013/2015. (I. 27.) 
343 Resolution No. 3/2015 concerning the uniformity of criminal law. 
344 See Article 109 of Act LXXII of 2014, which inserted a new subtitle on the mandatory pardon 
proceeding of persons sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of conditional release, 
Articles 46/A-46/H into Act CCXL of 2013. 
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contradiction of Strasbourg tests.345 The Supreme Court insisted that life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole is allowed by international law, and that the ECtHR case law, 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court’sdecision or the above mentioned Magyar decision do 
not offer reasons to depart from domestic law. This statement is difficult to interpret, since the 
Constitutional Court did not pass a judgment in the merits, whereas the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is in clear contradiction with the rules, even the ones that were adopted after 
the Magyar judgment was rendered by the ECtHR. 
 
Principles of objectivity, non-discrimination and equal treatment of the entities 
scrutinised is the foundation of every Scoreboard. Acting to the contrary and using 
double standards will delegitimise the efforts of any new EU rule of law scoreaboard. As 
the current pre-Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland, and inaction vis-à-vis Hungary 
proved, additional procedural difficulties arise, if rule of law backsliders multiply and 
backing up for each other prevent an Article 7(2) mechanism requiring unanimity to be 
triggered. (For the details see Chapter 1.6.) 
 
4.8. A EU Rule of Law Commission  
The institutional framework behind the Scoreboard shall reflect this objectivity. The 
proposal to establish a ‘EU Rule of Law Commission’ as an independent body of scholars 
should be seriously considered. The EU Rule of Law Commission could be placed at the 
centre of the EU Rule of Law Scoreboard. The FRA should not play that role due to its 
high degree of dependence on EU Member States and the high degree of politicization, 
which is linked to the performance of its tasks and activities in a context of contested 
legal competences between EU and domestic arenas. The selection and organizational 
model could follow the one currently utilized in actors like the Venice Commission and 
the CEPEJ. Yet particular attention should be paid to the academic and independent 
nature of the members.  
 
The EU Rule of Law Commission shall make a context-specific assessment in light of data 
available or call for the need to gather extra information on EU issue-specific questions. 
The possibility to conduct country visits (following the UN Special Rapporteurs model) 
could also be envisaged. As a FRA pilot study has shown, it is easier to agree on 
standards for laws, institutions (structures) and policies (processes), but it is close to 
impossible to agree on how to assess the situation on the ground (outcome).346 The 
malevolent interpretation is that standards on structures and processes are easier to 
comply with, whereas states do not wish to subject themselves to a scrutiny on the truly 
decisive issue, which is the translation of promises into practice. A more benevolent 
                                                          
345 For the saga see P. Bárd, The Hungarian life imprisonment regime in front of apex courts I. - The 
findings of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court, 18 June 2015, 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/blog/2015/06/the-hungarian-life-imprisonment-hu and P. Bárd, The 
Hungarian life imprisonment regime in front of apex courts II. - The findings of the Kúria (Supreme 
Court), 18 June 2015, http://jog.tk.mta.hu/blog/2015/06/the-hungarian-life-imp-hu. 
346 Promoting the rule of law in the European Union. FRA SYMPOSIUM REPORT, 4th Annual FRA 
Symposium, Vienna, 7 June 2013, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-4th-annual-
symposium-report.pdf; Presentation by Gabriel Toggenburg, Senior Legal Advisor, European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights at the LIBE Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs meeting on 10/12/2015. 
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approach may acknowledge however that assessment of outcomes is context-specific to 
an extreme extent and therefore need a nuanced analysis that prevents the use of 
generalised standards. For this reason, the UN model of well-established working 
relationships/close partnerships with national Human Rights Authorities and civil 
society organisations should be pursued.  
 
An EU Rule of Law Commission could draw up Annual (Country Specific) Reports on 
the basis of available and additional materials.347  
 
The Annual Report shall point to the strengths and weaknesses, and suggest specific 
ways to overcome them. This exercise would not ‘track’ or rank EU Member States, 
which is a typical method in benchmarking methodologies.348 Whereas it may make 
sense with regard to macroeconomics (even though one should be aware of the 
methodological traps and limitations even in an area, which is more comfortably 
operating with figures), the contextualization and standardization of a rule of law 
assessment shall be a much more nuanced exercise and particular care shall be taken not 
to rely on a standardised benchmarking system that could potentially veil or blur 
problems in the subparts of EU values. Democracy, and to a greater and lesser extent 
respectively the rule of law and fundamental rights, are fluid concepts and phenomena, 
and there is no single ideal formula for achieving them. Therefore, we argue against 
designing the standards according to indicators – a rather dubious exercise that can easily 
be attacked as politically or ideologically biased.  
 
4.9. Matching the tools to the needs: establishing a two-prong 
mechanism 
The EU Rule of Law Commission shall monitor EU laws, policies, institutions and bodies, 
and institutions shall make use of existing procedures, the CJEU having a final say.  
 
In the following we focus on Member States. Tools and institutional design shall be 
adjusted to the needs, and accordingly the Scoreboard shall establish a two-prong 
mechanism for Member States ‘on track’ and ‘off the track’ of the rule of law.  
 
In both the first and second scenarios described above, i.e. when international 
mechanisms are used for upholding and promoting European values, remedying some 
breaches of single elements of European values or reversing the trends in the 
deterioration of some sub-elements of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights, the Scoreboard mechanism may follow a “‘sunshine policy’, which engages and 
involves rather than paralyses and excludes”, and where value-control “is owned equally 
                                                          
347 Promoting the rule of law in the European Union. FRA SYMPOSIUM REPORT, 4th Annual FRA 
Symposium, Vienna, 7 June 2013, http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2013-4th-annual-
symposium-report.pdf. 
348 It would therefore be different from MEP Sophie in ‘t Veld’s suggestion about a traffic light 
system ‘scoreboarding’ Member States in a way similar to the European semester for the Eurozone. 
The difference lies exactly in the way of assessment, as we argued against relying on indicators and 
benchmarking exclusively. Seminar of 4 February 2015, ALDE presenting the EU Democratic 
Governance Pact. 
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by all actors”.349  
 
More specifically, the first two scenarios could be distinguished. The first scenario may 
result in inaction of the institutions, whereas in the second scenario the FRA and/or the 
Commission could be the facilitators of such a debate on systemic problems with regard to 
European values in the second scenario, with the Council, the European Parliament and 
preferably national parliaments being given a role as well. That would on the one hand 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of the procedure and on the other hand be justified by 
a very profound reason for an inter-institutional arrangement: it is simply more difficult 
to ‘trick’ more than one institution. In this second scenario, the Member States adhere to 
the rule of law, accept internal and external forms of criticism, and therefore respond well 
to concerns formulated by the EU. Not only at the end of the annual cycle, but also 
throughout the year, the EU Rule of Law Commission shall have the right to alert the 
Commission about a potential case for an infringement procedure. The current 
mechanism available seems to be sufficient if fully exploited (as suggested above in 
Chapter 1.4), and there is no need to insert another level in between or to create a novel 
process preceding the infringement proceeding. These are only needed – as a second best 
option – if there is no political will on the side of the Commission to exploit the potential 
in Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, and other Member States do not take over the role initially 
foreseen for the Commission.350  
 
In this second scenario, it may be useful to disentangle the interrelated values of 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Whereas there are attempts to 
capture all European values including democracy and the rule of law in the rights 
language,351 there are skeptical voices with regard to an understanding of fundamental 
rights encompassing all values that could be associated with the good life.352 Maintaining 
the distinction is particularly useful at this point, since infringement in this second 
scenario typically affects fundamental rights, whereas other mechanisms exist in Europe 
to tackle fundamental rights problems. Apart from obvious and external fora, such as the 
EctHR, for example, in the EU setting national courts (ordinary and constitutional courts) and 
the Court of Justice of the EU shall play a decisive role, both with regard to interim 
measures and overall remedies.  
 
The third scenario – which is the trigger for the attempts to tackle the Copenhagen 
dilemma and also for the present Research Paper – is fundamentally different from the 
first two, and therefore the methodology of the Scoreboard shall introduce a second 
                                                          
349 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
350 D. Kochenov, ‘Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to 
Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool’, 7 The Hague Journal of the Rule of Law 2. 153–174 
(2015), 153. 
351 G.N. Toggenburg and J. Grimheden, The Rule of Law and the Role of Fundamental Rights: 
Seven Practical Pointers, in C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in 
the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), forthcoming. 
352 Interviewees underlined this important point. See also C. Closa, D. Kochenov and J. H. H. 
Weiler, ‘Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union’ (2014) RSCAS Working 
Paper No. 25/2014. 
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prong accordingly. When a State systematically undermines democracy, deconstructs the 
rule of law and engages in massive human right violations, there is no reason to presume 
the good intentions of those in power to engage in a sunshine approach involving a 
dialogue and soft measures in order to make the entity return to the concept of limited 
government – a notion that those in power wished to abandon in the first place.  
 
The first challenge lies in identifying the point when a Member State enters or is on the 
path towards the third phase, and to remedy the situation. It is under this Scenario that 
the systemic infringement proceedings, the EU Rule of Law Mechanism or Article 7 TEU 
would come in. All these procedures have – and we assume all future mechanisms will 
have – a discussion phase, where the Member State in question can present its views on 
its laws, policies and their realisation in practice. The Scoreboard could guide the 
discussion and make the process foreseeable and transparent. The discussion could still 
be led by an inter-institutional arrangement/agreement, with the FRA and/or the 
Commission taking the lead.  
 
Once a case-by-case contextual assessment proves the need for a supervisory mechanism 
is established in the third scenario, a further challenge lies is the creation of mechanisms 
in addition to the only – and, as it presently stands, inefficient – one available: Article 7 
TEU. Should there be no wilingness to make use of Article 7, the new mechanism should 
have both a preventive arm to prevent a State from taking the first step down a slippery 
slope and abandoning European values, and a sanctioning arm via proportionate, 
dissuasive and effective punishment of the ones which are already slipping to the 
bottom.353  
 
Finally, the mechanism’s speed of operation shall not be so great as to be a detriment to 
the quality of the assessment and monitoring; nevertheless, a timely response is 
necessary. As a main rule, the Scoreboard has an annual cycle, but steps may have to be 
taken at shorter intervals. Firm, immediate action is needed against rule of law 
backsliders, so as to prevent detrioration and also the phenomenon becoming contagious 
– and vice versa, tolerance towards or lack of consequences following the establishment 
of illiberal governments will encourage other Member States to follow. A speedy 
proceeding protects the individual against the State, so that the latter does not continue 
the violation, potentially resulting in greater or even irreversible harm. A speedy 
assessment proceeding also has pragmatic advantages: Member States will not have time 
to amend their problematic laws or change their practices and demand that the new 
situation shall trigger another mechanism, thereby gaining time to continue their 
practices in violation of EU values. 
 
Prisoners’ voting rights and the contagious nature of rule of law backsliding 
In trying the Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2) case,354 the ECtHR declared in its 2005 
judgment that the indiscriminate stripping of voting rights for persons sentenced to prison 
violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The ECtHR laid down a number of 
                                                          
353 For a division between measures sanctioning and promoting the rule of law, see C. Hillion, 
‘Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU’, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov, Reinforcing the Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming. 
354 ECtHR, Hirst v the United Kingdom, Application no. 74025/01, 6 October 2005 
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criteria to be met when depriving prioners of their voting right: the decision on 
disenfranchisement should be taken by a judge; the judge shall consider the specific 
circumstances of the case; and there shall be a link between the crime committed and issues 
relating to elections and democratic institutions.  
Five years later, after Applicant complained of being denied he right to participate at the 
Europeany Parliamentary elections, in Greens and MT v the United Kingdom355 in a pilot 
judgment the ECtHR called upon the respondent state to make legislative amendments to 
comply with the Hirst judgment.  
Almost four years passed, until Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom356 was decided. 
Applicants were ten prisoners who, again as an automatic consequence of their convictions 
and sentences of imprisonment, were unable to vote in the 2009 European Parliamentary 
elections. Whereas the Court recognised the United Kingdom’s intention to comply with the 
Strasbourg court’s expectations in the form of a draft bill and the report of the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee appointed to examine the bill, the UK was again found to be in violation of 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, given the fact that the case was identical to Greens and M.T. and the 
legislative environment did not change. 
A few month later 1015 prisoners’ cases were decided in McHugh and Others v. the United 
Kingdom,357 who, as an automatic consequence of their convictions and detention pursuant to 
sentences of imprisonment, were unable to vote in elections. The ECtHR found the UK again 
to be in violation of the Convention. 
Most recently in December 2015 the Committee of Ministers adopted an Interim Resolution 
deciding to resume consideration of the United Kingdom’s prisoners’ voting rights cases in 
December 2016 the latest.358 
The contagious nature of human rights violations, especially if they remain without 
consequences is very apparent in the series of voting rights cases against other respondent 
states after the United Kingdom failed to enforce Hirst. Whereas “the [debated] principle of 
solidarity implies that the case-law of the Court forms part of the Convention, thus extending 
the legally binding force of the Convention erga omnes”,359 non-enforcement works in the 
opposite direction, and instead of learning from each other’ mistakes, state parties will follow 
each other’s stance with regard to ECHR violations and non-enforcement of Strasbourg 
judgments. This may have disastrous consequences. As Council of Europe Human Rights 
Commissioner Nils Muižnieks in his Observations for the Joint Committee on the UK Draft 
Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill: “continued non-compliance would have far-reaching 
deleterious consequences; it would send a strong signal to other member states, some of 
which would probably follow the UK’s lead and also claim that compliance with certain 
judgments is not possible, necessary or expedient. That would probably be the beginning of 
                                                          
355 ECtHR, Greens and MT v the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 
November 2010. 
356 ECtHR, Firth and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications nos. 47784/09, 47806/09, 47812/09, 
47818/09, 47829/09, 49001/09, 49007/09, 49018/09, 49033/09 and 49036/09, 12 August 2014. 
357 ECtHR, McHugh and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 51987/08 and 1,014 others, 10 
February 2015. 
358 Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2015)251  Execution of the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights  Hirst and three other cases against the United Kingdom, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 9 December 2015  at the 1243rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.  
359 Parliamentary Assembly, Assembly debate on 28 September 2000 (30th Sitting) (see Doc. 8808, 
report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Jurgens). Text 
adopted by the Assembly on 28 September 2000 (30thSitting). 
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the end of the ECHR system, which is at the core of the Council of Europe.”360 Acknowledging 
the fatal effects of non-compliance he went so far as to prefer withdrawal to non-execution: “I 
think that any member state should withdraw from the Council of Europe rather than defy 
the Court by not executing judgments.”  
Indeed, a series of cases show the disease spreading. In Frodl v. Austria,361 the ECtHR 
acknowledged that unlike UK legislation, the Austrian National Assembly Election Act is not 
depriving prisoners indiscriminately and automatically of their voting rights, still, the 
national law did not meet all criteria laid down in Hirst, and therefore Austria was also found 
to be in violation of the Convention. 
In Söyler v. Turkey362 the Applicant, a person convicted for unpaid cheques was not allowed to 
exercise his right to vote, neither while being detained in prison, nor after his conditional 
release. The ECtHR held Turkey to be in violation of th Convention, due to the automatic and 
indiscriminate nature of the rights limitation, where the legislation did not allow to take in 
account the nature or gravity of the offence, the length of the prison sentence or the prisoner’s 
individual conduct or circumstances.  
In Murat Vural v. Turkey363 the ECtHR repeated that the Turkish system did not comply with 
the requirements laid down in Hirst, furthermore it also observed that the Applicant’s 
deprivation of his right to vote continued after his conditional release from prison.  
Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia364 was different from the above cases in that deprivation of 
voting rights was constitutionally entrenched. The ECtHR again found a violation of the 
Convention, but due to the difficulty of amending the Constitution, the Court held that Russia 
could enforce the judgment by way of some form of political process or by interpreting the 
Constitution in line with the Convention and the attached case-law. 
But the Russian legislator went further than just referring to the UK stance in prisoners’ 
voting rights cases,365 and passed a law which allows the Russian Constitutional Court to 
declare rulings of international bodies – including the ECtHR or the UN Human Rights 
Committee – ‘impossible to implement’, in clear violation of Article 46 ECHR and rendering 
the Convention system meaningless.366 
 
Graph 4: The three rule of law scenarios and the institutional actors 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
                                                          
360 N. Muižnieks, Memorandum – Observations for the Joint Committee on the Draft Voting 
Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill, Strasbourg, 10 October 2013 
361 ECtHR, Frodl v. Austria, Application no. 20201/04, 8 April 2010 
362 ECtHR, Söyler v. Turkey, Application no. 29411/07, 17 September 2013 
363 ECtHR, Murat Vural v. Turkey, Application no. 9540/07, 21 October 2014 
364 ECtHR, Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, Application no. 11157/04, 4 July 2013  
365 Ph. Leach and A. Donald, Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading?, EJIL Analysis, 19 
December 19, 2015, http://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/.  
366 Id.; Putin signs law allowing Russia to overturn rulings of international rights courts, Reuters, 15 
December 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-court-putin-
idUSKBN0TY17H20151215.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 7: The three rule of law scenarios and responding mechanisms  
Scenarios 
Type of 
measure 
Typology of 
instruments 
EU Rule of 
Law 
Commission’s 
output 
EU institutional 
actors 
Supranational 
procedures 
 
FIRST SCENARIO 
EU or Member 
States with no 
substantive 
problems 
(‘on track’) 
Sunshine approach, 
debate, dialogue, 
value co-ownership 
Debate, dialogue, 
monitoring, 
evaluation, 
benchmarking 
Annual Report  
n/a n/a 
SECOND 
SCENARIO 
Problems with 
regard to the sub-
elements of EU 
values: typically but 
not exclusively 
fundamental rights  
(‘on track’ with need 
for improvement) 
Sunshine approach, 
debate, dialogue, 
value co-ownership 
Debate, dialogue, 
monitoring, 
evaluation, 
benchmarking 
Annual Report  
 
+ 
 
Suggestions to 
instigate Pre-
Article 7 
procedure  
 
+  
 
Suggestions to 
start 
infringement 
procedures 
 
FRA and/or the 
Commission as 
facilitators of such a 
debate on systemic 
problems, with the 
Council, the European 
Parliament and 
preferably national 
parliaments being 
given a role as well. 
With regard to rights 
infringements, 
national and European 
courts shall play a 
role 
Pre-Article 7 
+ 
Infringement 
procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
THIRD SCENARIO 
Systemic domestic 
problems: typically 
but not exclusively 
rule of law problems 
No dialogue Supervision 
Annual Report  
 
+ 
 
Suggestions to 
FRA and/or the 
Commission as 
facilitators of such a 
debate on systemic 
problems, with the 
Article 7 
+ 
Systemic 
infringement 
procedures 
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(‘off track’) instigate Article 7 
procedure  
 
+  
 
Suggestions to 
start systemic 
infringement 
procedures 
 
Council, the European 
Parliament and 
preferably national 
parliaments being 
given a role as well. 
With regard to rights 
infringements, 
national and European 
courts shall play a 
role 
+ 
Article 7 TEU 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
Threat/risk 
(“rule of law 
backsliding”, i.e. “on 
the way to 
constitutional 
capture”) 
(Effective threat of 
an) efficient 
sanction to prevent 
Prevention, 
sanctioning 
  Article 7(1) 
procedure 
+ 
Systemic 
infringement 
procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
Breach 
(“constitutional 
capture”) 
Efficient sanction to 
stop 
Sanctioning 
  Article 7(2)-(3) 
procedure 
+ 
Systemic 
infringement 
procedures 
+ 
ECtHR proceedings 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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4.10. Acquisition of information and data, reversal of the burden of 
proof  
While many pieces of information can be gathered via existing mechanisms, there might 
be additional information and data needed. One of the important ways to ensure that 
information and data which are provided by Member States regarding their compliance 
with rule of law, democracy and human rights is using appropriate mechanisms to test 
and challenge that information and data. One of the problems with all information 
assessment exercises is the difficulty of determining the accuracy of information 
provided by actors who have vested interests in certain outcomes. Often in good faith, 
State officials provide summaries of their compliance with international human rights 
commitments which miss important elements. This can happen as a result of a number of 
failings – oversight is of course one. There is also the need to be sufficiently succinct. 
Also, a State official might fail to understand or take seriously the gravity of the 
information which he or she is seeking for a report to a supervisory body. Another reason 
for incomplete data can be that other ministries have failed to respond or respond fully 
on a subject, or subsidiary levels of governance have failed to provide the necessary 
information. There is always the question of (in)action arising out of bad faith, but in 
such circumstances very strenuous mechanisms need to be in place to sanction such 
(in)action. 
 
One of the ways in which supervisory bodies are able to test the accuracy of information 
which State authorities provide is by soliciting information from a wide range of sources 
in order to assess whether there is a wide divergence between what, for instance, 
specialist civil society actors have to say about compliance with democracy, the rule of 
law and human rights, and what the State authorities have to say. A case in point are the 
UN Treaty bodies studied in Section 1.2 above.  
 
Among the methods available to supervisory bodies is checking information provided by 
the State against any related judicial proceedings. Often, State authorities’ legal services 
provide very detailed information to their courts in challenges regarding the key 
principles, which may be divergent from the information provided to supranational 
authorities. The European Court of Human Rights is very aware of this issue and 
requires all information provided to the lower courts be made available to it as well. 
Secondly, State authorities are not always consistent in the information which they 
provide to different supervisory bodies at the national, supranational and international 
levels. Any EU body should ensure that it peruses carefully all the submissions of State 
authorities to national, supranational and international supervisory bodies in the context 
of the issue in question.  
 
All EU Member States have official bodies responsible for fundamental rights protection. 
These include ombudspersons, mediators, fundamental rights protection supervisors, etc. 
All of these bodies should be consulted to ensure the accuracy of information and data 
provided by State authorities. A central role in this regard might be given to the FRA, 
which has a mandate in respect of fundamental rights. The EU Ombudsperson’s Office, 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the Article 29 Working Party 
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should be closely associated with the project and have mandates to participate fully and 
make recommendations to the body. 
 
There any many international and national human rights civil society bodies which 
produce detailed reports on the condition of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights in the Member States. Due regard should be paid to these sources of information, 
which often provide an invaluable tool in making assessments.  
 
The existence of inconsistencies between information and data provided by State 
authorities and information and data gleaned from other sources must be subject to a 
rigorous evaluation standard. The EU is based on the principle of loyal cooperation 
between its Member States and its institutions and this duty of loyalty is central to the 
successful operation of the whole system. Thus identifying challenges and providing an 
instrument for Member States to respond to criticism and divergent information is 
essential. The burden of proof in establishing the relevant facts in respect of any matter 
concerning democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights must be spelt out. Due 
respect for the loyalty of the Member States must be the starting principle, but where 
contradictory information is revealed, the Member State must be fulfil its duty to provide 
an explanation and that explanation must be subject to anxious scrutiny.  
 
The standard of proof to trigger a further investigation must also be set at the level of 
anxious scrutiny of the respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – a 
level which is substantially higher than a balance of probabilities and certainly the 
opposite of the criminal law standard. As soon as there is a reasonable doubt that the 
requirements have been fulfilled and that the information provided accurately reveals the 
correct situation, the burden of proof should – following the UN model – shift to the 
Member State authorities to satisfy the body that their actions are consistent with the 
principles. Such a shifting of burden of proof is common in EU law.367 Under this 
scenario the burden of proof would shift to the Member State(s) concerned.  
 
4.11. Follow-up mechanism and efficient sanctions  
There was a general agreement between interviewees that a follow-up mechanism was 
needed, such as the Committee of Ministers in the framework of the Council of Europe 
overseeing Strasbourg judgments. After problems – whether individual or systemic – 
have been identified, there shall be regular assessment and a special procedure on 
compliance and follow-up with recommendations. The supervisory prong of the 
Scoreboard would however need to go beyond that. 
 
                                                          
367 See for instance Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin   and Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. Article 10 (1) and Article 8(1) state that Member States shall take such 
measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when 
persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been 
applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be 
presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to 
prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
 PE 579.328  126 
Promotion of the rule of law as foreseen in the Treaties with respect to current368 and 
prospective Member States369 is in close correlation with the possibility of effective 
sanctioning of rule of law violations – especially if systemic, persistent or serious.370 As is 
apparent from the state of the art and the depreciation of rule of law values, enforcement 
is the weak side of the existing legal framework overseeing European values – including 
the Article 7 mechanism or general infringement procedures according to Articles 258-
260 TFEU. Enforcement with effective sanctions is also the weak side of suggestions by 
EU institutions and academic proposals.371  
 
The highly probable failure of both naming and shaming, and also of a more positive 
discursive approach, shall be acknowledged: an illiberal State is unlikely to be persuaded 
to return to EU values by way of diplomatic attacks, political criticism, discussions and 
dialogue. Proposals “adding bite to the bark”372 therefore typically point to the power of 
the purse, i.e. operate with quasi-economic sanctions, such as the suspension, 
withholding or deduction of EU funds, or pecuniary sanctions.373 Whereas pecuniary 
sanctions may be effective with regard to all Member States, for the time being the power 
of the purse could be particularly strong, as paradoxically the main rule of law 
backsliders are countries which are net beneficiaries of European integration. Freezing 
EU funds in their case would also put an end to the paradox of using EU money to build 
authoritarian regimes in denial of EU values. 
 
4.12. Legal basis  
Concerning the legal basis dilemma, we have several options under the current Treaty 
framework to set up an EU Rule of Law Commission as a consultative body. 
                                                          
368 See especially Article 3 (1) TEU: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-
being of its peoples”; and Article 13 (1) TEU: “The Union shall have an institutional framework 
which shall aim to promote its values”. 
369 See Article 49(1) TEU. 
370 It shall be clarified whether or not the meanings of the different wordings in Article 7 TEU 
referring to a “serious and persistent breach”, in the Commission’s proposal addressing instances 
of “systemic threat to the rule of law”, and in Barroso’s reference to situations of “serious, systemic 
risks” to the rule of law are identical, and the extent to which they overlap. J.M.D. Barroso, State of 
the Union address 2013, European Parliament, 11 September 2013, Speech/13/684. 
371 D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric 
and Reality’, 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 512–540 (2015), 528. 
372 W. Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, EU Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ 16 
Columbia Journal of European Law 3, 385–426 (2010). 
373 K.L. Scheppele, Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement 
Procedures, in: C. Closa and D. Kochenov (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European 
Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, forthcoming; K.L. Scheppele, ‘The EU 
Commission v. Hungary: The Case for the “Systemic Infringement Action,”’ Assizes de la Justice, 
European Commission, November 2013, at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-
2013/files/contributions/45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversi
on_en.pdf and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Making Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment on 
Commission v Hungary, Case C-288/12’ Eutopia, 29 April 2014, 
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-infringement-procedures-more-effective-a-comment-
on-commission-v-hungary-case-c-28812-8-april-2014-grand-chamber/. Building on the above 
suggestions, see also J.-W. Müller, Why the EU Needs a Democracy and Rule of Law Watchdog, 
Aspen Review 2/015, http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/en/article/2-2015-why-the-eu-needs-a-
democracy-and-rule-of-law-watchdog/. 
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First, the option of an inter-institutional agreement without any further legal basis shall 
be considered. There is evidence to suggest that reviewing Member States from a rule of 
law perspective did not require a firm legal basis in the past. It is worth noting that the 
'Wise Men' evaluating Austria back in 2000 received their mandate on the basis of an 
addendum to the statement of the European Council in Feira dated 19-20 June 2000, on 
the basis of which then Council President and Portuguese Prime Minister António 
Guterres was given a mandate to request the President of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Luzius Wildhaber, to appoint three persons to carry out the task of drawing up a 
report on certain aspects of the situation in Austria.374 The obvious difference is that the 
Austrian scrutiny was conducted on an ad hoc basis, whereas the EU Rule of Law 
Commission shall be a permanent consultative entity, therefore the legal basis shall 
preferably be more solid. An interinstitutional agreement is one option. 
 
Second, Article 352 TFEU (former Article 308) constitutes the foundations for Regulation 
168/2007 establishing the FRA.375 There is therefore a precedent in its use. Article 352 
TFEU can cover Union action "within the framework of the policies defined in the 
Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties", with the exception of the 
common foreign and security policy. The procedure would however require unanimity 
in the Council, on a proposal by the Commission and the consent by the EP. 
 
It shall be noted that a Declaration was attached to the FRA mandate by the Council: "The 
Council considers that neither the Treaties nor the Regulation establishing the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights precludes the possibility for the Council to seek the assistance of 
the future European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights when deciding to obtain from 
independent persons a report on the situation in a Member State within the meaning of Article 7 
TEU when the Council decides that the conditions of Article 7 TEU are met."376 The mentioned 
‘independence’ of the experts is the weak point of any FRA appointment. As argued in 
Chapter 4.7. for such a group to be truly independent these persons should be also 
independent from the FRA due to limitations in its current mandate and its dependency on 
EU Member States' governments.  
 
The FRA also counts with a research network FRANET,377 but they only provide 'data' or 
research under very specific terms of reference drafted by the FRA, and the results are 
                                                          
374 The three persons appointed were (in alphabetical order) Martti Ahtisaari, former President of 
Finland, Professor Jochen Frowein, Director of the Max-Planck Institute at Heidelberg, former 
member and Vice-President of the European Commission of Human Rights, and Marcelino Oreja, 
former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
former member of the Commission of the European Communities. The three appointees reported 
directly to the State holding the Presidency of the European Union, in this case the French 
President Jacques Chirac. 
See e.g. W. Hummer, The End of EU Sanctions against Austria – A Precedent for New Sanctions 
Procedures?, The European Legal Forum, Issue 2-2000/1, 77–152; F. Schorkopf, Die Maßnahmen 
der XIV EU-Mitgliedstaaten gegen Österreich, Berlin: Springer, 2002; E. Busek, M. Schauer (Hrsg.), 
Die "Sanktionen" der Vierzehn gegen Österreich im Jahr 2000. Analysen und Kommentare, Wien, 
Köln, Weimer: Böhlau, 2003, 537. 
375 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights. 
376 Council of the European Union, Addendum to the draft minutes, 2781st meeting of the Council 
of the European Union (JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS), held in Brussels on 15 February 2007, 27 
February 2007. 
377 http://fra.europa.eu/en/research/franet 
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later presented and assessed in line with the FRA’s discretionary wishes, i.e. not in a 
foreseeable, independent and objective process.  
 
The FRA's organisational structure also includes a Scientific Committee composed of 
eleven independent persons, highly qualified, whose terms of office is not renewable. 
  Members are appointed after responding to a transparent call and a selection procedure 
conducted by the FRA Management Board after having consulted the competent 
committee of the European Parliament. Candidates cannot serve on both the 
Management Board and the Scientific Committee at the same time, furthermore the 
Committee has to have a balanced geographical representation. These are prerequisities 
and rules ensuring the objectivity of the Committee.378 The Scientific Committee thus is 
a candidate for fulfilling the role of the EU Rule of Law Commission. However, there are 
strong reasons against entrusting the FRA or the FRA Scientific Committee with such a 
mandate. First, as argued in Chapter 4.7. autonomy and legitimacy of the entity can only 
be preserved, if governments and the various EU institutions cannot accuse it of being 
‘political’ and ‘non-neutral’, and therefore any such body shall be detached from EU 
institutions and bodies. Second, whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights are closely interrelated, they cannot be used as synonyms, and shown in Chapter 
4.9. there are strong benefits in keeping these apart. 
 
Third, alternatively, or in parallel, the implementation of Article 70 TFEU could also be 
used. This article would give a sound entry point in an area, which is specific to EU law, 
namely mutual recognition. As proven above in Chapter 3.1., the principle of mutual 
recognition will work deficiently or become inoperational, if its foundations in the EU 
legal system are not on based on solid grounds. For instance, the existence of 
independent national judicial authorities to carry out an assessment on the rebuttable 
presumption of 'mutual trust' set by the Luxembourg Court379 is a sine qua non of the 
system, and the existence of such fora needs to be checked. 
 
Article 70 TFEU would lead to a Council-driven evaluation procedure in collaboration 
with the Commission. As suggested by Mitsilegas, Carrera and Eisele the model to follow 
here could be the new evaluation system on Schengen adopted in October 2013, making 
use of Article 70 TFEU for the first time.380  
                                                          
378
 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, Articles 12 and 14. 
379 Court of Justice of the European Union, C-411/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for Home Department 
[2010] OJ C 274/21; and C-493/10, M.E. v Refugee Applications Commissioner [2011] OJ C 13/18, 21 
December 2011. 
380 “following the template provided by the new 2013 Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, in which 
the European Parliament has played a role in the decision-making and implementation. This 
template should be followed at times of implementing any future system for criminal justice 
cooperation.” 
V. Mitsilegas, S. Carrera and K. Eisele, The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal 
Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal 
Justice area?, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 74 / December 2014, 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/end-transitional-period-police-and-criminal-justice-measures-
adopted-lisbon-treaty-who, 3 and 34.  
 PE 579.328  129 
“The new Schengen evaluation mechanism foreseen in Regulation 1053/2013 
provides a ‘template’ to be used in future implementation of Article 70 TFEU in 
the field of criminal justice cooperation, in particular when it comes to the 
increased involvement of the European Parliament in the decision-making 
process of EU law instruments focused on evaluation, as well as regards its role 
in the evaluation system itself and its access to information and documents in 
respect of the (annual and multiannual) evaluation results of Member States’ 
practical implementation of EU law, including those cases where serious 
deficiencies have been identified. This includes the requirement by the European 
Commission to inform the European Parliament of follow-up and monitoring on 
regular basis as well as the adoption of any improvement measures. (…) Finally, 
the latter Regulation foresees an annual reporting by the Commission before the 
European Parliament.”381 (footnotes ommitted) 
 
In order to ensure objectivity and impartiality the EU Rule of Law Commission 
independent from the Council shall be set up feeding into the general evaluation 
mechanism via the EU Scoreboard. Moreover, following the wording of this provision, 
the EP and national parliaments would be informed of the content and results.  
Any new system could give priority to thematic areas where concerns or more 
important challenges have been so far identified. (…) Special attention should 
indeed be paid to issues such as pre-trial detention, the basis for the 
implementation of the Framework Decision on the cross-border execution of 
judgments in the EU involving deprivation of liberty (transfer of prisoners 
system), or the uneven and differentiated practical implementation of the rights 
of suspects in police detention and criminal proceedings across the Union. 
Another priority area should be better ensuring the quality/independence of 
justice (principle of separation of powers), for instance, in what concerns the 
existence of sufficient impartial controls over the necessity and proportionality of 
the decisions on the issuing and execution of EAWs.”382 (footnotes ommitted) 
 
Fourth, the Court of Justice could get involved, in particularly at times of determining 
what is a systematic rule of law deficiencies. The EU Rule of Law Framework 
Communication by the Commission on page 7 states that "The main purpose of the 
Framework is to address threats to the rule of law (as defined in Section 2) which are of a 
systemic nature".383 No definition of the notion systematic deficiencies is given. In 
footnote 18 in the same page it is confusingly stated that  
"With regard to the notion of "systemic deficiencies" in complying with 
fundamental rights when acting within the scope of EU law, see, for example, 
Joined Cases C-411/10 and 493/10, N.S., not yet published, para 94 and 106; 
and Case C-4/11, Germany v Kaveh Puid, not yet published, para 36. With 
                                                                                                                                                               
Council of the European Union, Addendum to the draft minutes, 2781st meeting of the Council of 
the European Union (JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS), held in Brussels on 15 February 2007, 27 
February 2007. 
381 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision 
of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the 
evaluation and implementation of Schengen. 
382 Id. 
383 Council of the European Union, Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to 
strengthen the Rule of Law: Compatibility with the Treaties, Doc. 10296/14, Brussels, 27 May 2014, 
7. 
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regard to the notion of "systemic" or "structural" in the context of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, see also the role of the European Court of Human 
rights in identifying underlying systemic problems, as defined in the Resolution 
Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers of 12 May 2004, on Judgments 
Revealing an Underlying Systemic Problem, 
(https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=743257&Lang=fr)." 
 
If the EU Rule of Law Commission determines that there are systematic deficiencies, one 
could consider to call the Court to intervene and have a substantial assessment even 
before the context of Article 7 TEU, particularly when the deficiencies affect mutual 
recognition based EU policies and aspects where fundamental rights of people are at 
stake, for example in cases of detention.384 An option is to make use of the urgent 
preliminary ruling procedure laid down in CJEU Rules of Procedure.385 
 
Fifth, the EU Rule of Law Commission could follow a similar format than the Venice 
Commission.386 An open question is who should appoint its members. In the Venice 
Commission it is the Member States. For the EU, prospective potential members should 
pass the test of the European Parliament before nomination, and they could be chosen 
from candidates proposed by Council and the Commission. 
 
 
                                                          
384 Questions soon to be answered by the CJEU in Case C-404/15 Aranyosi, request for a 
preliminary ruling lodged on 24 July 2015. See also Opinion of AG Bot in  C‑ 404/15 Aranyosi and 
C‑ 659/15 PPU Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:140. 
385 See Chapter 3 and in particular Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 
386 Venice Commission, Adopting the Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, CDL(2002)027-e  Resolution RES (2002) 3, Article 2. 
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COUNCIL OF EUROPE387 
 
 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
European 
Commission for 
Democracy Through 
Law (Venice 
Commission) 
The Venice 
Commission was 
established in 1990.388 
Article 1 of the 
Statute389 states:  
“Article 1.1: The 
European Commission 
for Democracy through 
Law shall be an 
independent 
consultative body 
which co-operates with 
the Member States of 
the Council of Europe, 
as well as with 
interested non-Member 
States and interested 
international 
organisations and 
bodies. Its own specific 
Article 2 of the 
Statute stipulates: 
1. The Commission 
shall be composed of 
independent experts 
who have achieved 
eminence through 
their experience in 
democratic 
institutions or by 
their contribution to 
the enhancement of 
law and political 
science. The 
members of the 
Commission shall 
serve in their 
individual capacity 
and shall not receive 
or accept any 
Article 3.1 of the Statute 
emphasises: Without 
prejudice to the 
competence of the 
organs of the Council of 
Europe, the 
Commission may carry 
out research on its own 
initiative and, where 
appropriate, may 
prepare studies and 
draft guidelines, laws 
and international 
agreements. Any 
proposal of the 
Commission can be 
discussed and adopted 
by the statutory organs 
of the Council of 
Europe. 
Legal analysis of 
compliance with 
democracy, rule of 
law and 
fundamental rights 
standards and 
country visits are the 
main methods used 
when drafting the 
Opinion. It also 
includes studies and 
reports on topical 
issues. 
The Opinion is 
usually structured 
around the following 
sections: preliminary 
remarks (scope, 
background and 
specific legal 
There is no specific 
follow-up 
procedure 
envisaged. The 
Venice Commission 
offers facultative 
assistance to State 
parties to 
implement its 
Opinions and 
recommendations.  
As it is stated on its 
website: 
“A dialogue-based 
working method: 
The Commission 
does not seek to 
impose the 
solutions set out in 
its opinions. It 
                                                          
387
 Compilation as requested by the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 
388 It is composed by the following 11 sub-commissions: fundamental rights, federal State and regional state, international law, protection of minorities, judiciary, 
democratic institutions, working methods, Latin America, Mediterranean basin, rule of law and gender equality. Each sub-commission has one chairperson. 
389 Refer to Resolution(2002)3, Revised Statute of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 21 February 
2002 at the 784th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Statute and 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Statute_old. 
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field of action shall be 
the guarantees offered 
by law in the service of 
democracy. It shall 
fulfil the following 
objectives:  
- strengthening the 
understanding of the 
legal systems of the 
participating states, 
notably with a view to 
bringing these systems 
closer; 
- promoting the rule of 
law and democracy ; 
- examining the 
problems raised by the 
working of democratic 
institutions and their 
reinforcement and 
development. 2. The 
Commission shall give 
priority to work 
concerning: 
a. the constitutional, 
legislative and 
administrative 
principles and 
techniques which serve 
instructions.  
2. There shall be one 
member and one 
substitute in respect 
of each member 
State of the Enlarged 
Agreement. 
3. Members shall 
hold office for a 
four-year term and 
may be reappointed.  
6. The European 
Community shall be 
entitled to 
participate in the 
work of the 
Commission. It may 
become a member of 
the Commission 
according to 
modalities agreed 
with the Committee 
of Ministers. 
 
The JCCJ is 
composed of 
members of the 
Commission and 
representatives from 
2. The Commission may 
supply, within its 
mandate, opinions 
upon request submitted 
by the Committee of 
Ministers, the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly, the Congress 
of Local and Regional 
Authorities of Europe, 
the Secretary General, 
or by a state or 
international 
organisation or body 
participating in the 
work of the 
Commission. 
Where an opinion is 
requested by a state on 
a matter regarding 
another state, the 
Commission shall 
inform the state 
concerned and, unless 
the two states are in 
agreement, submit the 
issue to the Committee 
of Ministers. 
3. Any State which is 
process/context), 
followed by an 
analysis (general and 
specific remarks) 
and ending with 
conclusions 
(including 
outstanding issues, 
concerns and 
recommendations to 
the country 
concerned). 
An interesting 
example includes the 
recent request by the 
Polish government 
to the Venice 
Commission: 
833/2015 - 
Constitutional issues 
addressed in 
amendments to the 
Act on the 
Constitutional Court 
of 25 June 2015 of 
Poland. 
adopts a non-
directive approach 
based on dialogue 
and shares Member 
States’ experience 
and practices. A 
working group 
visits the country 
concerned to meet 
the various 
stakeholders and to 
assess the situation 
as objectively as 
possible. The 
authorities are also 
able to submit 
comments on the 
draft opinions to the 
Commission. The 
opinions prepared 
are generally 
heeded by the 
countries 
concerned. 
International 
institutions, civil 
society and the 
media regularly 
refer to the 
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the efficiency of 
democratic institutions 
and their 
strengthening, as well 
as the principle of the 
rule of law; 
b. fundamental rights 
and freedoms, notably 
those that involve the 
participation of citizens 
in public life; 
c. the contribution of 
local and regional self-
government to the 
enhancement of 
democracy.” 
“The Venice 
Commission’s key 
tasks is to assist states 
in the constitutional 
and legislative field so 
as to ensure the 
democratic functioning 
of their institutions and 
respect for 
fundamental rights.”390 
 
It has 60 State 
members,391 one 
co-operation courts 
and associations. 
not a member of the 
Enlarged Agreement 
may benefit from the 
activities of the 
Commission by making 
a request to the 
Committee of Ministers. 
4. The Commission co-
operates with 
constitutional courts 
and courts of equivalent 
jurisdiction bilaterally 
and through 
associations 
representing these 
courts. In order to 
promote this co-
operation, the 
Commission may set up 
a Joint Council on 
Constitutional Justice 
composed of members 
of the Commission and 
representatives from co-
operating courts and 
associations. 
5. Furthermore, the 
Commission may 
establish links with 
Commission’s 
opinions.”403 
 
                                                          
390 http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Const_Assistance. 
391 For a full overview of membership refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/countries.aspx?lang=EN. 
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associate member, five 
observers and three 
with special status 
(including the EU).392 
 
The Venice 
Commission’s areas of 
work are structured 
around three themes: 
First, democratic 
institutions and 
fundamental rights393; 
second, constitutional 
justice and ordinary 
justice394; and third, 
elections, referendums 
and political parties.395 
 
In respect of 
‘constitutional justice 
and ordinary justice’, 
since 2002 the Venice 
documentation, study 
and research institutes 
and centres. 
 
Its core task is to 
provide State parties 
with legal 
opinions/studies on 
draft pieces of 
legislation or laws 
already in force which 
are brought to its 
examination. “Groups 
of members assisted by 
the secretariat prepare 
the draft opinions and 
studies, which are then 
discussed and adopted 
at the Committee’s 
plenary sessions.”401  
 
The following actors 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
403 Quoted from http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
392 On the EU see http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/countries.aspx?id=69. Refer for instance to 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2003)022-e CDL-AD(2003)022-e, Opinion on the Implications of a Legally-binding EU Charter 
of fundamental rights on Human Rights Protection in Europe adopted by the Venice Commission, at its 57th Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 December 2003). 
393 For an overview of the work of the Commission on fundamental rights refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Rights. 
394 See for instance on constitutional reform http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_Reforms&lang=EN and Report on Constitutional Amendment 
of 19 January 2010 http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)001-e and COMPILATION OF VENICE 
COMMISSION OPINIONS CONCERNING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION of 22 December 2015, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2015)023-e and the COMPILATION OF VENICE COMMISSION OPINIONS AND REPORTS 
CONCERNING COURTS AND JUDGES, available at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI%282015%29001-e. 
395 On the Venice Commission activities refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
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Commission has 
counted on the so-
called ‘Joint Council on 
Constitutional Justice 
(JCCJ)’.396 The JCCJ is a 
steering body for the 
cooperation of the 
Venice Commission 
with the Constitutional 
Courts.397  
 
The Venice 
Commission has been 
active in the electoral 
field, in particular, 
through the adoption 
of opinions on draft 
electoral legislation and 
referendums. It also 
includes seminars, 
trainings and assistance 
missions.398 Here it 
cooperates closely with 
the Office for 
Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights 
(OSCE/ODIHR).399 
can request an Opinion 
from the Venice 
Commission: Member 
States, Council of 
Europe (Secretary 
General, Committee of 
Ministers, 
Parliamentary 
Assembly and Congress 
of Local and Regional 
Authorities); and 
international 
organisations, including 
the European Union, 
OSCE/ODIHR, etc. 
 
Any constitutional court 
or the European Court 
of Human Rights may 
request the Venice 
Commission to provide 
amicus curiae on 
comparative law issues. 
It can also deliver 
amicus ombud 
opinions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
401 Id. 
396 For more information see http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Constitutional_Justice#Joint Council on Constitutional Justice. 
397 See also the World Conference on Constitutional Justice: http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_WCCJ&lang=EN. 
398 Refer to http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_seminars&lang=EN. 
399 For more information see http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Elections_and_Referendums. 
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There is also a Council 
on Democratic 
Elections within the 
Venice Commission.400  
 
The Venice Commission 
develops and shares 
‘standards’ and ‘best 
practices’. 
 
The procedure for 
preparing an Opinion is 
composed of the 
following steps: 
 
First, reference by 
national, international 
or regional body for 
assessing legislative 
initiative or existing 
legal instruments or 
constitutional 
provision. 
 
Second, a working 
group is set up 
comprising rapporteurs 
and experts who count 
on the assistance of the 
Commission’s 
secretariat. 
 
Third, issuing of a draft 
opinion on the 
compliance with the 
                                                          
400 See http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_CED&lang=EN. 
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law with legal 
standards and 
suggestions for 
improvements.  
 
Fourth, country visit: 
meeting with relevant 
official and civil society 
actors. 
 
Fifth, issuing of final 
draft opinion.  
 
Sixth, final draft 
opinion is submitted to 
all members of the 
Commission before 
going to the Plenary 
Session. 
 
Seventh, option to hold 
a discussion between 
the Commission and the 
relevant State. 
 
Eight, debate and 
adoption of the Opinion 
in Plenary Session.402 
                                                          
402 “The Commission ‘endorses’ a draft opinion prepared by the rapporteurs when two conditions are fulfilled: it wishes to express its agreement with the draft 
opinion prepared by the rapporteurs (as in the case of adoption); and but there are circumstances which make it appear unnecessary to go into detail, either 
because the text was already adopted or already abandoned.” See http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. 
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Ninth, the Opinion is 
submitted to the 
requesting actor and it 
is published on the 
Venice Commission’s 
website. 
 
Parliamentary 
Assembly 
(Monitoring 
Committee) 
 
Since 1997 the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly has a 
Committee focused on 
monitoring the 
obligations and 
commitments by 
Member States of the 
Council of Europe 
(Monitoring 
Committee).404 
Paragraph 5 of 
Resolution 1115(1997) 
states: “The Monitoring 
Committee is 
responsible for 
verifying the fulfilment 
of obligations assumed 
by member States 
The Committee has 
90 members.405 
“Monitoring country 
reports are made in 
respect of each country 
separately. A report 
includes a draft 
resolution in which 
specific proposals are 
made for the 
improvement of the 
situation in the country 
under consideration, 
and possibly a draft 
recommendation for the 
attention of the 
Committee of Ministers. 
The Monitoring 
Committee is required 
to submit to the 
Assembly at least once 
“Two co-rapporteurs 
are appointed for a 
maximum duration 
of five years in 
respect of each 
member State, 
ensuring a strict 
political and 
regional balance. 
The code of conduct 
for co-rapporteurs, 
approved by the 
Monitoring 
Committee in 2001 
(see Doc. 9198, 
Appendix H), and 
Resolution 1799 
(2011) on the code of 
conduct for 
 
Paragraph 13 of 
Resolution 1115 
states that the 
Assembly “may 
penalise persistent 
failure to honour 
obligations and 
commitments 
accepted, and lack 
of co-operation in its 
monitoring process, 
by adopting a 
resolution and/or a 
recommendation, 
by the non-
ratification of the 
credentials of a 
national 
                                                          
404 Resolution 1115 (1997), adopted by the Assembly on 29 January 1997. See http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/as-mon/main. See also Committee on the 
Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), the monitoring procedure of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, AS/Mon/Inf(2015)14rev 5 October 2015. 
405 http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/AssemblyList/AL-XML2HTML-EN.asp?lang=en&XmlID=Committee-Mon  
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under the terms of the 
Statute of the Council 
of Europe, the 
European Convention 
on Human Rights and 
all other Council of 
Europe Conventions to 
which they are parties, 
as well as the 
honouring of 
commitments entered 
into by the authorities 
of member States upon 
accession to the 
Council of Europe”. 
every three years a 
report on each country 
being monitored 
(country report, see 
paragraph 14 of 
Resolution 1115). 
Parliamentary debates 
on monitoring are thus 
held in public. 
However, the 
monitoring procedure 
at the committee stage 
remains confidential”.406 
 
Within one year of the 
monitoring procedure’s 
conclusion, there is the 
possibility to establish a 
‘post-monitoring 
dialogue’ with a specific 
Member State. 
Moreover, the 
Committee reports to 
the Assembly on 
general progress of the 
monitoring procedures 
by submitting its 
progress report 
(Paragraph 14 of 
rapporteurs of the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly are aimed 
at preventing 
conflicts of interest 
and set out the rules 
which apply to 
rapporteurs of the 
Assembly such as, 
inter alia, the 
principle of 
neutrality, 
impartiality and 
objectivity, the 
obligation of 
discretion, the 
undertaking of 
availability, etc.”407 
 
Paragraph 3 of the 
Committee’s 
mandate: “An 
application to 
initiate a monitoring 
procedure may 
originate from: i. the 
general committees 
of the Assembly by 
reasoned written 
parliamentary 
delegation at the 
beginning of its next 
ordinary session or 
by the annulment of 
ratified credentials 
in the course of the 
same ordinary 
session in 
accordance with 
Rule 6 (now Rules 6 
to 9) of the Rules of 
Procedure. Should 
the Member State 
continue not to 
respect its 
commitments, the 
Assembly may 
address a 
recommendation to 
the Committee of 
Ministers requesting 
it to take the 
appropriate action 
in accordance with 
Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Statute of the 
Council of Europe”: 
 
                                                          
406 http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/259543/Role_E.pdf/980181e7-bdb1-4b0e-ab1c-799bd2a9c560. 
407 http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/259543/Role_E.pdf/980181e7-bdb1-4b0e-ab1c-799bd2a9c560. 
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Resolution 1115). The 
Committee also 
performs periodic 
overviews of groups of 
countries, on a country-
by-country basis, in 
accordance with its 
internal working 
methods. 
application to the 
Bureau; ii. the 
Monitoring 
Committee by a 
written opinion 
prepared by two co-
rapporteurs 
containing a draft 
decision to open a 
monitoring 
procedure; iii. not 
less than 20 
members of the 
Assembly 
representing at least 
six national 
delegations and two 
political groups, 
through the tabling 
of a motion for a 
resolution or 
recommendation; iv. 
the Bureau of the 
Assembly.” 
“Article 7: Any 
Member of the 
Council of Europe 
may withdraw by 
formally notifying 
the Secretary 
General of its 
intention to do so. 
Such withdrawal 
shall take effect at 
the end of the 
financial year in 
which it is notified, 
if the notification is 
given during the 
first nine months of 
that financial year. 
If the notification is 
given in the last 
three months of the 
financial year, it 
shall take effect at 
the end of the next 
financial year.  
 
Article 8: Any 
Member of the 
Council of Europe 
which has seriously 
violated Article 3 
may be suspended 
from its rights of 
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representation and 
requested by the 
Committee of 
Ministers to 
withdraw under 
Article 7. If such 
Member does not 
comply with this 
request, the 
Committee may 
decide that it has 
ceased to be a 
Member of the 
Council as from 
such date as the 
Committee may 
determine.” 
 
The Rules of 
Procedure of the 
Assembly explicitly 
refer to the 
“persistent failure to 
honour obligations 
and commitments 
and [to the] lack of 
co-operation with 
the Assembly’s 
monitoring 
procedure” as 
“substantial 
grounds” for which 
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the unratified 
credentials of a 
national delegation 
may be challenged 
(Rule 8). 
European 
Commission against 
Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) 
 
ECRI focuses on the 
examination of the 
situation concerning 
racism and intolerance 
in CoE Member States.  
The scope and tasks of 
ECRI are laid down in 
the statute adopted in 
Resolution 2002/8. 
According to Article 1 
of the Statute, ECRI is 
“a body of the Council 
of Europe entrusted 
with the task of 
combating racism, 
racial discrimination, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance in greater 
Europe from the 
perspective of the 
protection of human 
rights, in the light of 
ECRI has 47 
members.409 
Article 2(1) 
highlights: “One 
member of ECRI 
shall be appointed 
for each Member 
State of the Council 
of Europe; 2. The 
members of ECRI 
shall have high 
moral authority and 
recognised expertise 
in dealing with 
racism, racial 
discrimination, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance; 3. The 
members of ECRI 
shall serve in their 
individual capacity, 
shall be independent 
Article 11(1): “In the 
framework of its 
country-by-country 
approach, ECRI shall 
monitor phenomena of 
racism, racial 
discrimination, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance, by closely 
examining the situation 
in each of the Member 
States of the Council of 
Europe. ECRI shall 
draw up reports 
containing its factual 
analyses as well as 
suggestions and 
proposals as to how 
each country might deal 
with any problems 
identified. 2. In the 
framework of its 
ECRI drafts country 
reports, which 
during the fifth cycle 
focus on the 
following ‘common 
topics’: legislative 
issues, hate speech, 
violence and 
integration 
policies.412 
Each country report 
has five sections: a. a 
summary of ECRI’s 
findings; b. a section 
dealing with the 
common topics; c. a 
section dealing with 
the country-specific 
topics; d. a section 
dealing with the 
fourth-cycle interim 
recommendations 
that were not – or 
Country reports 
include information 
on Interim 
recommendations 
not implemented or 
partially 
implemented 
during the fourth 
monitoring cycle 
that will be 
followed up. 
                                                          
409 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/about/members_en.asp. 
412 Refer to Information document on the fifth monitoring cycle of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (adopted by ECRI’s Bureau 
on 28 September 2012, further to the decisions taken by ECRI at its 58th plenary meeting from 19 to 22 June 2012). 
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the European 
Convention on Human 
Rights, its additional 
protocols and related 
case-law. It shall 
pursue the following 
objectives: - to review 
Member States’ 
legislation, policies and 
other measures to 
combat racism, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance, and their 
effectiveness; - to 
propose further action 
at local, national and 
European level; - to 
formulate general 
policy 
recommendations to 
Member States; - to 
study international 
legal instruments 
applicable in the matter 
with a view to their 
reinforcement where 
appropriate”.408 
and impartial in 
fulfilling their 
mandate. They shall 
not receive any 
instructions from 
their government”. 
Moreover, Article 3 
of the statute states 
that they shall be 
appointed for a 
period of five years, 
which may be 
renewed twice. 
country-by-country 
monitoring, ECRI shall 
conduct, in cooperation 
with the national 
authorities, contact 
visits in the countries 
concerned. It shall 
subsequently engage in 
a confidential dialogue 
with the said authorities 
in the course of which 
the latter may comment 
on the findings of ECRI. 
3. ECRI’s country 
reports are published 
following their 
transmission to the 
national authorities, 
unless the latter 
expressly oppose such 
publication. These 
reports shall include 
appendices containing 
the viewpoints of the 
national authorities, 
where the latter deem it 
necessary”. 
 
not fully – 
implemented during 
the fourth 
monitoring cycle; 
and e. new interim 
recommendations. 
ECRI also issues 
General 
Recommendations 
on relevant 
themes.413 
 
Article 6 of the 
statute specifies the 
following: 
“ECRI may seek the 
assistance of 
rapporteurs or of 
consultants. 2. ECRI 
may organise 
consultations with 
interested parties. 3. 
ECRI may set up 
working parties on 
specific topics. 4. 
ECRI may be seized 
directly by non-
governmental 
                                                          
408 Resolution Res(2002)8 on the statute of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 June 2002 at 
the 799th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
413 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GeneralThemes_en.asp. 
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“The country 
monitoring deals with 
all member States on an 
equal footing and takes 
place in five-year cycles, 
covering nine/ten 
countries per year. 
ECRI’s fifth monitoring 
cycle has begun during 
the first semester of 
2013.”410  
 
ECRI performs country 
visits and organises a 
confidential dialogue 
with the national 
authorities. Member 
States’ authorities are 
provided – for the 
purposes of the 
confidential dialogue – 
with a version of their 
country’s report 
provisionally adopted 
by ECRI (draft 
report).411 
 
Article 12: “ECRI’s 
work on general themes 
organisations on any 
questions covered by 
its terms of 
reference. 5. ECRI 
may seek the 
opinions and 
contributions of 
Council of Europe 
bodies concerned 
with its work. 6. 
ECRI shall 
periodically inform 
the Committee of 
Ministers on the 
results of its work.” 
 
 
                                                          
410 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp  
411 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/Information%20document%20fifth%20monitoring%20cycle_en.pdf  
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shall generally consist 
of the adoption of 
general policy 
recommendations 
addressed to 
governments of 
Member States and of 
the collection and 
dissemination of 
examples of “good 
practices” in combating 
racism, racial 
discrimination, 
xenophobia, 
antisemitism and 
intolerance.” 
 
Commissioner for 
Human Rights 
 
Article 3 of the 
mandate414 states 
the Commissioner 
shall: “a. promote 
education in and 
awareness of human 
rights in the member 
States; 
b. contribute to the 
promotion of the 
effective observance 
The Commissioner415 
Article 9: “1. The 
Commissioner shall 
be elected by the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly by a 
majority of votes cast 
from a list of three 
candidates drawn up 
by the Committee of 
Ministers. 2. Member 
The Commissioner 
issues 
recommendations, 
opinions and reports 
(Article 8 of mandate). 
The most relevant 
documents which are 
published are activity 
reports, country work, 
issue papers, opinions, 
third-party 
Article 5 of the 
mandate stipulates 
that the 
Commissioner “may 
act on any 
information relevant 
to the 
Commissioner’s 
functions. This will 
notably include 
information 
 
 
 
                                                          
414 Resolution 99(50) on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 7 May 1999. Available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Res(99)50&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE. 
415 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/the-commissioner. 
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and full enjoyment of 
human rights in the 
member States; 
c. provide advice and 
information on the 
protection of human 
rights and prevention 
of human rights 
violations. When 
dealing with the public, 
the Commissioner 
shall, wherever 
possible, make use of 
and co-operate with 
human rights 
structures in the 
member States. Where 
such structures do not 
exist, the 
Commissioner will 
encourage their 
establishment; 
d. facilitate the 
activities of national 
ombudsmen or similar 
institutions in the field 
of human rights; 
States may submit 
candidatures by 
letter addressed to 
the Secretary 
General. Candidates 
must be nationals of 
a member State of 
the Council of 
Europe.” 
Article 10: “The 
candidates shall be 
eminent 
personalities of a 
high moral character 
having recognised 
expertise in the field 
of human rights, a 
public record of 
attachment to the 
values of the Council 
of Europe and the 
personal authority 
necessary to 
discharge the 
mission of the 
Commissioner 
effectively. During 
interventions and other 
publications and 
recommendations.417 
Their publication may 
be authorised by the 
Council of Ministers. 
A key dimension of the 
Commissioner’s work is 
conducting country 
visits, which aim at 
ensuring “a direct 
dialogue with the 
authorities and looking 
into one or several 
specific issues”.418 
There are a number of 
thematic areas where 
the Commissioner’s 
work is more focused, 
which include: 
children’s rights, 
terrorism, economic 
crisis, LGBTI, media 
freedom, migration, 
persons with 
disabilities, post-war 
justice, Roma and 
addressed to the 
Commissioner by 
governments, 
national 
parliaments, national 
ombudsmen or 
similar institutions 
in the field of human 
rights, individuals 
and organisations”. 
The mandate 
expressly states that 
the gathering of 
information relevant 
to the Commissioner 
will not entail any 
formal reporting 
procedure for 
Member States. 
Member States are 
required to facilitate 
the work of the 
Commissioner, in 
particular “the 
Commissioner’s 
contacts, including 
travel, in the context 
                                                          
417 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/documents. 
418 See http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/country-monitoring  
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e. identify possible 
shortcomings in the 
law and practice of 
member States 
concerning the 
compliance with 
human rights as 
embodied in the 
instruments of the 
Council of Europe, 
promote the effective 
implementation of 
these standards by 
member States and 
assist them, with their 
agreement, in their 
efforts to remedy such 
shortcomings; 
f. address, whenever 
the Commissioner 
deems it appropriate, a 
report concerning a 
specific matter to the 
Committee of Ministers 
or to the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the 
Committee of 
Ministers; 
g. respond, in the 
his or her term of 
office, the 
Commissioner shall 
not engage in any 
activity which is 
incompatible with 
the demands of a 
full-time office.” 
Article 11: “The 
Commissioner shall 
be elected for a non-
renewable term of 
office of six years.” 
“The Commissioner 
is elected by the 
Parliamentary 
Assembly of the 
Council of Europe 
from a list of three 
candidates drawn up 
by the Committee of 
Ministers, and serves 
a non-renewable 
term of office of six 
years”.416  
travellers, systematic 
human rights work.419 
 
of the mission of the 
Commissioner and 
provide in good time 
information 
requested by the 
Commissioner” 
(Article 6). 
 
 
                                                          
416 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/mandate. 
419 For an overview of the thematic work refer to http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/thematic-work. 
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manner the 
Commissioner deems 
appropriate, to requests 
made by the 
Committee of Ministers 
or the Parliamentary 
Assembly, in the 
context of their task of 
ensuring compliance 
with the human rights 
standards of the 
Council of Europe; 
h. submit an annual 
report to the 
Committee of Ministers 
and the Parliamentary 
Assembly; 
i. co-operate with other 
international 
institutions for the 
promotion and 
protection of human 
rights while avoiding 
unnecessary 
duplication of 
activities.” 
European Committee 
for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading 
Article 1 of the 1987 
European Convention 
for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman 
It has 42 members.421 
The members come 
from a variety of 
backgrounds, 
What does it do? “The 
CPT organises visits to 
places of detention to 
assess how persons 
Country visit and 
elaboration of 
country report, 
including 
Article 10.2 of the 
Convention states 
that  
“If the Party fails to 
                                                          
421 Refer to http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/members.htm. 
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Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) 
 
or Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment states: 
“There shall be 
established a European 
Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment 
(hereinafter referred to 
as “the Committee”). 
The Committee shall, 
by means of visits, 
examine the treatment 
of persons deprived of 
their liberty with a 
view to strengthening, 
if necessary, the 
protection of such 
persons from torture 
and from inhuman or 
degrading treatment or 
punishment.”420 
including “a variety 
of backgrounds, 
including lawyers, 
medical doctors and 
specialists in prison 
or police matter”.422 
Article 4: “1 The 
Committee shall 
consist of a number 
of members equal to 
that of the Parties. 
2 The members of 
the Committee shall 
be chosen from 
among persons of 
high moral 
character, known for 
their competence in 
the field of human 
rights or having 
professional 
experience in the 
areas covered by this 
Convention. 
deprived of their liberty 
are treated. These places 
include prisons, 
juvenile detention 
centres, police stations, 
holding centres for 
immigration detainees, 
psychiatric hospitals, 
social care homes, etc.423 
CPT delegations have 
unlimited access to 
places of detention, and 
the right to move inside 
such places without 
restriction. They 
interview persons 
deprived of their liberty 
in private, and 
communicate freely 
with anyone who can 
provide information. 
After each visit, the CPT 
sends a detailed report 
to the State 
recommendations. 
Article 10 of the 
Convention clarifies 
that “1 After each 
visit, the Committee 
shall draw up a 
report on the facts 
found during the 
visit, taking account 
of any observations 
which may have 
been submitted by 
the Party concerned. 
It shall transmit to 
the latter its report 
containing any 
recommendations it 
considers necessary. 
The Committee may 
consult with the 
Party with a view to 
suggesting, if 
necessary, 
improvements in the 
co-operate or 
refuses to improve 
the situation in the 
light of the 
Committee’s 
recommendations, 
the Committee may 
decide, after the 
Party has had an 
opportunity to 
make known its 
views, by a majority 
of two-thirds of its 
members to make a 
public statement on 
the matter.”427 
 
                                                          
420 See http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/ecpt.htm. 
422 Explanatory Report of the Convention states, “It is clear that they do not have to be lawyers. It would be desirable that the Committee should include members 
who have experience in matters such as prison administration and the various medical fields relevant to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. This 
will make the dialogue between the Committee and the States more effective and facilitate concrete suggestions from the Committee.” See 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/explanatory-report.htm. 
423 Article 8.2 of the Convention states, “A Party shall provide the Committee with the following facilities to carry out its task: a access to its territory and the right to travel 
without restriction; b full information on the places where persons deprived of their liberty are being held; c unlimited access to any place where persons are deprived of their 
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3 No two members 
of the Committee 
may be nationals of 
the same State. 
4 The members shall 
serve in their 
individual capacity, 
shall be independent 
and impartial, and 
shall be available to 
serve the Committee 
effectively.” 
Article 5 (1): “1 The 
members of the 
Committee shall be 
elected by the 
Committee of 
Ministers of the 
Council of Europe 
by an absolute 
majority of votes, 
from a list of names 
drawn up by the 
concerned.424 This 
report includes the 
CPT’s findings, and its 
recommendations, 
comments and requests 
for information. The 
CPT also requests a 
detailed response to the 
issues raised in its 
report. These reports 
and responses form part 
of the ongoing dialogue 
with the States 
concerned.”425 
Country visits, which 
are envisaged in 
Articles 7 to 9 of the 
Convention, are usually 
carried out once every 
four years. There is also 
the possibility to 
conduct further ad hoc 
visits. The state 
protection of persons 
deprived of their 
liberty.” 
CPT has developed a 
set of thematic 
‘standards’ which 
constitute the 
substantive sections 
of general reports.426 
These deal with: law 
enforcement 
agencies, prisons, 
psychiatric 
institutions, 
immigration 
detention, juveniles 
deprived of their 
liberty under 
criminal 
investigation, 
women deprived of 
their liberty, 
documenting and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
liberty, including the right to move inside such places without restriction; d other information available to the Party which is necessary for the Committee to carry out its task. In 
seeking such information, the Committee shall have regard to applicable rules of national law and professional ethics.” 
427 The Explanatory Report further adds that ““Given the importance of such a decision, it may only be taken by a qualified majority. Before using this remedy in the case of a 
State’s refusal to improve the situation, the Committee should pay full regard to any difficulties in the way of doing so. 75. The Committee will have a wide discretion in deciding 
what information to make public, but will have to take due account of the need to secure that information passed over in confidence is not revealed. It should also take into 
consideration the desirability of not revealing information in connection with pending investigations.” 
424 Country reports are available here http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/states.htm. 
425 Quoted from http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm. 
426 CPT Standards, Substantive Sections of the CPT’s General Reports, CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 - Rev. 2015, http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.pdf  
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Bureau of the 
Consultative 
Assembly of the 
Council of Europe; 
each national 
delegation of the 
Parties in the 
Consultative 
Assembly shall put 
forward three 
candidates, of whom 
two at least shall be 
its nationals. 
Where a member is 
to be elected to the 
Committee in 
respect of a non-
member State of the 
Council of Europe, 
the Bureau of the 
Consultative 
Assembly shall 
invite the Parliament 
of that State to put 
forward three 
candidates, of whom 
two at least shall be 
its nationals. The 
election by the 
Committee of 
Ministers shall take 
place after 
concerned needs to be 
informed in advance.  
reporting medical 
evidence of ill-
treatment, 
combating impunity 
and electrical 
discharge weapons. 
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consultation with the 
Party concerned. 
2 The same 
procedure shall be 
followed in filling 
casual vacancies. 
3 The members of 
the Committee shall 
be elected for a 
period of four years. 
They may be re-
elected twice. 
However, among the 
members elected at 
the first election, the 
terms of three 
members shall 
expire at the end of 
two years. The 
members whose 
terms are to expire at 
the end of the initial 
period of two years 
shall be chosen by 
lot by the Secretary 
General of the 
Council of Europe 
immediately after 
the first election has 
been completed. 
4 In order to ensure 
that, as far as 
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possible, one half of 
the membership of 
the Committee shall 
be renewed every 
two years, the 
Committee of 
Ministers may 
decide, before 
proceeding to any 
subsequent election, 
that the term or 
terms of office of one 
or more members to 
be elected shall be 
for a period other 
than four years but 
not more than six 
and not less than 
two years.” 
 
The European 
Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) 
 
CEPEJ exists since 
2002.428 Article 1 of the 
CEPEJ statute429 states 
that its aim is “(a) to 
improve the efficiency 
Article 5 – 
Composition of 
the CEPEJ:433 
“1. The CEPEJ 
shall be composed 
The evaluation of the 
judicial systems of the 
CoE’s members is 
coordinated by a 
Working Group on the 
The ‘principles’ 
against which the 
different judicial 
systems are 
examined are the 
 
                                                          
428 Resolution Res(2002)12 establishing the European Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ), (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 
2002, at the 808th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). See information leaflet 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/presentation/CEPEJ_depliant_en.pdf. 
429 See 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=Res(2002)12&Sector=secCM&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB
55&BackColorLogged=FFAC75. 
433 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/presentation/contacts_en.asp. 
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and the functioning of 
the justice system of 
Member States, with a 
view to ensuring that 
everyone within their 
jurisdiction can enforce 
their legal rights 
effectively, thereby 
generating increased 
confidence of the 
citizens in the justice 
system and (b) to 
enable a better 
implementation of the 
international legal 
instruments of the 
Council of Europe 
concerning efficiency 
and fairness of justice.” 
 
CEPEJ has different 
Working Groups: 
 
First, the Working 
Group on execution 
(CEPEJ-GT-EXE),430 
which enables a better 
of experts who are 
best able to 
contribute to its 
aims and 
functions, and 
who have in 
particular an in-
depth knowledge 
of the 
administration, 
functioning and 
efficiency of civil, 
criminal and/or 
administrative 
justice. 
2. Each member 
State of the 
Council of Europe 
shall appoint an 
expert to the 
CEPEJ.” 
CEPEJ members are 
supported by 
networks of national 
experts enabling 
them to keep in 
touch with the 
evaluation of judicial 
systems (CEPEJ-GT-
EVAL). 
Article 2 of the Statute 
stipulates the following 
functions: 
“a. to examine the 
results achieved by the 
different judicial 
systems in the light of 
the principles referred 
to in the preamble to 
this resolution by using, 
amongst other things, 
common statistical 
criteria and means of 
evaluation; 
b. to define problems 
and areas for possible 
improvements and to 
exchange views on the 
functioning of the 
judicial systems; 
c. to identify concrete 
ways to improve the 
measuring and 
functioning of the 
following: I. Access 
to justice and proper 
and efficient 
functioning of 
courts; II. The status 
and role of the legal 
professionals; 
III. Administration 
of justice and 
management of 
courts; IV. Use of 
information and 
communication 
technologies. 
The methods used 
are common 
statistical criteria435 
and other ‘means of 
evaluation’. In 
particular, CEPEJ 
has developed an 
‘Evaluation 
Scheme’.436 The 
Scheme is based on a 
system of six general 
indicators:437 
 Demographic 
                                                          
430 The composition of the working group is outlined here http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/Execution/GT-EXE-Composition.pdf. 
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implementation of 
relevant CoE standards 
concerning execution of 
court decisions in civil, 
commercial and 
administrative matters 
at national level. 
 
Second, the Working 
Group on quality of 
justice (CEPEJ-GT-
QUAL) which develops 
means of analysis and 
evaluation of the work 
done inside the courts. 
It aims at improving 
quality of the public 
service delivered by 
situation in Europe’s 
judicial systems.434 
judicial systems of the 
member States, having 
regard to their specific 
needs; 
d. to provide assistance 
to one or more member 
States, at their request, 
including assistance in 
complying with the 
standards of the 
Council of Europe; 
e. to suggest, if 
appropriate, areas in 
which the relevant 
steering committees of 
the Council of Europe, 
in particular the 
European Committee 
and economic 
data (including 
data on 
inhabitants, 
GDP, budget 
allocated to 
courts, etc.). 
 Legal aid 
(access to 
justice) 
(including 
number of legal 
aid cases).  
 Organisation of 
the court system 
and the public 
prosecution 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
435 Refer to CEPEJ Guidelines on Judicial Statistics (GOJUST), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2008)11&Language=lanEnglish&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColor
Logged=FDC864. 
436 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems, 2014-2016 Cycle, CEPEJ(2015)1, Strasbourg 2 June 2015. Available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2015)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColo
rLogged=FDC864. See also Explanatory Note 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2015)2&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColo
rLogged=FDC864. 
437 CEPEJ, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems: Key Judicial Indicators, 6 December 2007, CEPEJ(2007)27. See 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ(2007)27&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=DGHL-
CEPEJ&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6  
434 This includes “- a network of national correspondents responsible for co-ordinating the collection of relevant information for the evaluation of judicial systems; 
- a network of pilot courts allowing the CEPEJ to pursue its activities while taking account of the practical day-to-day operation of courts; - the Lisbon Network 
which is composed of representatives of national training institutions of the member States in charge of questions relating to training of judges and prosecutors, 
allowing the CEPEJ to develop European quality standards in the field of training”, quoted from 
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/profiles/default_en.asp. 
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national justice 
systems, with special 
attention to the 
expectations of the 
justice practitioners.431 
 
Third, a centre for 
judicial time 
management (SATURN 
Centre – Study and 
Analysis of Judicial 
Time Use Research 
Network).432 
 
on Legal Co-operation 
(CDCJ), may, if they 
consider it necessary, 
draft new international 
legal instruments or 
amendments to existing 
ones, for adoption by 
the Committee of 
Ministers.” 
 
CEPEJ may carry out its 
functions outlined in 
paragraphs a, b, c and e 
above on its own 
initiative. Tasks 
foreseen in d at the 
request of one or more 
Member States. 
 
Article 3 outlines the 
Working methods as 
follows: 
“a. identifying and 
developing indicators, 
collecting and analysing 
quantitative and 
qualitative data, and 
defining measures and 
means of evaluation; 
(including 
number of 
judges and 
prosecutors, 
level of 
computer 
facilities). 
 The 
performance 
and workload of 
courts and the 
public 
prosecution 
(including 
number of cases 
related to 
Article 6 ECHR, 
number of civil 
and 
administrative 
law cases, 
number of cases 
received and 
treated by 
public 
prosecutor, 
number of 
criminal cases). 
 Execution of 
                                                          
431 For more information refer to http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/quality/default_en.asp. 
432 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/Delais/default_en.asp. 
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b. drawing up reports, 
statistics, best practice 
surveys, guidelines, 
action plans, opinions 
and general comments; 
c. establishing links 
with research institutes 
and documentation and 
study centres; 
d. inviting to participate 
in its work, on a case-
by-case basis, any 
qualified person, 
specialist or non-
governmental 
organisation active in its 
field of competence and 
capable of helping it in 
the fulfilment of its 
objectives, and holding 
hearings; 
e. creating networks of 
professionals involved 
in the justice area.” 
States have the 
possibility to update 
some key data. 
court decisions. 
 Legal and 
judicial reforms 
(optional 
question). 
Group of States 
against Corruption 
(GRECO)438 
Article 1 of GRECO 
Statute439 states that it 
aims “to improve the 
Article 6 states the 
‘Composition of the 
GRECO’, in 
GRECO monitoring 
comprises:  
Article 10 deals with 
Evaluation 
procedure and 
“The assessment of 
whether a 
                                                          
438 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_en.asp. 
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capacity of its members 
to fight corruption by 
following up, through 
a dynamic process of 
mutual evaluation and 
peer pressure, 
compliance with their 
undertakings in this 
field.” 
Article 2 foresees the 
functions of the 
GRECO as follows: “i. 
monitor the observance 
of the Guiding 
Principles for the Fight 
against Corruption as 
adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of 
Europe on 6 November 
1997; and ii. monitor 
the implementation of 
international legal 
instruments to be 
adopted in pursuance 
of the Programme of 
Action against 
Corruption, in 
conformity with the 
provisions contained in 
such instruments”. 
particular “1. Each 
member shall 
appoint a delegation 
to the GRECO 
consisting of not 
more than two 
representatives. One 
representative shall 
be appointed as head 
of the delegation.” 
The evaluation 
procedure and 
method relies on 
evaluation teams. 
Article 10.4 states: 
“Each member shall 
identify a maximum 
of 5 experts who 
would be able to 
undertake the tasks 
set out in Articles 12-
14.” 
 
First, a “horizontal” 
evaluation procedure 
(all members are 
evaluated within an 
Evaluation Round), 
which constitutes a 
system of ‘mutual 
evaluation’.440 So far 
GRECO has launched 
four evaluation rounds. 
The evaluation 
procedure shall be 
based on the principle 
of mutual evaluation 
and peer pressure. 
The evaluation results 
in the issuing of 
recommendations 
aimed at furthering the 
necessary legislative, 
institutional and 
practical reforms.  
Second, a compliance 
procedure designed to 
assess the measures 
taken by its members to 
implement the 
recommendations.”441 
states: “1. The 
GRECO shall 
conduct evaluation 
procedures in 
respect of each of its 
members in 
pursuance of Article 
2. 2. The evaluation 
shall be divided in 
rounds. An 
evaluation round is a 
period of time 
determined by the 
GRECO, during 
which an evaluation 
procedure shall be 
conducted to assess 
the compliance of 
members with 
selected provisions 
contained in the 
Guiding Principles 
and in other 
international legal 
instruments adopted 
in pursuance of the 
Programme of 
Action against 
Corruption. 3. At the 
beginning of each 
round the GRECO 
recommendation 
has been 
implemented 
satisfactorily, partly 
or has not been 
implemented, is 
based on a situation 
report, accompanied 
by supporting 
documents 
submitted by the 
member under 
scrutiny 18 months 
after the adoption of 
the evaluation 
report. In cases 
where not all 
recommendations 
have been complied 
with, GRECO will 
re-examine 
outstanding 
recommendations 
within another 18 
months. 
Compliance reports 
and the addenda 
thereto adopted by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
439 Refer to Statute of the GRECO, Appendix to Resolution (99) 5, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/statute_en.asp. 
440 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/intro_en.asp  
441 Quoted from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/4.%20How%20does%20GRECO%20work_en.asp  
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 GRECO is currently 
conducting the fourth 
evaluation round which 
deals with “Prevention 
of corruption in respect 
of members of 
parliament, judges and 
prosecutors”.  
The evaluation starts 
with a questionnaire 
“for each evaluation 
round, which shall be 
addressed to all 
members concerned by 
the evaluation” (Article 
11 of Statute). There is a 
model of questionnaire 
which is used for this 
purpose.442 
According to GRECO 
Rules of Procedure 
(Title II on Evaluation 
Procedure), Rule 24:443  
“1. The mutual 
evaluation 
questionnaire shall be 
shall select the 
specific provisions 
on which the 
evaluation 
procedure shall be 
based. 4. Each 
member shall 
identify a maximum 
of 5 experts who 
would be able to 
undertake the tasks 
set out in Articles 12-
14. 5. Each member 
shall ensure that its 
authorities co-
operate, to the fullest 
possible extent, in 
the evaluation 
procedure, within 
the limits of its 
national legislation.” 
Article 11 deals with 
the Questionnaire, 
and stipulates: “1. 
The GRECO shall 
adopt a 
questionnaire for 
each evaluation 
round, which shall 
GRECO also contain 
an overall 
conclusion on the 
implementation of 
all the 
recommendations, 
the purpose of 
which is to decide 
whether to 
terminate the 
compliance 
procedure in respect 
of a particular 
member. Finally, the 
Rules of Procedure 
of GRECO foresee a 
special procedure, 
based on a 
graduated 
approach, for 
dealing with 
members whose 
response to 
GRECO’s 
recommendations 
has been found to 
                                                          
442 Available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/Greco%20(2012)%2022E%20Questionnaire%20Eval%20IV%20REVISED_EN.pdf. 
443 GRECO Rules of Procedure, 5 December 2011, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Greco(2011)20_RulesOfProcedure_EN.pdf. 
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sent to all members 
undergoing an 
evaluation. Unless 
otherwise decided by 
GRECO the replies to 
the questionnaire shall 
be returned to the 
Executive Secretary 
within the time limit set 
by GRECO. 2. The 
replies to the mutual 
evaluation 
questionnaire shall be 
detailed, answer all 
questions and contain 
all necessary 
appendices. Whenever 
a country visit is to be 
carried out, these 
documents shall be 
submitted to the 
Executive Secretary at 
least three months 
before the visit.” 
be addressed to all 
members concerned 
by the evaluation. 2. 
The questionnaire 
shall provide the 
framework of the 
evaluation 
procedure. 3. 
Members shall 
address their replies 
to the Secretariat 
within the time 
limits fixed by the 
GRECO.” 
Article 12 covers 
‘Evaluation teams’, 
and states: “1. The 
GRECO shall 
appoint, from the 
experts referred to in 
paragraph 4 of 
Article 10, a team for 
the evaluation of 
each member 
(hereinafter referred 
to as “the team”). 
When the evaluation 
concerns the 
implementation of 
one of the 
international legal 
instruments adopted 
be globally 
unsatisfactory.”444 
 
Article 16 of the 
Statute deals with 
‘Public Statements’, 
and states: “1. The 
Statutory 
Committee may 
issue a public 
statement when it 
believes that a 
member remains 
passive or takes 
insufficient action in 
respect of the 
recommendations 
addressed to it as 
regards the 
application of the 
Guiding Principles. 
2. The Statutory 
Committee, in its 
composition 
restricted to the 
members who are 
parties to the 
instruments 
concerned, may 
issue a public 
statement when it 
believes that a 
                                                          
444 Quoted from http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/4.%20How%20does%20GRECO%20work_en.asp. 
 PE 579.328  161 
 WHAT WHO 
HOW 
Procedure Method Follow-up 
in pursuance of the 
Programme of 
Action against 
Corruption, the 
GRECO shall 
appoint teams 
composed 
exclusively of 
experts proposed by 
members who are 
Parties to the 
instrument 
concerned. 2. The 
team shall examine 
the replies given to 
the questionnaire 
and may request, 
where appropriate, 
additional 
information from the 
member undergoing 
the evaluation, to be 
submitted either 
orally or in writing. 
Article 13 - Country 
visits foresees that 
“1. The GRECO may 
instruct the team to 
visit a member, for 
the purpose of 
seeking additional 
information 
concerning its law or 
practice, which is 
member remains 
passive or takes 
insufficient action in 
respect of the 
recommendations 
addressed to it as 
regards the 
implementation of 
an instrument 
adopted in 
pursuance of the 
Programme of 
Action against 
Corruption. 
3. The Statutory 
Committee shall 
inform the member 
concerned and 
provide an 
opportunity for the 
member to submit 
further comments 
before confirming 
its decision to issue 
a public statement 
referred to in 
paragraphs 1 
and/or 2 above.” 
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useful for the 
evaluation. 2. The 
GRECO shall give a 
minimum of two 
months’ notice to the 
member concerned 
of its intention to 
carry out the visit. 3. 
The visit shall be 
carried out in 
accordance with a 
programme 
arranged by the 
member concerned, 
taking into account 
the wishes expressed 
by the team. 4. The 
members of the team 
shall enjoy the 
privileges and 
immunities 
applicable under 
Article 2 of the 
Protocol to the 
General Agreement 
on Privileges and 
Immunities of the 
Council of Europe. 5. 
The budget of the 
Enlarged Partial 
Agreement shall 
bear the travel and 
subsistence expenses 
necessary for the 
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carrying out country 
visits.” 
Article 14 on 
Evaluation reports 
states: “1. On the 
basis of the 
information 
gathered, the team 
shall prepare a 
preliminary draft 
evaluation report on 
the state of the law 
and the practice in 
relation to the 
provisions selected 
for the evaluation 
round. 2. The 
preliminary draft 
report shall be 
transmitted to the 
member undergoing 
the evaluation for 
comments. These 
comments shall be 
taken into account 
by the team when 
finalising the draft 
report. 3. The draft 
report shall be 
submitted to the 
GRECO”. 
Evaluation Reports 
are confidential 
(Article 15.5 of the 
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Statute). 
European Committee 
on Crime Problems 
(CDPC)445 
Terms of Reference446     
Council for 
Penological 
Cooperation (PC– 
CP)447 
Terms of Reference448     
Committee of Experts 
on the Operation of 
European 
Conventions on Co-
Operation in 
Criminal Matters 
(PC-OC)449 
Terms of Reference450     
European Committee 
for Social Cohesion, 
Human Dignity and 
Equality451 
The CDDECS was set 
up by the Committee of 
Ministers under Article 
17 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe and 
in accordance with 
Resolution 
CM/Res(2011)24 on 
intergovernmental 
“The CDDECS 
Committee consists 
of representatives 
from CoE Member 
States. The 
governments of each 
member State 
designate one 
representative of the 
Its work is divided into 
several Working 
Groups, and the results 
are discussed in Plenary 
Sessions.454 It issues 
country reports on 
recent developments at 
national level. 
  
                                                          
445 For general information on the Committee refer to http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDPC/default_en.asp. 
446 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdpc/ToR%20CDPC%202014-2015.pdf. 
447 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/prisons/PCCP_en.asp. 
448 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/prisons/PCCP%20documents%202014/PC-CP%20Terms%20of%20Reference%202014-2015%20E.pdf. 
449 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/pc-oc/default_en.asp. 
450 http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/PC-OC/PCOC_documents/Documents%202015/PC-OC%20terms%20of%20reference%202016-
2017.pdf. 
451 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/. 
454 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/plenary-sessions  
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committees and 
subordinate bodies.  
It oversees and 
coordinates the 
intergovernmental 
work of the CoE in the 
fields of social 
cohesion, human 
dignity, equality and 
anti-discrimination. It 
advises the Committee 
of Ministers on all 
questions within its 
area of competence. 
According to the Terms 
of Reference,452 its tasks 
include: 
First, oversee, promote 
and review the 
implementation of the 
Council of Europe 
Strategy and Action 
Plan for Social 
Cohesion (2010) and 
develop appropriate 
tools to promote social 
cohesion, combat 
discrimination, 
marginalisation, social 
exclusion and poverty.  
Second, support the 
implementation of the 
highest possible rank 
and expertise in the 
relevant fields. The 
representatives have 
responsibility at the 
national level for the 
planning, 
development and 
implementation of 
policies relevant to 
the work of the 
Committee and are 
appointed by their 
governments to co-
ordinate at national 
level all elements of 
government policy 
relevant to the work 
of the Committee. 
Each member of the 
committee has one 
vote. Where a 
government 
designates more 
than one member, 
only one of them is 
entitled to take part 
in the voting.”453 
The Terms of 
Reference state that 
the members will 
have the 
                                                          
452 http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/terms-of-reference. 
453 Quoted from http://www.coe.int/en/web/cddecs/committee. 
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Gender Equality 
transversal 
programme. 
Third, support the 
implementation of the 
transversal programme 
“Building a Europe for 
and with Children” 
and of the Council of 
Europe Strategy for the 
Rights of the Child 
2012-15; support the 
preparation of the 
Strategy for 2016-19; 
and promote measures 
to prevent and 
eliminate all forms of 
violence against 
children and to protect 
and support child 
victims of violence.  
Fourth, oversee the 
promotion, 
implementation, 
follow-up and final 
review of the Council 
of Europe Disability 
Action Plan 2006-15, as 
well as the 
development of the 
Council of Europe 
post-2015 disability 
framework. 
Fifth, contribute, 
responsibility for 
“the planning, 
development and 
implementation of 
policies relevant to 
the work of the 
Committee and 
appointed by their 
governments to co-
ordinate at national 
level all elements of 
government policy 
relevant to the work 
of the Committee. 
Each member of the 
committee shall have 
one vote. Where a 
government 
designates more 
than one member, 
only one of them is 
entitled to take part 
in the voting.” 
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promote and support 
in its field of 
competence the 
implementation of 
standards, in particular 
through the promotion 
of the relevant Council 
of Europe conventions 
and the work carried 
out by ECRI, 
supporting States in the 
exchange of good 
practice to address the 
problems highlighted 
by monitoring 
mechanisms, taking 
into account the 
activities of other 
international 
organisations, in 
particular the 
European Union, the 
United Nations and the 
OSCE. 
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ANNEX 2 
Status of ratification of Human Rights Instruments by EU Member States455 
(As of 13/02/2013) 
 
 
C
E
R
D
 
C
E
R
D
: 
 
A
rt
. 
1
4 
C
C
P
R
 
O
P
T
. 
P
R
O
T
. 
2
n
d
 O
P
 
C
E
S
C
R
 
O
P
-C
E
S
C
R
 
C
A
T
 
C
A
T
 :
 A
rt
. 
22
 
O
P
C
A
T
 
C
E
D
A
W
 
C
E
D
A
W
: 
O
P
 
C
R
C
 
C
R
C
:O
P
S
C
 
C
R
C
: 
O
P
A
C
 
C
R
C
: 
O
P
IC
**
* 
C
M
W
 
C
R
P
D
 *
 
C
R
P
D
: 
O
P
 *
 
C
P
P
E
D
 *
* 
C
P
P
E
D
 *
* 
 
A
rt
. 
3
1 
C
P
P
E
D
 *
* 
A
rt
. 
3
2 
 
  
  
  
  
Austria  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 Austria  
Belgium  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 1 1 Belgium  
Bulgaria  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Bulgaria  
Croatia 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Croatia 
Cyprus  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Cyprus  
Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Czech Republic 
Denmark  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Denmark  
Estonia  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Estonia  
Finland  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 0 0 0 0 0 Finland  
France  1 1 1 1 1 1 S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 1 1 France  
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 0 0 Germany 
Greece  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Greece  
Hungary  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Hungary  
Ireland  1 1 1 1 1 1 S 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ireland  
Italy  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Italy  
Latvia  1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Latvia  
Lithuania  1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Lithuania  
                                                          
455
 Compilation as requested by the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 
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Luxembourg  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Luxembourg  
Malta  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Malta  
Netherlands  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 Netherlands  
Poland  1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 Poland  
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Portugal 
Romania  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 0 0 0 0 Romania  
Slovakia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Slovakia 
Slovenia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 0 0 0 Slovenia 
Spain  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S 0 1 1 1 1 1 Spain  
Sweden  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 Sweden  
UK 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 UK 
  28 22 28 27 26 28 3 28 23 20 28 25 28 26 27 2 0 25 20 6 4 4 373 
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Source: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx. 
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ANNEX 3 
UNITED NATIONS456 
 
 WHAT WHO HOW 
Procedure 
Method 
Follow-up 
“Following the review by the Working Group, a 
report is prepared by the troika with the 
involvement of the State under review and 
assistance from the OHCHR. This report, referred 
to as the “outcome report”, provides a summary of 
the actual discussion. It therefore consists of the 
questions, comments and recommendations made 
by States to the country under review, as well as 
the responses by the reviewed State.” 
It is a ‘state driven process’. 
The documents on which the reviews are based are:  
1) information provided by the State under review, 
which can take the form of a “national report”;  
2) information contained in the reports of 
independent human rights experts and groups, 
known as the Special Procedures (see below), 
The State has the primary 
responsibility to 
implement the 
recommendations 
contained in the final 
outcome. The UPR 
ensures that all countries 
are accountable for 
progress or failure in 
implementing these 
recommendations. 
During the second 
review the State is 
expected to provide 
information on what they 
have been doing to 
Universal 
Periodic Review 
(UPR)492 
Review of ‘the human 
rights record’ of UN 
members.493  
The UPR will assess 
the extent to which 
States respect their 
human rights 
obligations set out in: 
(1) the UN Charter; (2) 
the Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights; (3) human 
rights instruments to 
which the State is 
party (human rights 
The reviews are 
conducted by the UPR 
Working Group. 
The Group is 
composed of 47 
members of the 
Council. 
Any UN Member State 
can take part in the 
discussion/dialogue 
with the reviewed 
States.  
Each State review is 
assisted by groups of 
three States, known as 
                                                          
456
 Compilation as requested by the Directorate General for Parliamentary Research Services. 
492 UN General Assembly on 15 March 2006 by resolution 60/251. See also the information of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, part of the UN 
Secretariat. mandated to support the work of all UN human rights mechanism. See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx and 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx. 
493 Refer to UN, Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General 
Human rights bodies and mechanisms, 29 January 2015. Retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx. See also 
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM. 
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treaties ratified by the 
State concerned); (4) 
voluntary pledges and 
commitments made 
by the State (e.g. 
national human rights 
policies and/or 
programmes 
implemented); and, (5) 
applicable 
international 
humanitarian law. 
‘troikas’, which serve 
as rapporteurs. The 
selection of the troikas 
for each State is done 
through a drawing of 
lots following 
elections for the 
Council membership 
in the General 
Assembly. 
human rights treaty bodies, and other UN entities;  
3) information from other stakeholders including 
national human rights institutions and non-
governmental organisations. 
With the support of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), special procedures include country 
visits to analyse the human rights situation at the 
national level; act on individual cases and concerns 
of a broader, structural nature by 
sending communications to States and others in 
which they bring alleged violations or abuses to 
their attention; conduct thematic studies and 
convene expert consultations; contribute to the 
development of international human rights 
standards; engage in advocacy, raise public 
awareness, and provide advice for technical 
cooperation. Special procedures are reported 
annually to the Human Rights Council; the 
majority of the mandates also reports to the 
General Assembly.457 
All State parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the Committee on how the rights are 
being implemented. States must report initially one 
year after acceding to the Convention and then 
every two years. The Committee examines each 
report and addresses its concerns and 
recommendations to the State party in the form of 
“concluding observations”. 
“In order to facilitate the work of the Committee, 
States parties are once again requested to ensure 
implement the 
recommendations made 
during the first review as 
well as on any 
developments in the field 
of human rights. The 
international community 
will assist in 
implementing the 
recommendations and 
conclusions regarding 
capacity-building and 
technical assistance, in 
consultation with the 
country concerned. If 
necessary, the Council 
will address cases where 
States are not 
cooperating. 
If the State does not 
cooperate, the Human 
Rights Council will 
decide on the measures it 
would need to take in 
case of persistent non-co-
operation by a State with 
the UPR. 
Human Rights 
Council (Special 
Procedures) 
Idem Independent human 
rights experts with 
mandates to report 
and advise on human 
Special procedures 
regularly make 
recommendations to 
countries and other 
                                                          
457 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. 
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rights from a thematic 
or country-specific 
perspective.494 
As of 27 March 2015 
there are 41 thematic 
and 14 country 
mandates. 
Special procedures are 
either an individual 
(called “Special 
Rapporteur” or 
“Independent Expert”) 
or a working group 
composed of five 
members, one from 
each of the five United 
Nations regional 
groupings: Africa, 
Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 
Eastern Europe and 
the Western group. 
The Special 
Rapporteurs, 
Independent Experts 
and members of the 
that the reports correspond strictly to the 
provisions of the Convention and that they are 
drafted in accordance with the guidelines adopted 
by the Committee. States parties are invited to 
submit reports that are as succinct and concise as 
possible.” 
The procedure is as follows:458 reports of State 
parties, presence of the delegations of State parties, 
introductory presentation of State party’s 
representative, action of country rapporteurs,459 
interventions by members of the Committee, reply 
of the State party’s representative, Committee’s 
concluding observations, written comments by 
State party. 
 
“In addition, the Convention establishes three other 
mechanisms through which the Committee 
performs its monitoring functions: the early-
warning procedure, the examination of inter-state 
complaints and the examination of individual 
complaints.” 
The Committee will be provided by the secretariat, 
well in advance of the session, with country 
presentations concerning the State parties whose 
periodic reports are due to be considered by the 
Committee, or the State parties scheduled for 
stakeholders in their 
reports to the Human 
Rights Council. 
All recommendations 
contained in country visit 
reports by special 
procedures since 2006, as 
well as direct access to 
the reports in which the 
recommendations are 
included, are accessible 
through the Universal 
Human Rights Index.  
The database provides 
easy access to country-
specific human rights 
information emanating 
from 
international human 
rights mechanisms in the 
United Nations system: 
the Treaty Bodies, the 
Special Procedures and 
the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR). Refer to 
http://uhri.ohchr.org/. 
                                                          
494 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx See also ‘Facts and Figures’ at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/Facts_Figures2013.pdf  
458 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#A. 
459 “The country rapporteurs, in presentations that should also not exceed 30 minutes, must highlight aspects relevant to the fulfilment of the obligations arising under the 
Convention, and also those where shortcomings or deficiencies are apparent. They will also put questions aimed at supplementing the information received and ensuring 
greater clarity or precision with respect to the information received. These questions may be conveyed to the State party beforehand”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx#J. 
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Working Groups are 
appointed by the 
Human Rights 
Council and serve in 
their personal 
capacities.  
examination under the review procedure. These 
presentations, to be treated as confidential 
documents, should contain a summary of the 
information available on the country in connection 
with the periodic reports.460 
The Committee can also carry out missions by 
members to States parties. “in order to assist where 
their presence would be useful in facilitating better 
implementation of the Convention. The Committee 
appoints one or more members to undertake such 
missions. When an invitation for a mission is 
received between meetings of the Committee, the 
Chairman will request one or more members to 
undertake the mission, after consulting the 
members of the Bureau. Members of the Committee 
participating in such a mission will report to the 
Committee at its next session.” 
There is first a pre-sessional working group which 
convenes five days before each of the Committee’s 
sessions. It is composed of five members of the 
Committee nominated by the Chairperson. 
The Group identifies the key issues or questions or 
list of issues (LOI) which will structure the dialogue 
with the State in question. 
These recommendations 
can be searched by topic, 
right, mandate, region or 
country. 
Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies495  
  Follow-up496  
Committee on the 
Elimination of 
Racial 
Discrimination 
(CERD)497 
Application of the 
International 
Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
The Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral standing 
and acknowledged 
impartiality. 
Consideration must 
also be given to 
equitable geographical 
distribution and to the 
representation of the 
different forms of 
civilisation as well as 
CERD has a special 
follow-up procedure for 
its recommendations and 
for considering the 
situation of State parties 
that have not submitted 
even an initial report, or 
whose reports are 
considerably overdue. 
The Committee, through 
its observations and 
recommendations with 
respect to State parties in 
such a situation, draws 
the attention of the State 
party concerned to the 
                                                          
460 On methods refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx.“Overview of the methods of work of the Committee”, of the report of 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on its forty-eighth and forty-ninth sessions. Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 
18(A/51/18), paras. 587-627. 
495 Refer to The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, Factsheet No. 30/Rev. 1, 2012 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet30Rev1.pdf For an 
overview of the current working methods of the nine Human Rights Treaty Bodies refer to UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Overview of the human rights treaty 
body system and working methods related to the review of States parties, 12 April 2013. 
496 For an overview on follow up by Treaty body refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx  
497 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CERD/Pages/CERDIndex.aspx  
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of the principal legal 
systems. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
article 8 of the 
Convention. Elections 
for nine of the 
eighteen members are 
held every two years, 
ensuring a balance 
between continuity 
and change in the 
composition of the 
Committee. Members 
serve in their personal 
capacity and may be 
re-elected if 
nominated. 
As it is stated “24. It is generally accepted that the 
complex nature and diverse range of many of the 
issues raised in connection with the 
implementation of the Covenant constitute a strong 
argument in favour of providing States parties with 
the possibility of preparing in advance to answer 
some of the principal questions arising out of their 
reports. Such an arrangement also enhances the 
likelihood that the State party will be able to 
provide precise and detailed information.”461 
Depending on the expertise of the member 
concerned, issues are allocated within the Working 
Group. They function as ‘country rapporteurs’ and 
the final version of the list is adopted by the entire 
group. 
The Secretariat provides the Working Group with a 
country analysis and other relevant documents. 
The list of issues is then sent to State members,462 
requesting them to provide in written their replies. 
As part of the Dialogue, representatives of the State 
concerned should be present at the meetings of the 
consequences of such 
non-compliance and 
reminds it of its reporting 
obligations under 
article 9 of the 
Convention.  
It furthermore makes 
recommendations to the 
State party with a view to 
ensuring the 
implementation of the 
Convention. The 
Committee includes a 
special chapter on such 
cases in its annual report 
to the General Assembly 
for the Assembly to take 
what action it deems 
appropriate.498 
CERD can request 
additional information 
and even a new report by 
                                                          
461 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
462 This includes a note stating the following: “The list is not intended to be exhaustive and it should not be interpreted as limiting or in any other way prejudging the type and 
range of questions which members of the Committee might wish to ask. However, the Committee believes that the constructive dialogue which it wishes to have with the 
representatives of the State party is greatly facilitated by making the list available in advance of the Committee’s session. In order to improve the dialogue that the Committee 
seeks, it strongly urges each State party to provide in writing its replies to the list of issues and to do so sufficiently in advance of the session at which its report will be 
considered to enable the replies to be translated and made available to all members of the Committee.” 
498 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/FollowUp.aspx?Treaty=CERD&amp;Lang=en  
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Committee.463 
After the relevant procedure, the Committee drafts 
its ‘concluding observations’ with the following 
structure: introduction, positive aspects, principal 
subjects of concern and suggestions and 
recommendations. State parties can make 
comments to the concluding observations. 
Working Methods:464 “Once the State party has 
ratified the Covenant it should submit, one year 
after the Covenant enters into force, its initial report 
to the Committee. For periodic reports, it is the 
Bureau of the Committee, at the end of the session 
at which the State party report is examined, which 
decides the number of years after which the State 
party should present their next report.  
The general rule (ever since this system was started 
two years ago) is that State parties should present 
their periodic report to the Committee every four 
years. However, the Bureau can add or subtract one 
year to this four-year period depending on the level 
of compliance with the Covenant’s provisions by 
the State party.”465 
the State concerned on 
the implementation of its 
recommendations. It 
appoints for a period of 
two years a coordinator 
of the follow-up 
procedure, and presents 
the follow-up report 
before the Committee. 
Committee on 
Economic, Social 
and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR)499  
 
Monitors the 
implementation of the 
International 
Covenant on 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
The Committee was 
established 
under ECOSOC 
Resolution 1985/17 of 
28 May 1985 with the 
main task of 
monitoring functions 
The Committee on 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members 
are elected for a term 
of four years by State 
CESCR may request the 
State to provide more 
detailed information or 
statistics concerning 
specific follow-up issues 
before the next periodic 
reporting period. It can 
also ask a State party to 
implement a technical 
assistance mission (one 
or two committee 
members) and if the State 
is unwilling to cooperate 
                                                          
463 The following procedure is followed: “[T]he representative of the State party is invited to introduce the report by making brief introductory comments and providing any 
new information that may be relevant to the dialogue. The Committee then considers the report by clusters of articles (usually articles 1–5, 6–9, 10–12 and 13–15), taking 
particular account of the replies furnished in response to the list of issues. The Chairperson will normally invite questions or comments from Committee members in relation to 
each issue and then invite the State party representatives to reply immediately to questions that do not require further reflection or research. Any remaining questions are taken 
up at a subsequent meeting or, if necessary, may be the subject of additional information provided to the Committee in writing. Members of the Committee are free to pursue 
specific issues in the light of the replies thus provided, although the Committee has urged them not to (a) raise issues outside the scope of the Covenant; (b) repeat questions 
already posed or answered; (c) add unduly to an already long list on a particular issue; or (d) speak for more than five minutes in any one intervention.” Quoted from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
464 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx and the Guidelines are available at 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/doc/Implementing_Human_Rights/English/Reporting/UN%20Conventions/Guidelines/ICCPR.pdf. 
465 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
499 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx  
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assigned to the United 
Nations Economic and 
Social Council 
(ECOSOC). 
parties in accordance 
with ECOSOC 
Resolution 1985/17 of 
28 May 1985. Members 
serve in their personal 
capacity and may be 
re-elected if 
nominated. 
The Committee may call for a report three, five or 
six years after the submission of a periodic report, 
depending on the State party’s level of compliance 
with the provisions of the Covenant, including its 
reporting record. Refer to Rules 66 and 70, para. 1, 
of the rules of Procedure. 
‘Pre-Session Working Group’  
Country Report Tasks Forces (between four and six 
members) which identify in advance the questions 
which will constitute the principal focus of the 
dialogue with the representatives of the reporting 
State. One of these members is the country 
rapporteur who is overall responsible for the 
drafting of the list of issues. 
The working methods of the Country Report Task 
Force are as follows: First, the country rapporteur 
presents the draft list of issues for discussion to the 
Country Report Task Force. Once the members 
have made their observations, the list of issues is 
adopted by the Task Force as a whole. The Task 
Force then allocates to each of its members 
principal responsibility for a certain number of 
questions included in the list of issues, based in 
part on the areas of particular expertise or interest 
of the member concerned. Once the list of issues is 
adopted and edited, it is transmitted to the State 
party.466 
‘Constructive Dialogue’ 
It is the practice of the Committee, in accordance 
CESCR may submit the 
issue for consideration at 
the Economic and Social 
Council. The Committee 
decided at its 36 session 
to proceed as follows: 
“(a) In all concluding 
observations, the 
Committee would 
request the State party to 
inform the Committee, in 
its next periodic report, 
about steps taken to 
implement the 
recommendations in the 
concluding observations; 
(b) Where appropriate, 
the Committee may, in its 
concluding observations, 
make a specific request to 
a State party to provide 
more information or 
statistical data at a time 
prior to the date that the 
next periodic report is 
due to be submitted; (c) 
Where appropriate, the 
Committee may, in its 
concluding observations, 
                                                          
466 “In preparation for the Country Report Task Force, the secretariat places at the disposal of its members a country analysis as well as all pertinent documents containing 
information relevant to each of the reports to be examined. For this purpose, the Committee invites all concerned individuals, bodies and non-governmental organizations to 
submit relevant and appropriate documentation to the secretariat.” 
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with Rule 68 of its Rules of Procedure, to examine 
reports in the presence of representatives of the 
reporting States. 
Procedure: The representative of the State party is 
invited to introduce the report by making brief 
introductory comments, followed by the replies to 
the first group of questions included in the list of 
issues.  
It should be noted that State parties are encouraged 
to use the list of issues to better prepare for a 
constructive discussion, but are not expected to 
submit written answers. After this intervention, the 
Committee members will provide comments or 
further questions in relation to the replies provided. 
Although all Committee members participate in 
this dialogue, the members of the Country Task 
Force who are responsible for a pre-assigned 
number of questions, will have priority when 
asking questions to the representatives of the State 
party. The representative of the State party is then 
invited to reply to the remaining questions on the 
list of issues, to which will again follow the 
comments and questions of the Committee. 
 
‘Concluding Observations/Comments’  
The final phase of the Committee’s examination of 
the State report is the drafting and adoption of its 
concluding observations. The country rapporteur 
prepares draft concluding observations for the 
consideration of the Committee.467 
ask the State party to 
respond to any pressing 
specific issue identified 
in the concluding 
observations prior to the 
date that the next report 
is due to be submitted; 
(d) Any information 
provided in accordance 
with (b) and (c) above 
would be considered by 
the next meeting of the 
Committee’s pre-
sessional working group; 
(e) In general, the 
working group could 
recommend that the 
Committee take one of 
the following measures: 
(i) That the Committee 
take note of such 
information; 
(ii) That the Committee 
adopt specific additional 
concluding observations 
in response to that 
information; 
(iii) That the matter be 
pursued through a 
request for further 
                                                          
467 The agreed structure of the concluding observations is as follows: introduction; positive aspects; factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant; 
principal subjects of concern and suggestions and recommendations. 
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Reports by State parties to the Committee.468 So it is 
a ‘state driven process’. 
 
Documentation supplied by the Secretariat: The 
Committee will be provided with country files on 
the reporting State party. These files will include all 
material received by the secretariat, such as the 
official report, NGO and IGO information and 
other relevant documents. 
It also envisages cooperation with other specialised 
UN bodies and agencies, as well as NGOs and 
human rights organisations before the examination 
of a State report by the Committee.469 
State parties are obliged to submit regular reports 
to the Committee on how the rights of the 
Convention are implemented. During its sessions 
the Committee considers each State party report 
and addresses its concerns and recommendations 
to the State party in the form of concluding 
observations. 
In accordance with the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention, the Committee is mandated to: (1) 
receive communications from individuals or 
groups of individuals submitting claims of 
information; or (iv) That 
the Chairperson of the 
Committee be authorized 
to inform the State party, 
in advance of the next 
session, that the 
Committee would take 
up the issue at its next 
session and that, for that 
purpose, the 
participation of a 
representative of the 
State party in the work of 
the Committee would be 
welcome; (f) If the 
information requested in 
accordance with (b) and 
(c) above is not provided 
by the specified date, or 
is patently unsatisfactory, 
the Chairperson, in 
consultation with the 
members of the Bureau, 
could be authorized to 
follow up the matter with 
                                                          
468 On the simplified reporting procedure refer to UN ICCPR, Focused reports based on replies to ‘lists of issues prior to reporting’ (LOIPR): Implementation of the new 
optional reporting procedure (LOIPR procedure), 29 September 2010, so instead of a period report there is a so-called “focused report based on replies to a list of issues”. The 
LOPIR includes two sections: a first section on “General information on the national human rights situation, including new measures and developments relating to the 
implementation of the Covenant”; and a second section “where questions are organized according to clusters of provisions as in the standard list of issues, highlighting specific 
issues depending on the situation of the concerned State party and the information available to the Committee, in particular, the recommendations included in the last 
concluding observations addressed to the State party as well any follow-up information provided by the State.” 
469 The Committee, in its Annual Report (2002), stated that it reserved the right to determine, at a later stage, whether other briefings by non-governmental organisations should 
also become part of the Committee’s official record: (10) Paragraph 12, Annex III, Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee (2002), A/57/40 (Vol. I). 
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violations of rights protected under the Convention 
to the Committee and (2) initiate inquiries into 
situations of grave or systematic violations of 
women’s rights. These procedures are optional and 
are only available where the State concerned has 
accepted them. 
The Committee also formulates general 
recommendations and suggestions. General 
recommendations are directed to States and 
concern articles or themes in the Conventions. 
The procedure is also based on State reporting.470 
States are under the obligation to submit 
information regarding the ways in which they have 
or are implementing the Convention, as well as the 
‘recommendations’ of the Committee.  
They will need to submit a report one year after the 
entry into force of the Convention, and then 
periodic reports every four years. It can also 
consider individual communications, adopting 
general comments and implement inquiries.471 
Similar to other treaty bodies, CATS has adopted 
guidelines for States’ initial and periodic reports, 
which includes a common core document to be 
used when submitting the report to the Committee. 
Special focus is paid in the reporting to the practical 
implementation of the Convention as well as 
challenges characterising this implementation.  
the State party.” 
Human Rights 
Committee500 
Review the 
application of the 
International 
Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
The Human Rights 
Committee is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
Articles 28 to 39 of the 
Covenant.501  
Members serve in their 
personal capacity and 
may be re-elected if 
nominated. 
The Committee has a 
special follow-up 
procedure. It shall 
appoint a special 
rapporteur to report back 
to the Committee 
concerning information 
received from the State 
party (within a specified 
deadline) as to the steps 
taken to meet the 
recommendations of the 
Committee provided in 
the Concluding 
Observations. 
This sessional follow-up 
progress report will 
prompt the Committee 
plenary to make a 
determination of the 
date/deadline for the 
submission of the next 
report.  
This special follow-up 
procedure does not apply 
in cases of examination of 
country situations (i.e. 
                                                          
470 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
471 CAT C/3/Rev 5, Rules of Procedure, 21 February 2011.  
500 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx  
501 United Nations, ICCPR, Human Rights Committee, Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, 11 January 2012. 
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During the phase preceding the preparation of the 
reports by the States, the Committee consults with 
national human rights organisations as well as 
NGOs, which may provide information 
substantiating the work of the Committee.  
The Committee drafts a list of issues (LOI), which is 
sent to the State concerned.  
The States are under the obligation to respond to 
the LOI in writing, before the dialogue with the 
State’s delegation takes place. 
“The Committee holds two sessions annually, a 
four-week session in November and a four-week 
session in May, examining between 8 and 9 reports 
per session; a delegation from each country is 
invited to be present during the dialogue.”472 
The assessment of the report occurs in the shape of 
a ‘dialogue’:  
“The aim of the dialogue is to enhance the 
Committee’s understanding of the situation in the 
State party as it pertains to the Convention and to 
provide advice on how to improve the 
implementation of the Convention provisions in the 
State party. The dialogue also provides an 
opportunity for the State party to further explain its 
efforts to enhance prevention of torture and ill-
treatment and to clarify the contents of its report to 
the members of the Committee. Exceptionally, the 
Committee may examine a report in the absence of 
representatives of the State party when, after being 
notified, they fail to appear without providing 
strong reasons.” 
when the Committee 
examines the measures 
taken by the State party 
in the implementation of 
the Covenant in the 
absence of a State report). 
“When the State party 
has not presented a 
report, the Committee 
may, at its discretion, 
notify the State party of 
the date on which the 
Committee proposes to 
examine the measures 
taken by the State party 
to implement the rights 
guaranteed under the 
Covenant. If the State 
party is represented by a 
delegation, the 
Committee will, in 
presence of the 
delegation and in public 
session, proceed with the 
examination on the date 
assigned. If the State 
party is not represented, 
the Committee may, at its 
discretion, either decide 
to proceed to consider 
the measures taken by 
                                                          
472 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
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How the meeting takes place is interesting. 
According to the CAT website: 
“Two public meetings, a half-day meeting on the 
first day and another half-day on the following day, 
are generally devoted to the examination of a 
report. The first meeting begins with a short 
presentation by the State party’s representatives, 
who usually update the information contained in 
the report and, if applicable, highlight the most 
relevant issues of the replies to the LOI previously 
sent in written to the Committee. Subsequently, the 
country rapporteurs and other Committee 
members make comments, ask questions and seek 
additional information related to issues that they 
consider require clarification. They can raise 
matters that had not been referred to in the LOI. On 
the following day, the second meeting will be 
devoted to the replies of the State party’s 
representatives to the questions posed by the 
members during the first meeting as well as to any 
follow-up issues that might be raised by the 
Committee. 
Individual members do not participate in any 
aspect of the examination of the reports of the 
States parties of which they are nationals. 
Press releases in English and French are issued 
the State party to 
implement the 
guarantees of the 
Covenant at the initial 
date or notify a new date 
to the State party. In both 
cases the Committee will 
prepare provisional 
concluding observations 
which will be transmitted 
to the State party. The 
Committee will mention, 
in its Annual Report, that 
these provisional 
concluding observations 
were prepared, but their 
text will not be 
published.”502 
Moreover, in case of non-
cooperation by a State 
party, the Special 
Rapporteur may call for a 
meeting with a 
representative of the 
State party. Also, “the 
Committee has produced 
and updated a follow-up 
table which includes all 
the information on States 
parties that have gone 
through the follow-up 
                                                          
502 http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/kokusai/humanrights_library/treaty/data/HRC_GC_30e.pdf  
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immediately by the United Nations Information 
Service (www.unog.ch) regarding the meetings at 
which a State report is examined. Summary records 
are also issued after the closure of the session in 
English or French.” 
So a key incentive for State parties to provide 
information is that the assessment will take in any 
case place if they don’t provide the report “and 
such review would be carried out on the basis of 
information that is available to the Committee, 
including sources from outside the United 
Nations.”473 
Following the examination the two rapporteurs 
draft ‘concluding observations’ are discussed and 
adopted in plenary of the Committee. The 
Conclusions follow a specific format, which after a 
brief introduction include a section on ‘positive 
aspects’ and another one on ‘subjects of concern 
and recommendations’. The State parties may 
provide any follow-up or mention complementary 
issues in light of the concluding observations. They 
can also elaborate comments. It foresees the 
possibility of simplified reporting procedures.474 
The LIOs are prepared by “two country 
rapporteurs on the basis of the information 
contained in the report, previous concluding 
process since July 2006. 
The table is presented as 
an annex to the follow-up 
progress report. The 
Committee also 
publishes on its website 
CSO submissions on 
follow-up together with 
the follow-up replies 
from States parties.”503 
Committee on the 
Elimination of 
Discrimination 
Against Women 
(CEDAW)504 
 
The Committee on the 
Elimination of 
Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) is 
the body 
of independent 
experts that monitors 
implementation of 
the Convention on the 
Elimination of All 
Forms of 
Discrimination against 
Women. 
 
CEDAW consists of 23 
experts on women’s 
rights from around the 
world. A total of 104 
experts have served as 
members of the 
Committee since 1982. 
The officers of the 
Committee consist of a 
Chairperson, three 
Vice-Chairpersons and 
a Rapporteur. Office-
bearers serve for two 
year terms and are 
eligible for re-election 
“provided that the 
principle of rotation is 
CEDAW introduced a 
follow up procedure back 
in 2008. CEDAW calls 
states to give follow up 
information on the way 
in which they have 
implemented two 
recommendations in two 
years’ time. A rapporteur 
is also appointed to 
monitor the follow up. 
“It requests the State 
party to provide 
information within a 
period of one or two 
years on steps taken to 
implement specific 
                                                          
473 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/172/18/PDF/G1517218.pdf?OpenElement. 
474 See http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=HRI/MC/2014/4. 
503 UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Other activities of the human rights treaty bodies and participation of stakeholders in the human rights treaty body process, 
HRI/MC/2013/3, 22 April 2013, page 3. 
504 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx  
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upheld”. 
 
observations addressed by the Committee to the 
State and information originating from other treaty 
bodies, special procedures and from the United 
Nations system as well from others sources, 
including regional human rights mechanisms, 
NHRI and NGO and adopted by the Committee in 
plenary”.475 
 
It is the only Treaty body which does not require 
State parties to submit reports. The ICPPED does 
not require State parties to submit periodic reports. 
This body also constitutes an exception when it 
comes to ‘individual communications’. In 
comparison to the other bodies it is not possible for 
it to receive them. 
It has two main competences: 
First, visits to any place where a person may be 
deprived of liberty in State party territories.476 
There are four types of visits: SPT country visits, 
SPT country follow-up visits, NPM advisory visits 
and OPCAT advisory visits. 
Second, advice and assistance to State parties on 
the establishment of National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs), independent national bodies 
for the prevention of torture.477 The setting up of 
NPMs constitutes a requirement for State parties to 
recommendations. Such 
recommendations are 
selected because it is 
considered that their lack 
of implementation 
constitutes a major 
obstacle for the 
implementation of the 
Convention and 
implementation is seen as 
feasible within the 
suggested time frame. 
The Committee has a 
Rapporteur on follow-up 
and a Deputy Rapporteur 
who review and assess 
the follow-up 
information.”505 
Committee 
Against Torture 
(CAT)506 
 
It monitors 
implementation of 
the Convention 
against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading 
Treatment or 
Punishment by its 
The Committee is 
composed of 10 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
CAT has a special follow-
up procedure.507 The 
concluding observations 
include508 ‘issues to be 
followed up’ and which 
require the State party to 
report back on progress 
within the period of one 
                                                          
475 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
476 For a list of visits see http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/CountryVisits.aspx. 
477 The Subcommittee has provided guidelines on the setting up of NPMs, see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/NationalPreventiveMechanisms.aspx. 
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State parties. Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
article 17 of 
the Convention 
against Torture. 
Members serve in their 
personal capacity and 
may be re-elected if 
nominated.  
the Optional Protocol. 
It publishes an Annual Report478 which is presented 
before the CAT and the General Assembly.  
 
According to the SPT website,479 “The SPT 
undertakes country visits during which a 
delegation of its members visits places where 
persons may be deprived of their liberty. During its 
visits, the SPT examines the conditions of their 
detention, their daily life, including the manner in 
which they are treated, the relevant legislative and 
institutional frameworks, and other questions that 
may be related to the prevention of torture and ill 
treatment. At the end of its visits, the SPT draws up 
a written report which contains recommendations 
and observations to the State, requesting a written 
response within six months of its receipt. This then 
triggers a further round of discussion regarding the 
implementation of the SPT’s recommendations, and 
thus begins the process of continual dialogue. The 
SPT visit reports are confidential, though State 
parties are encouraged to make them public 
year. 
“The Committee 
identifies some of its 
recommendations that 
are serious, protective 
and can be achieved 
within one year, which it 
would like to receive 
information from the 
State party. The State 
party, within one year, 
must provide 
information on measures 
taken towards their 
implementation. 
The Committee has 
appointed a rapporteur 
to follow-up on the State 
party’s compliance with 
these requests.”509 The 
Rapporteur sends 
reminders to the States 
concerned. 
Its Annual Report (2014-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
505 CEDAW/C/54/3, Methodology of the Follow up Procedure, 13 March 2013. 
506 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx  
507 Refer to Article 72 of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure. 
508 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/58/44), para. 12. 
478 For a full list refer to http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=12&DocTypeID=27. 
479 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/OPCATIntro.aspx. 
509 Two documents of interest are the Overview of the Follow Up Procedure 2003-2015, available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/INT_CAT_FGD_7408_E.pdf; and Annual Report A/70/44, Chapter IV, paragraphs 46-74, Follow 
up to Concluding Observations on States’ Parties reports, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/172/18/PDF/G1517218.pdf?OpenElement  
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documents, as permitted by the OPCAT. 
When undertaking NPM advisory visits, the SPT 
focuses on issues concerning the establishment 
and/or operation of the NPM in the country 
concerned. OPCAT advisory visits focus on high-
level discussions with the relevant authorities 
concerning a whole range of issues concerning 
OPCAT compliance. 
The working methods can be summarised as 
follows.480 
State parties undertake to submit to the Committee 
reports on the implementation of the Convention 
within two years of the entry into force of the 
Convention for the State party concerned and 
thereafter every five years (Article 44.1 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
The Committee has issued guidelines for 
structuring and facilitating the dialogue with State 
parties.481 The agenda for the discussion takes place 
around the articles structuring the convention: 
(a) General measures of implementation (Arts. 4, 42 
and 44.6); (b) Definition of the child (Art. 1); (c) 
General principles (Arts. 2, 3, 6 and 12); (d) Civil 
rights and freedoms (Arts. 7, 8, 13-17 and 37a); (e) 
Family environment and alternative care (Arts. 5, 
18.1, 18.2, 9, 10, 27.4, 20, 21, 11, 19, 39 and 25); (f) 
Basic health and welfare (Arts. 6.2, 23, 24, 26, 18.3, 
27.1, 27.2 and 27.3); (g) Education, leisure and 
cultural activities (Arts. 28, 29 and 31); (h) Special 
15) states: 
“The Committee 
deplores the fact that that 
some States parties do 
not comply with their 
reporting obligations 
under article 19 of the 
Convention. At the time 
of reporting, there were 
28 States parties with 
overdue initial reports 
and 37 States parties with 
overdue periodic 
reports”. Refer to 
Chapter II of the Annual 
Report.” 
As a strategy to 
encourage compliance, 
the Annual Report to the 
General Assembly 
includes a full list of 
‘overdue reports’. The 
Annual Report states that 
the Committee will 
“establish a working 
group on the follow-up 
to concluding 
observations to prepare a 
note on follow-up to 
concluding observations 
                                                          
480 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
481 CRC/C/5 and CRC/C/58. 
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protection measures:  
(i) Children in situations of emergency (Arts. 22, 38 
and 39); (ii) Children in conflict with the law (Arts. 
40, 37 and 39); (iii) Children in situations of 
exploitation, including physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration (Arts. 32, 33, 34, 
35, 36 and 39); (iv) Children belonging to a minority 
or an indigenous group (Art. 30).  
 
Before the session in Committee where the report is 
assessed, there is a pre-sessional working group. 
The group organises a private meeting with UN 
agencies and bodies, NGOs, and other competent 
bodies such as National Human Rights Institutions 
and youth organisations. 
 
This pre-sessional working group leads to the 
enactment of a list of issues, whose purpose 
according to the Committee’s working methods 
follows:  
 
“The list of issues is intended to give the 
Government a preliminary indication of the issues 
which the Committee considers to be priorities for 
discussion. It also gives the Committee the 
opportunity to request additional or updated 
information in writing from the Government prior 
to the session. This approach gives Governments 
the opportunity better to prepare themselves for 
the discussion with the Committee, which usually 
takes place between 3 and 4 months after the 
working group. In order to facilitate the efficiency 
of the dialogue, the Committee requests the State 
and discuss the use of 
indicators” and  
“ (j) To request the 
rapporteurs on reprisals 
to prepare a document 
on concrete actions 
against reprisals.” 
Page 17 of the annual 
report states: “In 
November 2014, in his 
oral report to the 
Committee, the 
Rapporteur said that, in 
the light of the treaty 
body strengthening 
process and the 
Convention against 
Torture Initiative to 
ensure universal 
ratification within 10 
years, it was incumbent 
upon the Committee to 
enhance the follow-up 
procedure. He also said 
that two overriding 
questions were how to 
strengthen compliance 
with the Convention and 
how to measure the 
extent of that compliance. 
In May 2015, he 
suggested that the 
follow-up procedure 
 PE 579.328  187 
party to provide the answers to its List of Issues in 
writing and in advance of the session, in time for 
them to be translated into the working languages of 
the Committee. It also provides an opportunity to 
consider questions relating to technical assistance 
and international cooperation.”  
The State party report is discussed in an open and 
public session of the Committee. The focus is on 
‘progress achieved’ and ‘factors and difficulties 
encountered’ when implementing the Convention, 
but also a more strategic discussion with the 
delegation representing the State concerned, so as 
to discuss ‘future goals and implementation 
priorities’. 
 
The discussions with the State are led by two 
country rapporteurs appointed between the 
members of the Committee. 
 
After the discussions the Committee will draft 
‘concluding observations’ which also contain 
recommendations and specific suggestions. After 
an introduction, the concluding observations 
provide a similar format or structure dealing with 
positive aspects (including progress achieved); 
factors and difficulties impeding the 
implementation; principal subjects for concern; 
suggestions and recommendations addressed to the 
State party.  
 
The observations are made public and sent to the 
could be strengthened in 
several ways, such as by 
making the 
recommendations clearer 
and more implementable, 
inviting State parties to 
meet with the Committee 
on follow-up, using an 
assessment grading 
system to evaluate 
compliance, and using 
quantitative indicators to 
assist with the 
assessment of 
implementation. He also 
highlighted the role of 
civil society 
organizations in the 
follow-up procedure.”  
 
Subcommittee on 
the Prevention of 
Torture (SPT)510 
It has a preventive 
mandate “focused on 
an innovative, 
sustained and 
proactive approach to 
the prevention of 
torture and ill 
treatment.” It 
commenced its 
activities in 2007 on 
the basis of the 
Its composition 
include 25 
independent and 
impartial experts from 
different backgrounds 
and from various 
regions of the world. 
Members are elected 
by States Parties to the 
OPCAT for a four-year 
mandate and can be 
“if the State party refuses 
to co-operate or fails to 
take steps to improve the 
situation in light of the 
SPT’s recommendations, 
the SPT may request the 
Committee against 
Torture to make a public 
statement or to publish 
the SPT report if it has 
not yet been made 
                                                          
510 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx. 
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Optional Protocol to 
the Convention 
against Torture 
(OPCAT). 
re-elected once. State involved, and they are submitted to the 
United Nations General Assembly, through the 
Economic and Social Council, for its consideration, 
every two years. 
 
“The secretariat prepares country files for the pre-
sessional working group, containing information 
relevant to each of the reports to be examined. 
These include country specific information 
submitted by United Nations bodies and 
specialized agencies, non governmental 
organizations and other competent bodies. The 
secretariat also prepares country briefs. Prior to the 
plenary session both file and country briefs are 
updated and made available to the Committee 
members during the sessions.”482 
 
The monitoring system is based on States’ reporting 
in light of Article 73 of the Convention.483 
Article 73 of the Convention states: “1. States 
Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations for consideration by 
the Committee a report on the legislative, judicial, 
administrative and other measures they have taken 
to give effect to the provisions of the present 
Convention: 
public” 
Committee on the 
Rights of the Child 
(CRC)511 
 
It monitors the 
implementation of the 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child by 
its State parties. It also 
monitors 
implementation of 
two Optional 
Protocols to the 
Convention, on 
involvement of 
children in armed 
conflict (OPAC) and 
on sale of children 
child prostitution and 
child pornography 
(OPSC). On 19 
December 2011, the 
UN General Assembly 
approved a third 
Optional Protocol on a 
communications 
procedure (OPIC), 
which allow 
The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child is 
composed of 18 
independent experts 
who are persons of 
high moral character 
and recognised 
competence in the 
field of human rights. 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by State parties 
in accordance with 
Article 43 of the 
Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
Members serve in their 
personal capacity and 
may be re-elected if 
nominated. 
There is not a general 
obligation or special 
procedure to reply in 
written to the concluding 
observations and 
recommendations issues 
by the Committee. The 
State concerned ‘is 
expected to’ send the 
Committee written 
information on the 
follow-up measures. 
The Committee may 
decide to send to any 
relevant agency (such as 
OHCHR, UNICEF, ILO, 
UNESCO, WHO and 
UNHCHR) “any reports 
from States parties 
containing a request or 
indicating a need for 
technical advice or 
assistance, along with the 
Committee’s 
                                                          
482 Working Methods document retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. See also the Committee “Guidelines for the 
participation of partners (NGOs and individual experts) in the pre-sessional working group of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.” (CRC/C/90, Annex VIII.) 
483 See Rules of Procedure of the Committee, HRI/GEN/3/Rev.1/Add.1 7 May 2004. 
511 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx. 
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individual children to 
submit complaints 
regarding specific 
violations of their 
rights under the 
Convention and its 
first two optional 
protocols. The 
Protocol entered into 
force in April 2014. 
(a) Within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention for the State Party concerned; (b) 
Thereafter every five years and whenever the 
Committee so requests.” 
The reports focus on ‘factors and difficulties’ 
affecting the implementation of the Convention. 
They will also include information on the 
characteristics of migration flows in the State 
concerned. 
Article 74.1 stipulates: “The Committee shall 
examine the reports submitted by each State Party 
and shall transmit such comments as it may 
consider appropriate to the State Party concerned. 
This State Party may submit to the Committee 
observations on any comment made by the 
Committee in accordance with the present article. 
The Committee may request supplementary 
information from States Parties when considering 
these reports.”484 
The Committee then presents an Annual Report 
before the General Assembly on the 
implementation of the Convention, which contains 
its own considerations and recommendations 
“based, in particular, on the examination of the 
reports and any observations presented by States 
observations and 
suggestions.”512 
 
The Committee has 
underlined the 
importance of timely 
reporting.  
“At its twenty-ninth 
session (see CRC/C/114, 
paragraph 561), the 
Committee decided to 
send a letter to all States 
parties whose initial 
reports were due in 1992 
and 1993, requesting 
them to submit that 
report within one year. In 
June 2003, similar letters 
were sent to three States 
parties whose initial 
reports were due in 1994 
and never submitted. The 
Committee further 
decided to inform those 
States parties in the same 
letter that should they 
not report within one 
year, the Committee 
would consider the 
                                                          
484 The same article states: “6. The Committee may invite representatives of other specialized agencies and organs of the United Nations, as well as of intergovernmental 
organizations, to be present and to be heard in its meetings whenever matters falling within their field of competence are considered.” 
512 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx  
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Parties.” 
Article 76 provides signatories to recognise the 
competence of the Committee “to receive and 
consider communications to the effect that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling 
its obligations under the present Convention.” 
And Article 77 “to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim that their 
individual rights as established by the present 
Convention have been violated by that State Party”. 
Similar to other Treaty bodies, the Committee 
identifies a set or list of issues prior to reporting 
(LoIPR) which are sent to the States concerned and 
which are aimed at structuring the periodic 
reporting procedures. On the basis of the reports by 
State parties, the Committee elaborates Concluding 
Remarks or observations.  
 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.485  
The reporting by States follows the common set of 
harmonised guidelines on reporting under the 
human rights treaties.486 
The Working Methods can be summarised as 
follows:487 
It is a State reporting based model. Article 35, 
situation of child rights 
in the State in the absence 
of the initial report, as 
foreseen in the 
Committee’s “Overview 
of the reporting 
procedures” (CRC/C/33, 
paras. 29-32) and in light 
of rule 67 of the 
Committee’s provisional 
rules of procedure 
(CRC/C/4).”513  
The United Nations 
Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) is the body 
playing a specific 
function in following up 
the concluding 
observations of CRC, 
with the support of 
OHCHR and other 
partners.514 
Committee on 
Migrant Workers 
(CMW)515 
It monitors the 
implementation of the 
International 
Convention on the 
“It is composed of 14 
independent experts 
(persons of high moral 
character, impartiality 
 
                                                          
485 http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=7&Lang=En. 
486 United Nations, International Human Rights Instruments, HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009. 
487 UN, Working Methods of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopted at its fifth session (11-15 April 2011), CRPD/C/5/4, 2 September 2011. 
513 Working Methods document retrievable from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx  
514 UN, International Human Rights Instruments, Other activities of the human rights treaty bodies and participation of stakeholders in the human rights treaty body process, 
HRI/MC/2013/3, 22 April 2013, page 4. 
515 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx  
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 Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and 
Members of Their 
Families.516 
and recognized 
competence in the 
field covered by the 
International 
Convention on the 
Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members 
of their Families). 
Members are elected 
for a term of four 
years by States parties 
in accordance with 
article 72 of the 
Convention. Members 
serve in their personal 
capacity and may be 
re-elected if 
nominated. 
Members are elected 
at meetings of States 
parties, in accordance 
with article 72  of the 
Convention.”517 
paragraph 1, of the Convention stipulates that State 
parties are obliged to submit to the Committee 
within two years of the ratification of the 
Convention, and every four years thereafter, a 
report on the implementation of the Convention. 
It is also based on a framework of ‘constructive 
dialogue’ between the Committee and the State. 
The dialogue starts on the basis of a list of issues, 
which according to the working methods document  
“5. On the basis of information at its disposal, the 
Committee will formulate in advance a list of issues 
for which supplementary information to that 
contained in the common-core and treaty-specific 
documents is required. States parties will be 
requested to provide brief and precise replies in 
writing, not exceeding 30 pages. States parties may 
submit additional pages of statistical data, which 
will be made available to Committee members in 
their original format, as submitted.” 
The Committee nominates one or two country 
rapporteurs on each of the reports received by each 
country, and “The country rapporteur(s) shall 
prepare a draft list of issues on the State Party 
report for which they are responsible prior to the 
dialogue, and draft concluding observations 
following the constructive dialogue.”488 
The State reports are examined in a public hearing, 
where all the relevant stakeholders may attend. The 
Committee on the 
Rights of Persons 
It monitors the 
Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
“The Committee is a 
body of 18 
independent 
“It identifies a number of 
specific 
recommendations of 
                                                          
516 Refer to Factsheet No. 24 (Rev 1) 
517 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/Membership.aspx  
488 See http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD/C/5/4&Lang=en. 
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with Disabilities 
(CRPD)518 
 
Disabilities (GA 
resolution 
A/RES/61/106). 
experts which 
monitors 
implementation of the 
Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The 
members of the 
Committee serve in 
their individual 
capacity, not as 
government 
representatives. They 
are elected from a list 
of persons nominated 
by the States at the 
Conference of the State 
Parties for a four year 
term with a possibility 
of being re-elected 
once (cf. Article 34 of 
the Convention).”519 
States are represented by delegations who 
“comprise persons who possess the knowledge, 
competence and authority to explain all aspects of 
the human rights situation of persons with 
disabilities in the reporting State”. 
Following the structured dialogue, the Committee 
will adopt the Concluding Observations which will 
be structured as follows: “Positive aspects • Factors 
and difficulties that impede the implementation of 
the Convention • Principal topics of concern • 
Suggestions and recommendations”. 
“Concluding observations will be made public on 
the last day of the session at which they were 
adopted, and posted on the website of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR).” 
There is also a simplified reporting procedure.489 
The Working Methods are outlined here.490 They 
are founded on the Convention and the 
Committee’s rules of procedures. 
The reporting is carried out following an article by 
article basis, and if necessary on complementary 
information. The focus is on the state of 
implementation and progress achieved and 
obstacle encountered.  
“The Committee encourages the involvement of 
families of victims’ organizations, human rights 
concern in its concluding 
observations and 
requests the State party 
to provide additional 
information, within a 
period of up to one year, 
on implementation of 
those.” 
The Committee may 
request States to provide 
written information on 
the implementation of 
the suggestions and 
recommendations. 
 
“The Committee may 
appoint one of its 
members to serve as 
rapporteur to follow up, 
who will then submit a 
follow-up report to the 
Committee within two 
months of receiving the 
information from the 
State party.”520 
And the Working 
Methods state: 
                                                          
518 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx. 
519 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/QuestionsAnswers.aspx  
489 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Simplifiedreportingprocedure.aspx and 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/OptionalReporting.aspx?TreatyID=4&Lang=En. 
490 Refer to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
520 Quoted from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx . 
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defenders working on the issue of enforced 
disappearance, non-governmental organizations 
and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
in the process of consultations leading to the 
preparation of reports. The Committee also 
encourages civil society stakeholders and NHRIs to 
directly provide to it information on the 
implementation of the provisions of the Convention 
at the national level.”491 
The Committee appoints two or more country 
rapporteurs by report, which carry out the review. 
They draft the list of issues and the concluding 
observations which are then validated by the 
Committee. 
After the report is received,  
“the Committee shall transmit a letter to the State 
party concerned notifying it of the dates, duration 
and venue of the session at which its report will be 
examined as well as a list of issues about which the 
Committee would like to receive additional 
information. The list of issues facilitates the 
preparation by the State party for the constructive 
dialogue; provide a focus for the constructive 
dialogue, without restricting it; and improve the 
efficiency of the reporting system.” 
Also, “In reviewing States Parties reports, the 
Committee may take into consideration 
information originating from other treaty bodies, 
special procedures, in particular the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
“22. The follow-up 
rapporteur will establish 
a deadline, not exceeding 
12 months from the date 
of notification, for States 
parties to submit the 
information requested. 
Once the requested 
information is received 
from the State party, the 
follow-up rapporteur 
will submit a follow-up 
report to the Committee 
within two months. If the 
follow-up rapporteur 
does not receive the 
requested information by 
the deadline, he or she 
will inform the 
Committee.” 
Committee on 
Enforced 
Disappearances 
(CED)521 
 
It monitors the 
International 
Convention for 
the Protection of 
All Persons from 
Enforced 
Disappearance. 
 
It is composed of 10 
independent experts.  
“It requests States parties 
to provide information 
within one year on the 
steps taken to implement 
specific 
recommendations of its 
concluding observations. 
Such recommendations 
are identified because 
they are particularly 
                                                          
491 Point 6 of working methods, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/WorkingMethods.aspx. 
521 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/CEDIndex.aspx  
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and from the United Nations system as well from 
others sources, including regional human rights 
mechanisms, civil society stakeholders and 
NHRIs.” 
The report is examined in the context of a 
‘constructive dialogue’ between the Committee and 
the delegation of the State party. 
serious, urgent, 
protective, and/or can be 
achieved within short 
periods of time. The 
Committee has 
appointed a Follow-up 
Rapporteur, who shall 
assess, in consultation 
with the country 
rapporteurs, the 
information provided by 
the State party and report 
at every session to the 
Committee on her/his 
activities.”522 
 
 
                                                          
522 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx. 
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ANNEX 4 
Rule of law: economic impact and the costs of an 
EU scoreboard 
 
by Prof. Dr Wim Marneffe – Hasselt University – Policy Management Research Group 
 
 
1. The rule of law and economic performance 
1.1. Introduction 
One of the key research questions in economic literature is what causes some countries to 
grow more rapidly than others. Within this strand of literature, the relationship between 
institutions and economic growth has become a dynamic research domain of theoretical 
and empirical analysis by economic, political and legal scholars. Since the 1990s (neo-
)institutional and growth research have crossed paths in the literature and scholars are 
increasingly examining institutional variables and their positive causal relationship with 
growth, investments, employment, etc.523 For the remainder of the present chapter, we 
focus on the rule of law as the institutional variable of interest. The goal is not to provide 
an exhaustive overview of the institutional literature on the impact of the rule of law, but 
to highlight the most important scholars and findings on this topic. As discussed 
extensively in Chapter 2.4, numerous definitions of rule of law are being used, and the 
same appears to be the case in the institutional literature.  
1.2. The concept of rule of law in economic literature 
The institutional literature makes a distinction between a narrow and a broad definition 
of the concept of rule of law. Voigt clearly describes these different approaches used in 
the institutional literature.524 The broad concept of rule of law has various dimensions: 
law and order, citizens’ respect for formal legislation, democracy and human rights. This 
part of the Research Paper presents an overview of the variables/indicators being used in 
the institutional literature to measure the rule of law, such as the separation of powers,525 
judicial constitutional review,526 judicial independence,527 fair trial528 and fundamental 
                                                          
523 See e.g. Acemonlu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. ‘The colonial origins of comparative 
development: empirical investment’. American Economic Review, 91, 1369-1386 (2001); Acemoglu, D., 
Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. A. ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’, in Aghion, 
P. and Durlauf, S. (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, North Holland, Amsterdam, 385-
472 (2005); Easterly, W. and Levine, R., ‘Tropics, germs, and crops: How endowments influence 
economic development’, 50 Journal of Monetary Economics 1, 3–39 (2003); Rodrik, D., Subramanian, 
A. and Trebbi, F. ‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in 
economic development’, Natl. Bur. Econ. Res. Work. Pap. 9305 (2002). 
524 Voigt, S. ‘How to measure the rule of law’. Kyklos, 65(2), 262-284 (2012). 
525 Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer and P. Walsh (2001), “New Tools and New Tests in 
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions” World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 165-176. 
526 La Porta, R. ‘Judicial Checks and Balances’. J. Pol. Econ., 112, 445-470 (2004). 
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rights.529 The author also finds that the correlation between the various dimensions of the 
rule of law is also quite low, which shows that these dimensions are not perfect 
substitutes for each other and should be measured separately. Skąpska outlines a 
theoretical framework for the economic importance of the rule of law.530 Rational law 
presents a necessary condition for economic transactions, and its application creates a 
sense of foreseeability and predictability on the part of economic agents. The latter is a 
necessary condition in order for rational economic actions to occur. Butkiewicz & 
Yanikkaya state that most developed economies are characterised by two dimensions: 
democracy and the rule of law.531 While the empirical evidence clearly reflects the rule of 
law’s impact on economic growth, democracy’s impact is less straightforward.  
1.3. Theoretical and empirical relationship between rule of law and 
economic performance 
One of the most interesting studies in this research domain is Haggard & Tiede.532 The 
authors identify four major theoretical routes from the rule of law to economic growth: 
through the mitigation of violence; through protection of property rights; through 
institutional checks on government; and through control of private capture and 
corruption. For each of these four theoretical routes, we highlight some of the major 
empirical studies: 
- Reducing violence: The first studies on the rule of law focused almost entirely 
on the provision of security. The logic is that it makes little sense to discuss 
security of property or the contract integrity if economic agents themselves 
are not secure.533 Numerous studies have demonstrated the impact of 
reducing violence on economic growth and job creation. For instance, the 
World Bank estimated that decreasing the homicide rate by 10% increased 
per capita GDP by 0.7–2.9% over the subsequent five years.534 
                                                                                                                                                               
527 Feld, L.P. and Voigt, S. ‘Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence 
using a new set of indicators’. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 497-527 (2003). 
528 Hathaway, O. (2002), “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
111, No. 8, pp. 1935-2042.  
529 Cingranelli, D.L. ‘The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) human rights data project’. Human Rights 
Quarterly, 32, 395-418 (2004). 
530 Skąpska, G. ‘The rule of law, economic transformation and corruption after the fall of the Berlin 
wall’. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 1(2), 284-306 (2009). 
531 Butkiewicz, J.L. and Yanikkaya, H. ‘Institutional quality and economic growth: Maintenance of 
the rule of law or democratic institutions, or both?’. Economic Modelling, 23(4), 648-661 (2006). 
532 Haggard, S. and Tiede, L. ‘The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?’. World 
Development, 39(5), 673-685 (2011). 
533 See e.g. Belton, R. ‘Competing definitions of the rule of law: Implications for practitioners’. 
Carnegie. Rule of Law Ser. #55. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow. Int. Peace (2005); Black, B., 
Kraakman, R. and Tarassova, A. ‘Russian privatization and corporate governance: what went 
wrong?’. Stanford Law Review, 1731-1808 (2000); Narayan-Parker, D. and Patel, R. ‘Voices of the 
poor: can anyone hear us?’, World Bank Publications, Vol. 1 Oxford Univ. Press, New York (2000). 
534 World Bank. ‘Crime, violence and economic development in Brazil: Elements for effective public 
policy’. Washington, D.C. Working Paper No. 36525 (2006). 
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- Protection of property rights: Among economists, the central theoretical 
mechanisms that connects the rule of law and economic prosperity are 
property rights and contract enforcement.535  
- Institutional checks on governments: For most economists, institutional checks 
on executive discretion, including through independent judiciaries, are also 
part of the broad concept of the rule of law. Henisz has conducted the most 
comprehensive effort to construct a cross-national database of institutional 
checks on government.536 The author finds a significant and positive 
relationship between such checks and economic growth, foreign direct 
                                                          
535 See e.g. Alchian, A.A. ‘Some economics of property rights’. Il politico, 816-829 (1965); Alchian, 
A.A. and Demsetz, H. ‘The property right paradigm’. The Journal of Economic History, 33(01), 16-27 
(1973); Coase, R.H. ‘The problem of social cost’. Journal of Law and Economics, 3. 1-44 (1960); 
Demsetz, H. ‘Toward a theory of property rights’. American Economic Review, 57, 347-359 (1967); 
Williamson, O.E. ‘The vertical integration of production: market failure considerations’. The 
American Economic Review, 61(2), 112-123 (1971); Williamson, O.E. ‘The Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism Firms Markets Relational Contracting’. The Free Press, New York (1985); Asoni, A. 
‘Protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria’. Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(5), 
953-987 (2008); Barzel, Y. ‘Economic analysis of property rights’. Cambridge University Press, New 
York (1997); Furubotn, E.G. and Pejovich, S. ‘Property rights and economic theory: a survey of 
recent literature’. Journal of Economic Literature, 10(4), 1137-1162 (1972); Dam, K.W. ‘The law-growth 
nexus: The rule of law and economic development.’ Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 
(2007); Haber, S., Maurer, N. and Razo, A. ‘The politics of property rights: political instability, credible 
commitments, and economic growth in Mexico, 1876-1929’. Cambridge University Press, New York 
(2003); North, D.C. ‘Institutions, institutional change and economic performance’. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (1990); North, D.C. ‘Structure and change in economic history’. W.W. Norton, New 
York (1981); North, D.C. and Thomas, R.P. ‘The rise of the western world: A new economic history’. 
Cambridge University Press, New York (1973). In economic literature almost all studies clearly find 
that more robust property rights protection leads to significantly improved long-term economic 
performance (Asoni, A. ‘Protection of property rights and growth as political equilibria’. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 22(5), 953-987 (2008); Barro, R. J. ‘Determinants of economic growth: A cross-country 
empirical study.’ National Bureau of Economic Research. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1997); Clague, 
C., Keefer, P., Knack, S. and Olson, M. (1996). ‘Property and contract rights in autocracies and 
democracies’. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), 243-276; Keefer, P. ‘Beyond legal origin and checks 
and balances: Political credibility, citizen information, and financial sector development’. World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4154 (2007); Knack, S. and Keefer, P. ‘Institutions and 
economic performance: cross‐ country tests using alternative institutional measures’. Economics & 
Politics, 7(3), 207-227 (1995); Scully, G.W. ‘The institutional framework and economic development’. 
The Journal of Political Economy, 652-662 (1988); Zak, P.J. and Knack, S. ‘Trust and growth’. The 
Economic Journal, 111 (470), 295-321 (2001); Alston, L.J. and Libecap, G.D. ‘The determinants and 
impact of property rights: Land titles on the Brazilian frontier’. Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 12(1), 25-61 (1996); Anderson, T.L. and Hill, P.J. ‘The evolution of property rights: a 
study of the American West’. The Journal of Law & Economics, 18(1), 163-179 (1975); Bazzi, S. and 
Clemens, M. (2009). ‘Blunt instruments: On establishing the causes of economic growth’. Center for 
Global Development, Working Paper No. 171 (2009); Libecap, G.D. ‘Contracting for property rights’. 
Cambridge University Press, New York (1989); Kaufmann, D. The worldwide governance indicators 
project: answering the critics (Vol. 4149). World Bank Publications (2007); Malesky, E. and Taussig, M. 
‘Out of the gray: The impact of provincial institutions on business formalization in Vietnam’. 
Journal of East Asian Studies, 9(2), 249-290 (2009). 
536 Henisz, W.J. ‘The institutional environment for economic growth’. Economics & Politics, 12(1), 1-
31 (2000); Henisz, W.J. ‘The institutional environment for multinational investment’. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 16(2), 334-364 (2000). 
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investment, and investment in infrastructure.537 In a seminal article, La Porta 
et al. proxy judicial independence through objective indicators such as 
judicial tenure and the lawmaking power of judicial decisions, and show that 
independence has positive effects on the security of property rights.538 
However, another study finds that judicial independence is not associated 
with long-term growth.539 These divergent findings are explained by Feld & 
Voigt, who make a distinction between the ‘de facto’ (actual independence as 
enjoyed by judges) and the ‘de jure’ measures (independence from looking at 
the letter of the law) of the rule of law.540 The authors find that whereas GDP 
growth (1980–98) is not affected by de jure independence measures, such as 
formal institutional arrangements, it is affected by de facto independence, 
such as the effective length of terms and trends in budgets. 
- Control of corruption: Since the 1990s scholars have been increasingly 
examining the link between corruption and economic growth. Mauro 
indicated that greater corruption (measured by surveys of investors) leads to 
lower investment and growth.541 Numerous other studies followed which 
showed that countries facing less corruption are associated with greater 
economic development.542 
Haggart & Tiede perform an interesting cross-country study of 74 developing and 
transition economies in the 2003-07 period.543 They grouped 11 indicators for the rule of 
law into the four dimensions as discussed above. Interestingly, the authors find that the 
correlations across various rule of law measures are mostly lower than expected, which 
reflects a previous finding that the impact of the rule of law on economic growth is 
dependent on the indicator used.544 The authors do find that the dimension positively 
                                                          
537 See also Stasavage, D. ‘Private investment and political institutions’. Economics & Politics, 14(1), 
41-63 (2002); Stasavage, D. ‘Public debt and the Birth of the democratic state: France and Great Britain 
1688–1789’. Cambridge University Press, New York (2003). 
538 La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. ‘The quality of government’. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and organization, 15(1), 222-279 . (1999). 
539 Glaeser, E.L. and Shleifer, A. ‘Legal origins’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1193-1229 (2002). 
540 Feld, L.P. and Voigt, S. ‘Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence 
using a new set of indicators’. European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 497-527 (2003). 
541 Mauro, P. ‘Corruption and growth’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 681-712 (1995). 
542 E.g. Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. ‘Rents, competition, and corruption’. The American Economic 
Review, 89(4), 982-993 (1997); La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. ‘The 
quality of government’. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 222-279 (1999); Keefer, P. 
and Knack, S. ‘Polarization, politics and property rights: Links between inequality and growth’. 
Public Choice, 111(1-2), 127-154 (2002); Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R. ‘Corruption's effect on growth 
and its transmission channels’. Kyklos, 57(3), 429-456 (2004); Wei, S.J. ‘How taxing is corruption on 
international investors?’. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1), 1-11 (2000); Treisman, D. ‘The 
causes of corruption: a cross-national study’. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 399-457 (2000); 
Treisman, D. ‘What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national 
empirical research?’. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 10, 211-244 (2007). 
543 Haggard, S. and Tiede, L. ‘The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We?’, 39 World 
Development 5, 673-685 (2011). 
544 Arndt, C. and Oman, C. ‘Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators’. Paris: Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. Development Centre Series (2006). 
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and significantly impacts long-term economic growth. The corruption dimension appears 
to be the strongest and has the most significant impact on economic performance.545 
The economic literature has seen a remarkable increase in the number of studies 
examining the causal relationship between the rule of law and economic performance of 
countries. Part of this increased attention stems from the discussion on the ‘right’ 
measures or indicators for the rule of law. On the one hand some scholars make use of 
subjective indicators, which means they are based on expert evaluations or surveys 
among investors or citizens. On the other hand, scholars are implementing so-called 
‘objective’ indicators that capture features of the institutional and legal environment. This 
difference between subjective and objective indicators has been an ongoing point of 
controversy. Glaeser et al. argue that scholars should limit their analysis to “objective” 
measurement due to the risk of bias in subjective measures.546 Kurtz & Schrank also show 
that the significance of subjective governance variables disappears in cross-country 
growth regressions when controlling for economic performance.547 
1.4. Summary 
To sum up, we can see that authors of the economic literature are increasingly examining 
the relationship between the rule of law and economic performance of countries. In the 
beginning this literature was mostly theoretical and focused on the relevance of property 
rights and security. In recent decades authors have more frequently used a broad 
definition of the rule of law to examine the impact of corruption, judicial independence, 
etc. Furthermore, authors still debate the use of objective versus subjective indicators of 
the rule of law, which could lead to divergent results, but in general the broad consensus 
remains that a higher degree of rule of law is associated with increased economic 
performance of countries. Further research in the coming decades can, it is hoped, 
provide more insights into which dimensions of the rule of law have the most significant 
economic impact. 
2. Costs of the EU Scoreboard on the rule of law 
The European Union is likely to reap substantial societal benefits from a well-designed 
and -enforced Scoreboard. Yet the setup and maintenance of such a Scoreboard will also 
entail non-negligible costs. The assessment of these costs is made on the basis of a 
permanent multi-actor and multi-method annual insourced Scoreboard cycle to monitor 
and enforce the rule of law throughout the Union, administered by an independent EU 
Rule of Law Commission . The Scoreboard is not a standardised benchmarking system 
(which would significantly reduce its costs, but also its benefits) (see Chapter 4.5). 
                                                          
545 See also Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. ‘Governance matters VII: Aggregate and 
individual governance indicators for 1996–2007’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
4654. Washington, D.C. (2008); Skaaning, S.E. ‘Corruption in the post-communist countries: A 
study of its particularity and diversity’, in Backes, U., Jaskulowski, T. and Polese, A. (eds). 
Totalitarismus und Transformation: Defizite der Demokratiekonsolidierung in Mittel-und Osteuropa, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen (2009). 
546 Glaeser, E.L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. Do institutions cause growth?. 
Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 271-303 (2004). 
547 Kurtz, M.J. and Schrank, A. ‘Growth and governance: A defense’. Journal of Politics, 69(2), 563-
569 (2007). 
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In assessing the costs of such a Scoreboard, a clear distinction has to be made between (1) 
the preparatory and implementation phase, (2) the Monitor and the Monitored States, 
and (3) the three scenarios of adherence to the rule of law. 
 
2.1. Costs in the preparatory phase  
 
2.1.1. Monitor 
 
The preparatory phase starts with the set-up of the EU Rule of Law Commission . Set-up 
costs include the selection of independent scholars who will administer the Scoreboard 
process, guaranteeing the objectivity, impartiality and scientific soundness of the 
assessment methods used in the EU Scoreboard. The EU Rule of Law Commission 
(henceforth, ‘the Monitor’) will be responsible for the actual monitoring and evaluation of 
the rule of law. 
 
Next, the Monitor has to develop the final Scoreboard and help to set up an 
organisational model. As a result, the Monitor will incur information and planning 
costs. They comprise the costs of building the Scoreboard (determining which variables 
shall be included and how information shall be gathered, e.g. country visits), identifying 
and making agreements with cooperating partners (e.g. CoE), setting up a timetable for 
the annual process, developing a sanctioning mechanism, and establishing the 
organisation that will manage the Scoreboard on a daily basis (i.e. quantifying the need 
for data collectors and (IT-)administrators, screening, hiring or reallocating as well as 
training of personnel, etc.).  
 
Furthermore, the Monitor will incur some one-shot start-up costs for infrastructure 
(office equipment, ICT, etc.). 
 
2.1.2. Monitored States 
 
The Monitored States will also incur information and planning costs (getting acquainted 
with the Scoreboard (e.g. organising get-to-know work-shops), preparing and organising 
the national administration to meet the reporting demands, training of personnel, hiring 
or reallocating personnel, as well as infrastructural costs (office equipment, information 
and communications technology, etc.).  
 
Furthermore, the Member States may engage in lobbying activities to influence the final 
design of the Scoreboard. While these so-called ‘rent-seeking costs’ are difficult to 
measure, they cannot be ignored. 
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2.2. Costs in the implementation phase 
2.2.1. Monitor 
 
Once the Scoreboard methodology and timetable are elaborated, the Monitor will start 
the annual cycle of gathering, collecting, interpreting, discussing, monitoring and 
evaluating country-specific information on the rule of law. The implementation phase 
entails operational, administrative, monitoring and enforcement costs. In regulatory 
impact assessment, a clear and strict distinction is made between these cost categories. 
However, since the essence of the Scoreboard is to inform and monitor, the 
administrative and monitoring costs are part of the operational costs, which include: 
compensation of staff and/or external consultants gathering and collecting information, 
compensation of the Copenhagen experts interpreting and evaluating information, 
country visits, drawing up of annual (country-specific) reports, etc.  
 
If the Monitored States do not comply with their reporting duties on the rule of law, the 
Monitor will have to take steps to obtain the necessary information, thus incurring 
informational enforcement costs (additional costs of data collection).  
 
Since the Scoreboard system will be used for upholding European values, a mechanism 
will be implemented that will remedy any breach of those values and reverse negative 
trends. As the breaches of the rule of law are more severe, costs are likely to rise. Three 
scenarios have to be distinguished. In the scenarios 1 and 2, breaches are such that the 
Monitored State is willing to self-remedy them. The Scoreboard mechanism then follows 
a “sunshine policy”, which will engage the Monitored States in self-remedying and/or 
self-reversing. The enforcement costs of the Monitor are thus relatively limited, 
especially since the burden of proof is shifted to the Monitored States (see Chapter 4.9). 
 
Scenario 3 is fundamentally different from the first two and involves a Member State 
which undermines democracy and the rule of law. There is no indication that this State 
will return to the rule of law by its own initiative. It follows that the sunshine policy does 
not apply. In this third scenario, enforcement costs are incurred by starting an 
infringement procedure and drafting an inter-institutional agreement that – in case of 
breach of the rule of law – will impose sanctions.  
2.2.2. Monitored States 
 
The costs incurred by the Monitored States in the implementation phase are to a large 
extent the mirror image of the Monitor’s. The States will also have to gather information 
and provide it to the Monitor. The interpretation of the raw data will require and be the 
subject of a discussion between the Monitor and the Monitored State. The annual 
Scoreboard cycle thus entails operational, administrative, monitoring and enforcement 
costs for the Monitored States. As mentioned, in regulatory impact assessment, the 
administrative burden and monitoring costs are typically distinguished from the 
operational costs. But in the case of the Scoreboard, both will fall under operational costs 
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and include: additional or imputed compensation of staff and/or compensation of 
external consultants gathering and collecting information, presenting the information in 
the Copenhagen format, interpreting and evaluating information internally, organising 
country visits, discussing information with the Copenhagen group, etc. If the Monitored 
State does not fully comply with its reporting duties, it will have to allocate additional 
resources to provide the information required by the Monitor (compliance costs). 
 
As mentioned, when a breach of rule of law is observed, three different scenarios may 
apply. Scenarios 1 and 2 assume that the Monitored State is willing to solve the problem. 
The Scoreboard mechanism thus follows a “sunshine policy”. In those scenarios, the costs 
of remedying and/or reversing the breach of the rule of law are primarily borne by the 
Monitored State. Since the enforcement costs of the Monitor in the first and second 
scenarios are relatively limited, the bulk of the costs are the State’s compliance costs 
(changing laws or policies, etc.).  
 
However, in the third scenario, where the Scoreboard process indicates that a Member 
State is undermining democracy and the rule of law and there is no indication that this 
Member State will return to the rule of law by its own initiative, the sunshine policy does 
not apply. The Monitored States thus faces substantial enforcement costs (procedural 
costs, financial sanctions, economic sanctions, etc.). 
 
2.3. Economies of scale and efficiency gains 
 
As previously pointed out, there is a common understanding “not to reinvent the wheel” 
and avoid duplications. Concretely, the costs of the Scoreboard on the rule of law can be 
substantially reduced if the European Union realises the economies of scale that are 
within reach, by cooperating with the Council of Europe and the United Nations and 
relying on their existing mechanisms while complementing them with EU-specific 
elements. This third-party approach will also strengthen the objective and perceived 
impartiality of the Scoreboard, which in turn will increase the political support by the 
Monitored States.  
 
Bringing all existing information (from CoE and UN) as well as new EU-specific 
information on the rule of law under the umbrella of one Monitor (i.e. the EU Rule of 
Law Commission ) also has several cost advantages. First of all, in building its own 
institutional capacity to assess the rule of law, the European Union avoids wasting time 
and money on discussing legal inconsistencies that might arise from the special 
characteristics of the EU legal system.  
 
Second, the Monitor can and should uphold a timetable that is consistent with other EU-
reporting activities (instead of relying on CoE or UN). In order to reduce the 
administrative burden on the Monitored States, the reporting duties of the Monitored 
States should indeed be bundled. One way to achieve efficiency gains might be to link the 
EU Scoreboard on the rule of law to the timetable of the European Semester and Cycle of 
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Economic Governance. However, since a Scoreboard is incapable of catching the most 
atrocious violations and detecting internal linkages sufficiently, a comprehensive and 
qualitative assessment is recommended. Moreover, the purpose of the Scoreboard is not 
only to monitor but also to enforce. Unfortunately, the recommendations following the 
European Semester have so far not been enforced adequately.548  
2.4. Summary 
 
The costs of setting up and maintaining a Scoreboard on the rule of law are summarised 
in Table 1, which makes a clear distinction between the costs borne by the Monitor and 
the Monitored States in the two phases of preparation and implementation and in the 
three scenarios of (non-)compliance. The analysis is based on the concept of a permanent 
annual insourced Scoreboard cycle administered by an independent EU Rule of Law 
Commission .  
 
Table 1. Scoreboard costs 
 Monitor Monitored States 
 
Preparatory phase  
(one-shot costs) 
Expert group set-up costs *  
Information and planning costs * * 
Infrastructural costs * * 
Rent-seeking costs  * 
 
Implementation phase  
(recurrent costs  
 on annual basis) 
Operational costs * * 
 (Administrative costs) * * 
 (Monitoring costs) *  
Compliance costs (information)  * 
Enforcement costs (information) *  
Compliance costs (scenarios 1, 2)  * 
Enforcement costs (scenario 3) * * 
 
Although the precise format of the Scoreboard has not yet been determined (hence the 
cost categories cannot be monetised precisely), the operational costs of the Monitor in the 
implementation phase of a stand-alone Scoreboard (no economies of scale) can be 
estimated at €4 million per year, based on the experience of the Venice Commission. If 
the EU decides to cooperate with the CoE, some important economies of scale can be 
realised. However, the unknown cost factor today lies precisely in the degree of 
specificity of the EU Scoreboard on the rule of law (which data of CoE can and cannot be 
used, which additional data have to be collected) and the enforcement mechanism (how 
much manpower is needed to follow up serious breaches as described in scenario 3). 
                                                          
548 See e.g. Darvas, Z. and Leandro, Á. ‘The Limitations of Policy Coordination in the Euro Area 
Under the European Semester‘, Brussels: Bruegel Institute, Policy Contribution 2015/19, November 
2015; Deroose, S. and Griesse, J. ‘Implementing Economic Reforms – are EU Member States 
Responding to European Semester recommendations?’, Brussels: European Commission, ECF in 
Economic Brief 37, October 2014. 
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This final section discusses the benefits of a rule of law monitoring instrument. First of 
all, there are non-economic benefits relating to the improved quality of the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights. These non-economic benefits are captured by an improved 
(sense of) well-being of individuals and increased level of confidence in society (in 
general) and in other individuals and businesses (in particular). These benefits have 
already been discussed extensively and will not be detailed in this section. Secondly, we 
have the economic benefits of a rule of law monitoring system. These effects are 
discussed in the literature review above. Improving the rule of law leads to increased 
confidence of consumers and/or investors, leading to increased transactions and 
consequently investments (in employment, capital, etc.). The empirical literature has 
shown that the growth effects of improvements in the level of rule of law are significant. 
The potential of growth, however, differs between countries based on their previous level 
of rule of law and other growth factors. Currently, no detailed study examines the effects 
of an overall improvement in the rule of law in Europe on growth. Thus the consensus is 
that a rule of law improvement will lead to additional growth, though the degree of 
growth will differ from country to country. 
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